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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN CORPORATE FINANCE
Daniel Kim
Amir Yaron
Lucian A. Taylor
The first chapter “Shareholder Recovery and Leverage” estimates shareholder recovery rate
and examines its implications on firm outcomes, including leverage. A positive recovery rate
makes shareholders more willing to default, which increases borrowing costs. In response,
firms lower leverage ex-ante. This channel helps to match distributions of both leverage and
default probabilities. Structural estimation reveals a dramatic change over time in the U.S.
bankruptcy system: shareholder recovery rate increased from roughly zero to 29% around
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, and has gradually decreased back to zero. Finally, I
show that a positive shareholder recovery rate has a quantitatively large effect on leverage,
default probabilities, firm value, and government tax revenue.
In the second chapter “Measurement Error in Multiple Equations”, co-authored with Karim
Chalak, we econometrically characterize the identification regions for the coefficients in a
system of linear equations under the classical measurement error assumptions. We demon-
strate the identification gain that results from jointly considering the equations, as opposed
to separately. We apply this framework to COMPUSTAT data and analyze the effects of
cash flow on the investment, saving, and debt of firms when Tobin’s q is used as an error-
laden proxy for marginal q. Using our framework, we document a considerable identification
gain that results from analyzing the investment, saving, and debt equations jointly. Further,
the measurement error in Tobins q can reconcile the discrepancy with the theories if, and
only if, Tobin’s q is a noisy proxy for marginal q. If a researcher maintains that Tobins q
is a moderately accurate proxy for marginal q, then we show that a more elaborate theory
or specification must be considered.
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CHAPTER 1 : Shareholder Recovery and Leverage
1.1. Introduction
In the United States, the absolute priority rule1 states that shareholders should recover
nothing in default unless creditors are paid in full. However, shareholders have received
a positive payoff due to a sequence of historical events, notably the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978. Between 1970 and 2005, shareholders received a positive payoff in 30.3% of
bankruptcy instances (Bharath, Panchapegesan and Werner, 2007). In this paper, I use
U.S. data to study the economic consequences of a positive shareholder recovery rate. To
that end, using a dynamic model, this paper structurally estimates shareholder recovery
rate and conducts counterfactual analysis.
The key insight of the dynamic model is as follows. When shareholders expect to receive
a positive payoff in default, they choose to strategically default sooner, which increases
borrowing costs, reducing optimal leverage ex-ante. Shareholders would like to commit to
zero recovery in default because this would enable them to take higher leverage ex-ante,
which generates a greater tax shield benefit. Yet, due to the unique nature of the bankruptcy
system in the United States, shareholders sometimes are able to recover some value ex-post,
and thus the commitment to zero recovery is not credible. This commitment problem is
amplified by allowing default to be costly even when shareholders receive a positive payoff
by renegotiating with creditors. The costly default contrasts with model implications of Fan
and Sundaresan (2000) and yet is realistic and consistent with empirical findings (Andrade
and Kaplan, 1998). As default cost increases, borrowing costs, conditional on leverage,
increase, reducing optimal leverage ex-ante. Taken together, this commitment problem can
help explain the observed leverage, and thus addresses the “underleverage puzzle,” which
states that the “trade-off theory” produces counterfactually high leverage levels when given
realistic default costs. (Miller, 1977; Graham, 2000)
1See the U.S. Bankruptcy Code §1129(b)(2)(B)(ii))
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How much does this commitment problem reduce leverage? I address this question by
estimating the structural parameters of my model, targeting leverage and default proba-
bilities. I am able to identify shareholder recovery rate and default cost in the following
way. I define shareholder recovery rate as a fraction of remaining firm value before default
cost is realized. Accordingly, shareholder recovery increases with shareholder recovery rate
although it does not move with respect to changes in default costs. Thus, conditional on
leverage, in making a strategic default decision, shareholders consider their recovery rate
and yet do not consider default cost. This implies that conditional default probabilities
increase with shareholder recovery rate but do not move with respect to changes to default
cost. The difference in sensitivities of conditional default probabilities with respect to the
two structural parameters helps to separately identify them. Then, I structurally estimate
for the representative firm similar to Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007).2
I document dramatic changes over time in the U.S. bankruptcy system. As Hackbarth,
Haselmann and Schoenherr (2015) show, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 increased
shareholders’ bargaining power vis-a´-vis creditors, and thus shareholder recovery rate in-
reased. In order to test this, similar to Hackbarth et al., I form two subperiods, 1975Q1-
1978Q3 and 1981Q2-1984Q4. Between these two subperiods, I allow tax rates to vary in
order to account for the other concurrent change: the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.
Consistent with Hackbarth et al.’s finding, my structural estimation shows that shareholder
recovery rates statistically significantly increased from 0.1% to 29%, whereas default cost
statistically insignificantly increased from 19.0% to 21.0%. In response to the change in
shareholder recovery rates, firms optimally lowered leverage ex-ante by 32.0%. This shows
that allowing a positive shareholder recovery rate better explains the empirically observed
leverage than does the “trade-off theory.” Due to lower leverage, default probabilities de-
creased by 62.5%, and credit spreads decreased by 5.4%. Because firms took less advantage
of tax shield benefits, firm values decreased by 5.0% and government tax revenue, defined
2In addition, in order to analyze how shareholder recovery rates vary across firms, I structurally estimate
shareholder recovery rate for each subset of firms.
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as a contingent claim to the future tax revenue, increased by 22.2%. Lastly, lower default
probabilities, driven by a positive shareholder recovery, implied less frequent realization of
deadweight cost. Thus, the sum of firm values and government tax revenue increased by
4.4%.
After a subsequent series of contractual innovations in the bankruptcy process (Skeel, 2003;
Bharath, Panchapegesan and Werner, 2007), shareholders’ bargaining power vis-a´-vis cred-
itors steadily decreased, and thus shareholder recovery rate decreased. After accounting
for changes in tax rates, my estimates for shareholder recovery rate show the consistent
trend: 19.9% between 1985Q1 and 1994Q4; 3.8% between 1995Q1 and 2004Q4; and 0.97%
between 2005Q1 and 2016Q4. On the other hand, default cost did not significantly change
from one subperiod to the next.
Similar to the existing empirical literature on the capital structure, I also estimate model
parameters based on the long sample period, 1970Q1-2016Q4. The implied shareholder
recovery rate was 7.1% and the implied default cost was 17.3%. Compared to the coun-
terfactual world where shareholder recovery rate is set to zero, firms’ optimal leverage was
9.4% lower. Due to lower leverage, default probabilities were 8.1% lower, and credit spreads
were 1.7% lower. Moreover, firm values were 1.5% lower, government tax revenue was 9.9%
greater, and the sum of firm values and government tax revenue was 0.9% greater.
My empirical strategy complements existing literature that relies on natural experiment
and direct measurement. Even though results from a natural experiment can be instruc-
tive, due to other concurrent changes, it is empirically challenging to tease out the impact
of a positive shareholder recovery rate. For example, a seemingly ideal setting for a natural
experiment is the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. However, the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981 changed tax rates almost simultaneously and thus it is hard to disentangle the
impact of shareholder recovery rate from the impact of tax rate. Moreover, it is empirically
challenging to use a natural experiment by itself to estimate an unobservable parameter
such as shareholders’ expected recovery rate. Direct measurement analysis calculates a
3
sample average of shareholder recovery rates among bankrupt firms. While instructive,
these results may suffer from sample-selection bias because firms with lower shareholder
recovery rates default more frequently. This paper bases estimates on a broad cross-section
of firms, including both bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms, and thus is immune from the
sample-selection bias. Using direct measurement analysis, literature estimates shareholder
recovery rate to be between 0.4% and 7.6% (Eberhart, Moore and Roenfeldt, 1990; Franks
and Torous, 1989; Betker, 1995; Bharath, Panchapegesan and Werner, 2007). Even before
accounting for the sample-selection bias, this paper’s structural estimate of 7.1% for share-
holder recovery rate during 1970Q1-2016Q4 is in-line with direct measurement analysis’
estimates.
Admittedly, a structural estimation has limitations. One limitation is that it is hard to
account for heterogeneity across firms. This limitation makes it empirically challenging
to structurally estimate the sample-selection bias.3 Firm heterogeneity can arise due to
multiple sources, such as heterogeneous shareholder recovery rates or heterogeneous model
misspecification. Because the sample-selection bias arises due to heterogeneous shareholder
recovery rates but not due to heterogeneous model misspecification, estimating the sample-
selection bias requires identifying a portion of heterogeneity that arises only due to the
former. Unfortunately, the structural estimation cannot distinguish between these two
sources; thus, structural estimation for the sample-selection bias is significantly biased. Due
to this limitation, I do not target the result of direct measurement analysis in the structural
estimation. Moreover, the limitation implies that researchers might need to revisit the
structural estimation of the sample-selection bias (Glover, 2016).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Immediately following the introduction is
the literature review. Section 1.2 discusses in detail the sequence of events in the United
States that allowed shareholders to receive a positive payoff. Section 1.3 develops the
model and Section 1.4 discusses the estimation procedure. Section 1.5 presents my empirical
3The structural estimation for the representative firm properly addresses heterogeneity thanks to the law
of large numbers.
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results on model fit, parameter estimates, and economic consequences. Section 1.6 discusses
robustness, and Section 1.7 concludes.
Literature Review First, there is growing literature on shareholder recovery rate in
default. Shareholders can recover non-negative value in default because shareholders can
threaten to exercise several options.4 Credibility of these threats is best illustrated in East-
ern Airlines’ bankruptcy case in 1989 (Weiss and Wruck, 1998). Thus, creditors are forced
to accept shareholders’ renegotiating terms and this naturally allows shareholders to recoup
non-zero residual value in default. Accordingly, using pre-2000 samples on defaulted firms,
a number of empirical papers (Eberhart, Moore and Roenfeldt, 1990; Franks and Torous,
1989; Betker, 1995) document that shareholders recover 2.28% to 7.6% of the remaining firm
value on average. However, a subsequent series of contractual innovations in the bankruptcy
process (Skeel, 2003) decreased shareholder recovery rate ever since. Shareholders recover
0.4% of the remaining firm value on average in 2000Q1-2005Q4 period (Bharath, Pan-
chapegesan and Werner, 2007). Although these results are instructive, their measures could
potentially suffer from sample-selection bias in estimating population cross-sectional mean
of shareholder recovery rates, whereas my structural estimation is immune from the bias.
Moreover, consistent with documented time-series variation, my subperiods analysis (see
Figure 4) yields a downward trend in shareholder recovery rate.
The second strand of literature that this paper relates to is on the underleverage puzzle.
Using various approaches, a few papers (Altman, 1984; Andrade and Kaplan, 1998) estimate
default cost to be between 10% and 20%. However, researchers find that the empirically
observed default cost is too low to justify empirically observed leverage (Miller, 1977; Gra-
ham, 2000). In response to this concern, Almeida and Philippon (2007), Elkamhi, Ericsson
and Parsons (2012), Ju et al. (2005), Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev (2010), and Chen
(2010) use various approaches to address the puzzle. More recently, Glover (2016) esti-
4These include 1) an option to take risky actions (asset substitution), 2) an option to enter costly
Chapter 11, 3) an option to delay the Chapter 11 process if entered and 4) an option not to preserve tax
loss carryfowards (for asset sales).
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mates population default cost to be much larger (45%) and attributes sample-selection bias
as a possible reason behind the large discrepancy between his estimate and other empirical
work. In an attempt to address the same puzzle, this paper uses shareholders’ strategic
default action driven by a positive shareholder recovery.
Similar to this paper, Morellec, Nikolov and Schurhoff (2012) allow shareholders to receive
a positive payoff and obtain a number for shareholder recovery rate. They set liquidation
cost to be 46%, assume the liquidation cost to be a bargaining surplus between creditors
and shareholders, and assume that shareholders are as equally powerful as creditors are in
bargaining. This implies that default is not costly when shareholders and creditors bargain
and shareholders recover 23% in default. The gap between Morellec et al.’s estimate and
the direct measurement analysis estimate is too large to be reconciled only by the sample-
selection bias. This paper allows default to be costly, focuses on the commitment problem
driven by shareholder recovery rate, and obtains a shareholder recovery rate that is more
in line with the previously documented numbers, between 0.4% and 7.6%.
More recently, by using a model that forces firms to roll over a fixed fraction of debt,
Reindl, Stoughton and Zechner (2017) estimate default cost to be 20%. Although Reindl
et al.’s estimate is similar to mine, we differ in a few major areas. Most importantly, I
allow shareholders to receive a positive payoff and this extension makes the model general
enough to capture some types of debt covenants. Absent such an extension, as Reindl et
al. argues, debt covenants could have prevented shareholders from strategically defaulting.
Next, Reindl et al. argues that Glover’s estimate is significantly upward biased due to
a model misspecification in explaining leverage, and motivates the authors’ choice not to
match leverage. As discussed in Section 1.6.4, I show that the first-order reason behind
Glover’s large estimate is due to Glover’s particular choice of estimation procedure, which
is conducted at each firm level. Moreover, I show that the structural estimation procedure,
which is used by Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007), and used in this paper, suffers signif-
icantly less from a model misspecification problem and thus validates use of leverage as a
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matching moment. Lastly, I allow firms to optimally choose an upward refinancing point.
The third strand of literature that this paper relates to is as follows. Noting the importance
of a positive shareholder recovery, Fan and Sundaresan (2000) model strategic interactions
between creditors and shareholders and their model is adopted in a number of recent pa-
pers (Davydenko and Strebulaev, 2007; Garlappi, Shu and Yan, 2008; Garlappi and Yan,
2011; Morellec, Nikolov and Schurhoff, 2012; Hackbarth, Haselmann and Schoenherr, 2015;
Boualam, Gomes and Ward, 2017). Yet, their models typically assume that firms do not
incur any default cost in equilibrium, whereas my model allows firms to incur default cost.
Finally, Green (2018) studies how valuable a restrictive debt covenant is in reducing agency
costs of debt. As the author focuses on refinancing, he models firms’ default decision as
random events. On the contrary, I take firms’ strategic default decision more seriously and
study how it impacts firms’ financing. Although I do not explicitly model covenants in my
model, a cash-flow-based covenant can be one-to-one matched with shareholder recovery
rate and have the similar effect on firms’ optimal leverage ex-ante (see Section 1.3.1 for
more discussion). Corbae and D’Erasmo (2017) studies a welfare implication of an policy
counterfactual (hybrid version of Chapter 7 and Chapter 11). Corbae et al. compares a
policy counterfactual to the world where firms in default optimally choose between Chapter
7, which complies with APR yet comes with high default cost, and Chapter 11, which
violates APR yet comes with low default cost. On the contrary, in this paper, firms are
not given an option to choose between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11, and this paper studies a
shareholder recovery’s impact on the behavior of “average” firms.
1.2. Bankruptcy Law in the United States
In the United States, the bankruptcy code states that creditors should be paid in full before
shareholders can receive anything in default. However, in practice, the bankruptcy process
is a negotiated agreement involving both creditors and shareholders. Thus, the code merely
serves as a guideline for the process rather than a requirement, and thus shareholders can
7
receive a positive payoff even when creditors are not paid in full. In this section,5 I briefly
discuss the sequence of historical events in the United States that eventually allowed a
positive shareholder recovery rate.
Prior to the nineteenth century, the bankruptcy system in the United States was adminis-
trative in nature: bankrupt firms were almost always liquidated, its shareholders did not
recover any value and managers were let go. Consequently, APR always held and share-
holders were never part of the bankruptcy process.
However, in the late nineteenth century, there was a dramatic turn of events due to a series of
bankruptcies in the railroad industry. These bankruptcies prompted the courts to intervene
and rescue them for the sake of public interest in an effective transportation system. The
courts formed equity receivership to run the bankrupt firm. Equity receivership comprised
old shareholders, old creditors and old managers. This is important because this was the
first time that shareholders became a part of the bankruptcy process. The practice spread
to other industries and persisted over time. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 formally
gave more power to shareholders, leading to larger shareholder recovery rate. Although the
bankruptcy laws did not significantly change since then, a subsequent series of contractual
innovations in the bankruptcy process gradually decreased shareholder recovery rate over
time.
It is important to note that a positive shareholder recovery is a byproduct of the courts’
effort to keep its business alive and pay creditors, which is Chapter 11’s stated objective.
The bankruptcy process sometimes requires shareholders’ help or consent and thus requires
shareholders to be paid off at the expense of the creditors. Consequently, this effort leads to
a positive shareholder recovery. In the rest of the document, through the lens of the model,
developed in the next section, I test whether a positive shareholder recovery is implied by
firm data, and if so, quantify its magnitude that is implied by firm data.
5See Skeel (2001) for a more detailed discussion.
8
1.3. Model
I extend the workhorse dynamic capital structure model (Goldstein, Ju and Leland, 2001)
as follows. Upon default, firms lose α , shareholders recover η, and creditors recover the
remainder 1− η−α fraction of the remaining firm value.67 If shareholders are subject to a
higher tax rate than creditors are, firms have an incentive to issue debt to shield earnings
from taxation. Such a tax shield benefit motive is the only reason that firms want to lever
up in my model. To stay in a simple time-homogeneous setting, I consider callable debt
contracts that are characterized by a perpetual flow of coupon payments. Shareholders of
each firm make three types of corporate financing decisions: (1) when to default, (2) when
to refinance, and (3) how much debt to issue upon refinancing. Shareholders exercise their
default option if earnings drop below a certain earning level, called the default threshold.
Shareholders exercise the refinancing option if earnings rise above a certain earning level,
called the upward refinancing threshold. These features are shared with numerous other
capital structure models.
1.3.1. Setup and Solution
In the model, a firm i’s earnings growth depends on aggregate earnings shocks as well as
idiosyncratic shocks specific to the firm. Before-tax earning, Xi,t, evolves according to
dXi,t
Xi,t
= µidt+ biσAdW
A
t + σ
F
i dW
F
i,t
Firm i’s expected earnings growth is given by µi. bi is firm i’s exposure to the aggregate
earnings shocks generated by the Brownian motion WAt and σA is the volatility of aggregate
earnings shocks. σFi is the volatility generated by the firm-specific Brownian motion W
F
i,t.
By assumption, WFi,t is independent of W
A
t for all firms i.
6This naturally imposes a restriction that η + α <= 1.
7Contrary to Leland (1994), the model allows shareholders to recover non-zero value. Contrary to Fan
and Sundaresan (2000), firms can potentially incur default cost even when shareholders and creditors enter
renegotiation. Here, I want to emphasize that the model does not rule out α = 0 nor η = 0.
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The model is partial equilibrium, and thus the pricing kernel is exogenously set as:
dΛt
Λt
= −rdt− ϕAdWAt
where r is the risk-free rate and ϕA is the market Sharpe ratio. Under the risk-neutral
measure, the earnings process evolves according to:
dXi,t
Xi,t
= µˆidt+ σi,XdWˆi,t
where Wˆi,t is Brownian motion under the risk-neutral probability measure, µˆi = µi−biσAϕA
and σi,X =
√
(biσA)2 + (σFi )
2. In order to guarantee the convergence of the expected present
value of Xi,t, I impose the usual regularity condition r− µˆi > 0. For notational convenience,
I drop i in the rest of the document.
This paper uses τcd ≡ 1− (1− τc)(1− τd) as an effective tax rate that shareholders pay on
the corporate earnings where τc denotes tax on corporate earnings and τd denotes tax on
equity distributions. τcdi ≡ τcd − τi denotes tax shield benefit rate, where τi denotes tax on
interest income.
Now, I describe how debt value and equity value are derived. For given default threshold
XD and optimal policies (coupon C and upward refinancing point XU ), I use the contingent
claims approach to solve for debt value D(X) and equity value E(X). The most relevant
boundary conditions are as follows. (Please see the Appendix for more detail.)
D(XD) = (1− α− η)(1− τcd)XD
r − µˆ (1.1)
E(XD) =
η(1− τcd)XD
r − µˆ (1.2)
The first boundary condition captures that creditors recover 1 − α − η fraction of the
remaining unlevered firm value. The second boundary condition captures that shareholders
recover η fraction of the remaining unlevered firm value.
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The next step is to solve for an optimal coupon C, upward refinancing point XU , and default
threshold XD. C and XU are determined at time 0 (initial point or refinancing point) to
maximize firm value minus debt issuance cost. Here, debt issuance cost is φD times the
debt value.
[C,XU ] = arg max
C∗,X∗U
((1− φD)D(X0;C∗, X∗U ) + E(X0;C∗, X∗U )) (1.3)
subject to
lim
Xt↓XD
E
′
(Xt) =
η(1− τcd)
r − µˆ (1.4)
XD is determined based on the above smooth pasting condition, Equation (1.4) (see the
heuristic derivation of the smooth pasting condition in Appendix A.3.2).
Because the model is used to explain the data, it is important to discuss what η might
potentially capture. In the model, shareholders recover only in default. In reality, prior
to declaring bankruptcy, some shareholders can potentially enjoy benefits of control rights
by, for example, opportunistically refinancing to change covenants (Green, 2018).8 To the
extent that shareholders’ opportunistic behavior makes debt more costly and higher debt
cost is internalized, shareholder recovery rate η in the model captures such benefits in
addition to explicit ex-post recovery value.
When shareholders recover zero amount in default, shareholders might not be able to strate-
gically default at the optimal default threshold due to debt covenants (Reindl, Stoughton
and Zechner, 2017). Yet, when shareholders are allowed to receive a positive payoff in
default, such debt covenants can be easily described with my current model and sharehold-
ers will behave as if shareholders strategically default. More specifically, let us consider a
cash-flow-based covenant, which specifies that shareholders must default if the earnings-to-
coupon ratio goes below a certain threshold, say X¯DC . Because strategic default threshold
8For example, fallen angel firms delay refinancing relative to always-junk firms because loose covenants
allow shareholders to transfer wealth from creditors.
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XDC(η) monotonically increases over η (as shown below in Equation (1.5)), I can find unique
η that sets XDC(η) = X¯DC . Such an implied η increases over X¯DC , and thus shows that a
more restrictive covenant (or equivalently higher X¯DC) corresponds to larger η. As such,
my model is general enough to capture cases with some types of debt covenants.
1.3.2. Key Economic Channels: Commitment Problem
In this subsection, I discuss key economic channels in three steps.
Let me explain the first step. In their decision to default, shareholders weigh the benefits of
holding on to their control rights, all future dividends, and recovery value against the costs
of honoring debt obligations while the firm is in financial distress. As shareholder recovery
rate (η) increases, the trade-off shifts and leads to earlier exercise of the option to default.
This intuition can be seen in a closed form for the normalized default threshold (XDC):
XDC =
XD
C
=
r − µˆ
r
−λ−
1− λ−
1
1− η (1.5)
where λ− is a negative solution to the characteristic equation.
On a related note, XDC does not depend on default cost, α, yet depends on η. The intuition
is as follows. I define shareholder recovery rate as a fraction of remaining firm value before
default cost is realized. Accordingly, shareholder recovery rate does not move with respect
to changes to default cost. Thus, conditional on leverage, in making a strategic default
decision, shareholders account for their recovery rate and yet do not account for default
cost. This implies that conditional default probabilities increase with shareholder recovery
rate but default probabilities do not move with respect to changes to default cost. This
intuition is a key mechanism in separately identifying α and η. Thus, I write this as a
proposition below and refer back to it later:
Proposition 1 Conditional on the leverage, default probabilities increase over shareholder
recovery rate (η). Conditional on the leverage, default probabilities do not change over
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default cost (α).
The second step is, conditional on the leverage, debt becomes more costly. In other words,
as η increases, borrowing cost increases because creditors lose η to shareholders and XDC
is determined to maximize the equity value at the expense of the bond value. In the third
step, firms internalize higher debt cost and optimally lower leverage ex-ante.
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
The aforementioned three-step intuition can be illustrated graphically as shown in Figure
1. Going from point A to B illustrates the first two steps, where firm value decreases due to
shareholders’ strategic default action. The last step is illustrated by going from point B to
C where firms optimally lower leverage ex-ante, and thus firm values increase. Interestingly,
as Proposition 7 proves, the increase in firm values from point B to C is not sufficient to
offset the decrease in firm values from point A to B.
In the rest of this section, I show why costly default is important in my setting. In order
to present the intuition with closed forms, I suppress upward refinancing and study terms
for firm value minus debt issuance cost:
(1− φD)D(Xt) + E(Xt) =1− τcd
r − µˆ Xt +
τ˜cdiC
r
+ Loss
(
Xt
C ·XDC
)λ−
(1.6)
where τ˜cdi = (1− τi)(1− φD)− (1− τcd) and
Loss/C = − τ˜cdi
r
− (α+ φD(1− α− η))(1− τcd)XDC
r − µˆ < 0 (1.7)
Here, τ˜cdiCr captures the tax shield benefit whereas Loss
(
Xt
C·XDC
)λ−
captures expected
firm-value loss. As η increases, firm values decrease because the expected firm-value loss
increases due to larger XDC . Firms’ optimal policy, C, has to decrease to equate marginal
cost and marginal benefit. It is important to note that η impacts firms’ capital structure
decision mainly through XDC . Thus, if default cost (α) becomes zero, because φD is very
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small in magnitude, (α+φD(1−α−η)) in Equation (1.7) becomes negligible, and thus Loss
term in Equation (1.6) becomes insensitive to η. Consequently, η’s impact on the optimal
leverage significantly decreases.
1.3.3. Leverage, Default Probability and Market Beta
In this subsection, I discuss how η and α relate to leverage, default probability, and market
beta.
Higher α implies higher firm-value loss conditional on defaults and thus higher expected
firm-value loss. This consequently implies lower optimal leverage. Higher η implies higher
firm-value loss and higher default probability. Taken together, this implies higher expected
firm-value loss and consequently implies lower optimal leverage.
Proposition 2 Higher default cost (α) and higher shareholder recovery rate (η) lead to
lower leverage.
All proofs are in the Appendix. Let us now discuss how α and η relate to default proba-
bilities. As α increases, optimal leverage decreases, and thus default probabilities decrease.
Higher η implies higher default probabilities and higher firm-value loss conditional on de-
faults. If leverage decreases only to exactly offset the increase in default probabilities but
not in firm-value loss, then marginal cost is larger than marginal benefit and thus it is not
optimal. Leverage has to further decrease and this exactly implies that default probabilities
decrease over η.
Proposition 3 Higher default cost (α) and higher shareholder recovery rate (η) lead to
lower default probability.
Because default probabilities and leverage change over η in the same direction as they do
over α, I need an extra key economic channel to separately identify α and η. The structural
estimation in this paper is akin to solving the system of two equations for two unknowns.
The two unknowns correspond to shareholder recovery rate and default cost. Leverage
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specifies one equation in terms of two model parameters and default probability specifies
the other equation in terms of the same two parameters. Figure 2 graphically illustrates
the intuition. It shows locus of α and η that match a given leverage (solid line) and a given
default probability (dashed line). A necessary condition for α and η to be point-identified
is that both lines have different slopes.
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
The key driver for the aforementioned necessary condition is Proposition 1. The difference
in sensitivities of conditional default probabilities with respect to the two model parameters
helps to separately identify them in the system of two equations. Proposition 4 uses this
intuition to prove the necessary condition.
Proposition 4 Leverage and default probability help to separately identify default cost (α)
and shareholder recovery rate (η).
Lastly, let us discuss how market betas change over η. Upon default, higher η implies
that shareholders recover a higher share of the unlevered firm value. Because unlevered
firm value is less risky than equity, positive probability of receiving higher payout that
is less risky in default implies lower market beta. Moreover, as firms actively lower their
leverage, firms face smaller distress risk and thus market betas further decrease. This idea
is consistent with empirical evidence that is documented in Garlappi, Shu and Yan (2008),
Garlappi and Yan (2011) and Hackbarth, Haselmann and Schoenherr (2015).
Proposition 5 Higher shareholder recovery rate (η) leads to lower market beta.
1.4. Estimation
This section describes the data, aggregate parameters, estimator, and intuition behind the
estimation method.
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1.4.1. Data
Sample
I obtain panel data from CRSP and COMPUSTAT. I omit missing observations and all firms
whose primary SIC classification is between 4900 and 4999 or between 6000 and 6999 since
the model is inappropriate for regulated or financial firms. I follow Bharath and Shumway
(2008) and Gomes, Grotteria and Wachter (2018) to construct quarterly distance-to-default
(DD) default probability measures. The sample contains 246,090 firm-quarter observations,
number of unique firms is 4,435 and spans from 1970Q1 to 2016Q4. Table 1 shows summary
statistics for the panel data set that this paper attempts to match. Section A.4.1 describes
data variable definitions.
[INSERT TABLE 1]
Market beta is 1.105 on average,9 quarterly earnings growth rate is 0.6% on average, and
leverage is 0.283 on average. Moments of quarterly DD default probability are important in
identifying my key parameters. Thus, I validate DD default probability measures. Sample
average for my constructed quarterly default probability is 0.27%. This is similar in magni-
tude to the realized quarterly bankruptcy frequencies that are reported at 0.27% based on
the sample period between 1970 and 2014 (Chava and Jarrow, 2004; Chava, 2014; Alanis,
Chava and Kumar, 2015) or 0.28% based on the sample period between 1970 and 2003
(Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi, 2008). I also validate my measure against Moody’s Ex-
pected Default Frequencies (EDF) measures, which are widely used by financial institutions
as a predictor of default probability and are used in several academic papers including Gar-
lappi, Shu and Yan (2008) and Garlappi and Yan (2011). My measures and Moody’s are
significantly and positively correlated as rank correlation is 0.75 with p-value=0.00.
9Market beta is not 1 on average because this is an equal-weighted average.
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Tax Rates
Following Graham (2000), a few papers (Chen, 2010; Glover, 2016) set τc = 35%, τd = 12%
and τi = 29.6%. However, Graham’s sample period covers only from 1980 to 1994. Because
my sample spans from 1970 through 2016, it calls for more up-to-date tax rates. I construct
panel data of the most up-to-date tax rates (τc, τi and τd) by closely following Graham
(2000) (see Section A.4.1).
The tax rates used in this paper are τc = 28.21%, τd = 17.76%, and τi = 32.85%. Relative
to what were used by a few papers, my τc is lower because it captures periods with low
earnings growth and thus implies lower corporate tax rates. My τd is larger because the
proportion of long-term capital gains that is taxable increased from 0.4 to 1 after 1987 and
my sample captures more of post-1987 than Graham (2000) does. Lastly, my τi is slightly
larger because it accounts for the fact that τi is larger in the pre-1988 period. In net, τcdi
decreased from 13.20% to 10.20%.
1.4.2. Aggregate Parameters
Because I assume that aggregate variables do not change over time, I calibrate aggregate
variables using the longest sample period available: 1947 through 2016. Table 2 summarizes
calibrated values for aggregate parameters and the corresponding data sources. For quar-
terly aggregate earnings growth volatility (σA), I use log growth rates based on the quarterly
aggregate earnings data from National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) Table 1.14.
For real risk-free rate (r), I subtract realized inflation rate from the nominal three-month
Treasury bill rate.10 Lastly, I use quarterly market Sharpe ratio and debt issue cost (φD)
that are reported in Chen (2010) and Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) respectively.
[INSERT TABLE 2]
10Using the expected inflation rate (Bansal, Kiku and Yaron, 2012) yields very similar value for r.
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1.4.3. Estimator
I estimate the model using a two-step process. I first set µ to the sample mean of earn-
ings growths, which is 0.60%. Then, I estimate the remaining four parameters by using
the simulated method of moments (SMM), which chooses parameter estimates that mini-
mize the distance between moments generated by the model and their data analogs. The
following subsection defines matched moments and explains how they identify the four pa-
rameters. The four parameters are η and α, which characterize the default process, and b
and σF , which characterize earning. Appendix A.1 contains additional details on the SMM
estimator.
1.4.4. Identification and Selection of Moments, and Heterogeneity
In a structural estimation, proper moment selection is crucial to identify a unique set of
model parameters that make the model fit the data as closely as possible. To that end,
moments’ predicted values need to be differently sensitive to the model parameters, and
there should be a sufficient number of moments. I match eight moments to identify the four
parameters.
Before defining the moments, I address the issue of firm heterogeneity. Model parameters
vary across firms, and it is undoubtedly important to account for cross-sectional distribution
of model parameters as shown by Glover (2016). However, it is empirically challenging to
estimate cross-sectional distribution especially when the model is misspecified (see Section
1.6.4). Similar to Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007), the structural estimation used in this
paper addresses firm heterogeneity in the data by removing firm fixed effects and estimates
for the representative firm. Consequently, this allows me to match time-series variation of
moments.
Now, I define the moments. The eight matched moments are the mean of market beta, the
variance of earnings growth, leverage’s three moments (mean, variance and skewness) and
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default probability’s three moments (mean, variance and skewness).11 One additional can-
didate for moments, in identifying η, are statistical moments of shareholder recovery rates
among defaulted firms, which are documented by Eberhart, Moore and Roenfeldt (1990),
Franks and Torous (1989), Betker (1995), and Bharath, Panchapegesan and Werner (2007).
In matching these moments, it is crucial to address sample-selection bias. Unfortunately,
the magnitude of sample-selection bias is very sensitive to cross-sectional distribution of
η. Because it is empirically challenging to estimate cross-sectional distribution of η (see
Section 1.6.4), I decided not to match those moments.
Next, in order to explain how the identification works, I discuss how each parameter is
identified by the aforementioned eight moments. Table 3 tabulates how much each moment
changes over parameters and supports the description below. Each moment depends on all
model parameters, but I explain the moments that are the most important for identifying
each parameter.
[INSERT TABLE 3]
Time-series mean, volatility and skewness of leverage and the same statistical moments of
default probabilities help to identify η. This is illustrated by Figure 3. The figure illustrates
two firms that face the same sequence of earnings (top panel). Two firms have the identical
model parameter numbers except for η. The middle panel illustrates that η = 0 firm has
larger leverage than η 6= 0 firm on average (consistent with Proposition 2). Lower target
leverage, driven by larger η, makes leverage less sensitive to sequence of subsequent earnings
growth shocks and thus decreases time-series volatility of leverage.
Moreover, larger η incentivizes firms to upward refinance less frequently. Because upward
refinancing makes it more probable to default, larger expected firm-value loss, driven by
larger η, incentivizes firms to upward refinance less frequently. Similar to debt issuance
11Another relevant moment to match is the credit spread. Yet, I decided not to match the credit spread
due to its data limitation. Firms’ debt frequently consists of heterogeneous instruments, and market prices
for most of these are less readily available than aforementioned data. Nonetheless, I study its sensitivity to
key parameters.
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cost (see Leary and Roberts (2005) for empirical support), shareholder recovery rate makes
firms’ leverage more persistent over time. Consequently, leverage decreases on average
and becomes less volatile. As firms reduce their target leverage and stay below its target
leverage longer, time-series distribution becomes more positively skewed. Although default
probabilities are similarly related to η as leverage is related to η, default probabilities are
not as sensitive to η as leverage is due to the opposing force from shareholders’ strategic
default action (see Table 3). As illustrated in Figure 3, η = 0 firm upward refinances at time
84 whereas η 6= 0 firm does not upward refinance until its earnings reach a higher threshold
at time 154. Because η = 0 firm increases its leverage earlier, a series of negative shocks
between time 90 and 140 keep its leverage much higher and more volatile than η 6= 0 firm’s.
This leads to more significant jumps in default probability for η = 0 (bottom panel).
[INSERT FIGURE 3]
In addition, market beta helps to identify η. η is negatively related to market beta. This
relation is consistent with empirical findings reported in Garlappi, Shu and Yan (2008),
Garlappi and Yan (2011), and Hackbarth, Haselmann and Schoenherr (2015).
Similar to η, time-series mean, volatility and skewness of leverage and the same statistical
moments of default probabilities help to identify α. Higher α makes leverage lower on
average, less volatile and more positively skewed and thus default probability lower on
average, less volatile and more positively skewed.
Most importantly, I discuss how α and η are separately identified. Conditional on leverage,
shareholders’ strategic default implies that default probabilities increase over η. Due to
the commitment problem, however, optimal leverage decreases and, consequently, default
probabilities decrease over η. Thus, default probabilities are less negatively related to η than
they would be without the opposing force driven by shareholders’ strategic default. However,
because shareholders’ strategic default action does not depend on α, default probabilities
are much more negatively related to α. I illustrate this by calculating the implied slopes
of two curves shown in Figure 2. Using numbers reported in Table 3, the slope of solid
20
blue curve is − ∂E(Lev)/∂η∂E(Lev)/∂α = −−0.317−0.603 = −0.53, whereas the slope of dashed red curve is
− ∂E(DP )/∂η∂E(DP )/∂α = −−0.081−0.530 = −0.15. Two curves have different slopes, and thus satisfy a
necessary condition for α and η to be point-identified.
Lastly, let us discuss how the remaining two parameters are identified. Larger b implies
higher exposure to the systematic risk. This naturally translates to larger mean of market
beta. Larger b also implies lower risk-neutral earnings growth rate, which implies lower
equity value. This translates to larger mean, higher volatility and smaller skewness of lever-
age. Larger b also implies higher volatility of earnings growth rate and thus implies larger
mean and higher volatility of default probability. σF is naturally identified by the earnings
growth rate volatility. Moreover, larger σF translates to higher volatility of default prob-
ability and implies higher volatility of equity value, and thus higher volatility of leverage.
Lastly, as σF increases, the probability of reaching the default threshold during the next
period increases and thus the mean of default probability increases.
1.5. Empirical Results
In this section, I present main structural estimation results and discuss their implications.
1.5.1. Main Results
Table 4 summarizes model fit. The first and the second rows show data moments and
standard errors, respectively. The third row shows model-implied moments. The last two
rows show difference between data and model-implied moments and t-statistics.
[INSERT TABLE 4]
As shown, all the moments are matched well as none of the differences between data and
model-implied moments are statistically significantly different from zero. Especially, I want
to highlight two main matching moments. Data sample mean of leverage is 0.283, whereas
the model counterpart is 0.283. The difference between the data leverage and model-implied
leverage is statistically insignificant. Data sample mean of quarterly default probability is
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0.3%, whereas the model counterpart is 0.4%. Again, the difference between the data default
probability and model-implied default probability is statistically insignificant.
Table 5 summarizes the parameter estimates. Shareholders’ recovery rate (η) is estimated
to be 7.1% and α is estimated to be 17.3%. Most interestingly, η is statistically different
from zero, thus a natural null hypothesis that η = 0 is rejected at 1% significance level.
This number is in line with the empirically observed counterpart, between 0.4% and 7.6%
(Eberhart, Moore and Roenfeldt, 1990; Franks and Torous, 1989; Betker, 1995; Bharath,
Panchapegesan and Werner, 2007), and thus strongly validates my estimates (see Section
1.6.4 for more careful validation of my estimates). Another interpretation of results is that
average firms expect to enter the Chapter 11 in default and expect shareholders to recover
a non-negative amount. If average firms expect to enter the Chapter 7 in default, then the
implied η should have been 0, but this is statistically significantly rejected. This is consistent
with an empirical observation that most publicly listed firms that are declaring bankruptcy
file for the Chapter 11 rather than the Chapter 7.12 Moreover, default cost (α) is expected
to be statistically significantly positive even when shareholders and creditors are expected
to renegotiate in default. Lastly, if η = 0 is imposed in the structural estimation, α is
estimated to be 22.7%. This illustrates how allowing a positive shareholder recovery helps
to obtain default cost, which is more in line with the empirically observed counterpart,
between 10% and 20% (Altman, 1984; Andrade and Kaplan, 1998),13 and thus strongly
validates my estimates.
[INSERT TABLE 5]
1.5.2. Credit Spread, Firm Value, and Government Tax Revenue
In this section, I discuss how η qualitatively relates to credit spreads, firm values and
government tax revenue. Then, I quantify such relations in the subsequent sections.
12According to www.bankruptcydata.com, more than 90% of U.S. public firms file under Chapter 11.
13Morellec, Nikolov and Schurhoff (2008, 2012) cite Gilson, John and Lang (1990) to argue that α is small
(0%-5%) when shareholders and creditors renegotiate. However, Gilson’s measure does not include indirect
cost and thus is not an appropriate measure in my context.
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Credit Spread
Conditional on leverage, larger η can be thought of as wealth transfer from creditors to
shareholders. As this is disadvantageous to creditors, credit spreads increase. However,
as firms lower leverage in response, their default risk decreases, and thus credit spreads
decrease. Such a commitment problem is strong enough that credit spreads decrease over
η in net.
Proposition 6 Higher shareholder recovery rate (η) leads to lower credit spread.
In the literature, there is no empirical consensus on how η impacts credit spreads. Davy-
denko and Strebulaev (2007) find the relation to be positive yet economically small in
magnitude. Based on cross-country data, Davydenko and Franks (2008) do not find any
positive correlation between η and credit spreads. Hackbarth, Haselmann and Schoenherr
(2015) find that credit spreads increased after η supposedly increased due to the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978. Yet, I argue that the increase in credit spreads was not due to the
increase in η but due to the concurrent decrease in personal income tax rates (τi). Section
1.6.1 lists more detail on quantitative analysis of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
Firm Value and Government Tax Revenue
Higher η leads to lower default probabilities and thus lower expected firm-value loss. Si-
multaneously, lower leverage and less frequent refinancing, driven by higher η, decrease the
tax shield benefit. As default probabilities are small in magnitude, the latter channel more
than offsets the former channel. In net, firm values decrease over η.
Proposition 7 Higher shareholder recovery rate (η) leads to lower firm value.
As η increases, firms decrease their leverage and upward refinance less often. Both of these
lead to less usage of the tax shield benefit and thus the government collects more taxes. In
order to quantify how much government tax revenue increases, I assume that government
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tax revenue is a contingent claim to the future tax revenue (see the Appendix for the
derivation).
Proposition 8 Higher shareholder recovery rate (η) leads to larger government tax rev-
enue.
Let us make one more assumption to study η’s impact on the entire economy: the en-
tire economy consists of firms and the government. In the model, there are two sources of
deadweight cost, default cost and debt issuance cost. Larger η leads to smaller default prob-
abilities and thus less frequent realizations of default cost. Moreover, larger η leads to less
frequent realization of debt issuance cost as larger η makes refinancing less frequent. Taken
together, larger η implies less frequent realization of deadweight cost, and consequently
larger value for the entire economy (see Section A.3.6 for the mathematical derivation).
1.5.3. The Effect of Positive Shareholders’ Recovery Rate
Column (1) of Table 6 summarizes the counterfactual world when shareholders recover zero
amount in default (η = 0). Under column (2), I allow shareholders to recover non-zero
amount in default, yet I force firms to keep the same optimal policies (coupon, C, and
refinancing point, XU ) as under (1). This exercise helps to quantify how much expected
firm-value loss increases, conditional on the firms’ optimal policies. Upon default, firms lose
α (1−τcd)XDr−µˆ , where
(1−τcd)XD
r−µˆ is the unlevered firm value in default. Firm-value loss increases
as XD increases from 0.077 to 0.083. Simultaneously, default probabilities increase from
0.388% to 0.436%. Taken together, expected firm-value loss increases by 21.3% even when
default cost α does not change. Lastly, consistent with a few papers such as Davydenko
and Strebulaev (2007), credit spreads increase. Now, under (3), I allow firms to internalize
higher borrowing cost and to re-choose their optimal policies. Higher borrowing costs force
firms to borrow less, and thus default probabilities decrease, market betas decrease and
credit spreads decrease.
In sum, as we allow for a positive shareholder recovery (i.e. comparing column (1) and
24
(3)), leverages decrease by 9.4% and default probabilities decrease by 8.1%. Market betas
decrease by 20.5% and this is qualitatively consistent with Garlappi, Shu and Yan (2008),
Garlappi and Yan (2011), and Hackbarth, Haselmann and Schoenherr (2015)’s empirical
finding. Moreover, credit spreads decrease by 1.7% (see Appendix A.5 for the discussion on
its magnitude).
Interestingly, firm values decrease by 1.5% as firms lose tax shield benefit. Positive η de-
creases the net leverage benefit (defined as a difference between levered firm value and
unlevered firm value) by 14.2%. As firms take less advantage of tax shield benefits, the gov-
ernment collects more taxes. That amounts to a 9.9% increase in government tax revenue.
Lastly, the sum of firm values and government tax revenue increases by 0.9%.
1.6. Robustness
This section reports how estimates for shareholder recovery rate changed over time and
over different subsets of firms. I discuss how firm heterogeneity might affect estimates
for shareholder recovery rate. Lastly, I discuss how estimates would change when I use a
different assumption in the model.
1.6.1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (BRA) is the most important act that shaped the
nature of the modern U.S. bankruptcy system (see Appendix A.6 for more institutional
details). Through the lens of my model, I test how much this act changed default cost, α,
and shareholder recovery rate, η.
Similar to Hackbarth, Haselmann and Schoenherr (2015), I construct two subperiods:
1975Q1-1978Q3 and 1981Q2-1984Q4. A period between 1978Q4-1981Q1 is removed be-
cause, as Hackbarth argues, the market was still learning of BRA’s true impact. In order
to focus on the impact that BRA had on η and α, I assume that only η and α changed over
these two subperiods and assume that the other model parameters did not change. In order
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to account for shifts in firms’ optimal decisions driven by changes in tax rates, I allow tax
rates to vary across these two periods. More specifically, in each subperiod, I set the tax
rate to the panel-wide average of firm-quarter tax rates. For the pre-event subperiod, tax
shield benefit rate (τprecdi ) is set to 11.28%. For the post-event subperiod, tax shield benefit
rate (τpostcdi ) is set to 18.95%. τcdi changed over these two subperiods because the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 significantly decreased the personal tax rate on interest income
(τi).
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Similar to the main structural estimation (Section 1.4.3), I first estimate µ by using the
entire sample. Then, I structurally estimate six parameters by matching sixteen moments.
Six parameters include b, σF , η for the pre-event subperiod (ηpre), η for the post-event
subperiod (ηpost), α for the pre-event subperiod (αpre), and α for post-event subperiod
(αpost). Sixteen moments include eight moments (mean of market beta, variance of earnings
growth, three moments of leverage and three moments of default probability) from the pre-
event subperiod and the same eight moments from the post-event subperiod.
[INSERT TABLE 7]
Table 7 summarizes parameter estimates. Consistent with the literature’s qualitative argu-
ment, η statistically significantly increased (t-statistics is 11.4). Decrease in market betas,
leverages and default probabilities combined with the concurrent decrease in tax rates have
contributed to a significant increase in estimated η. More interestingly, the current paper
quantifies such an increase: η increased from 0.1% to 29.0%. Moreover, ηpre = 0.1% is
consistent with Hackbarth et al.’s argument that the impact of BRA was unclear leading
up to 1978. In addition, α increased, although not statistically significantly, from 19.0% to
20.1%.
When only η changed from 0.1% to 29.0%, leverages decrease by 32.0%, market betas de-
14One caveat to note here is that data on corporate marginal tax rates (τc) are not available for pre-1980
and τc used for firms in the pre-event subperiod are imputed as described in Section A.4.1. However, I
do not believe that this imputation causes an increase in τcdi as the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
targeted only individual income tax rates.
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crease by 17.5% and credit spreads decrease by 5.4%. A slight increase in α further decreases
leverage, market betas and credit spreads. Yet, the concurrent change in tax rates mutes
the aforementioned changes. In net, leverages decrease by 19.5%, market betas decrease by
12.5% and credit spreads increase by 4.0%. Here, I want to highlight that an empirically
observed increase in credit spreads, which Hackbarth, Haselmann and Schoenherr (2015)
documents, is not due to the change in the bankruptcy code but rather due to the change in
the tax code. Lastly, the rise in η decreases firm values by 5.0%, increases government tax
revenue by 22.2%, and increases the sum of firm value and tax revenue by 4.4%. Yet, after
accounting for all the changes, including tax rates, firm values increase by 0.5%, government
tax revenue decreases by 14.7%, and the sum decreases by 4.8%.
1.6.2. Evolution of Shareholders’ Recovery Rate
Even though bankruptcy law has not significantly changed since BRA was passed, Skeel
(2003) conjectured that contractual innovations in the bankruptcy process steadily de-
creased shareholder recovery rate. In support for Skeel’s conjecture, Bharath, Panchapege-
san and Werner (2007) documents an empirical evidence: among firms that defaulted be-
tween 2000 and 2005, shareholders only recovered 0.4% on average. Bharath et al. attributes
such a time-series decline in shareholder recovery rate to contractual innovations, such as
debtor-in-possession financing and key employee retention plans.
In order to test whether this is reflected in firm data, I structurally estimate shareholder
recovery rate and other model parameters for more recent periods. I first divided post-
1985 era into three subperiods: 1985Q1-1994Q4, 1995Q1-2004Q4, and 2005Q1-2016Q4. I
estimate model parameters for each subperiod independently from the others. Figure 4
graphically illustrates subperiod results. For completeness, the figure also illustrates pre-
1985 estimates, which were discussed in Section 1.6.1. Consistent with Skeel’s conjecture
and Bharath et al.’s empirical finding, shareholder recovery rate steadily decreased over
time. Shareholders’ recovery rate decreased from 19.9% during 1985Q1-1994Q4 to 0.97%
during 2005Q1-2016Q4. On the contrary, default costs slightly increased, yet the increase
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is not statistically significant.
The time-series changes in shareholder recovery rates and default costs are driven jointly by
various moving parts. Keeping other parameters constant, the time-series decrease in tax
shield benefit rate implies time-series decrease in leverage and time-series decrease in default
probability over 1985Q1-2016Q4. Absent the change in tax shield benefit rate, leverage and
default probabilities would have actually increased, under which case Figure 5 illustrates
how α and η are identified. As leverages and default probabilities increase, solid line (locus
of α and η match a leverage) shifts downward and dashed line (locus of α and η that match
a default probability) shifts downward. As shown, η significantly decreases yet α slightly
increases. The time-series increase in volatility of default probabilities and leverages further
help to identify significant decrease in η and modest increase in α.
Finally, this result helps to alleviate a possible concern that my structural estimates might
be picking up other alternative economic factors that influence leverage. Those alternative
factors are, but certainly not limited to, business cycle variation (Chen, 2010) or agency
costs (Morellec, Nikolov and Schurhoff, 2012). However, there is no clear explanation on
why either of these alternative factors shows the time-series trend that is shown in Figure
4, and thus puts more weight on my economic story: shareholder recovery rate.
1.6.3. Empirical Proxies for Shareholders’ Recovery Rate
The results so far quantify how much shareholders expect to recover in default for the
representative firm. Now, I explore how these values vary over firms with different char-
acteristics. Based on empirical proxies for shareholder recovery rate, discussed below, I
construct a subset of firms and estimate model parameters for each subset independently
from others. Then, I conduct counterfactual analysis in each subset to quantify economic
impacts of a positive shareholder recovery rate.
I first discuss empirical proxies for shareholder recovery rate that I use to construct subsets.
Due to lack of guidance on proxies’ validity, the literature uses a wide range of measures.
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Unfortunately, in many cases, these empirical measures simultaneously proxy other unob-
servable firm characteristics, and thus its validities can be ambiguous. This subsection
studies two commonly used proxies, firm size and intangible assets. I use total asset (Com-
pustat: AT) to measure firm size. I use two separate measures to proxy intangible assets:
normalized R&D expense (Compustat: XRD/AT) and Intangibility proposed by Peters and
Taylor (2016).
For a given empirical proxy, I form two subsets. In order to make sure that firms do not
move from one subset to the other over time, I perform the following procedure. At each
quarter, I calculate the proxy’s cross-sectional median, and I temporarily allocate a firm
with proxy value greater than the median to High-subset and a firm with proxy value smaller
than the median to Low-subset. This generates a time-series of subsets for a given firm.
Then, I allocate the firm’s entire time-series data to one subset that the firm spends the
most time in.
Across different subsets, I allow tax rates to vary but keep other aggregate variables con-
stant. Table 8’s first panel summarizes tax shield benefit rates and other matching moments.
For example, low-R&D firms’ tax shield benefit rate is much larger than high-R&D firms’
because high-R&D firms have higher expenses.
Next, I structurally estimate model parameters for each subset independently. Table 8’s
middle panel summarizes estimates for default cost (α) and shareholder recovery rate (η)
for different subsets. First, I find that estimates for η increase over firm size. This result is
consistent with the literature’s use of η as a positive proxy. Citing more frequent occurrences
of a positive shareholder recovery rate15 in larger firms, Garlappi, Shu and Yan (2008)
Garlappi and Yan (2011), and Hackbarth, Haselmann and Schoenherr (2015) use firm size
as a positive proxy for η. They argue that small firms usually have a higher concentration
of bond ownership. So, close monitoring by concentrated creditors severely decreases η.
Second, although η increases over R&D, the increase is not statistically significantly different
15Please see Weiss (1990), Betker (1995), and Franks and Torous (1994) for more detail.
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from 0, and thus casts doubt on this literature’s (Garlappi, Shu and Yan, 2008; Garlappi and
Yan, 2011; Hackbarth, Haselmann and Schoenherr, 2015)’s use of R&D as a negative proxy
for η. They use it as a negative proxy because firms with high R&D are more likely to face
liquidity shortages (Opler and Titman, 1994) during financial crises, thus are more likely to
forgo intangible investment opportunities that shareholders value (Lyandres and Zhdanov,
2013). Firms’ urgent need for liquidity effectively acts as cash-flow-based covenants, and
thus high intangibility puts shareholders at a disadvantage vis-a´-vis creditors and implies low
η. However, η can increase over R&D because some R&D investments are more valuable
under shareholders’ possession, which increases shareholders’ bargaining power vis-a´-vis
creditors. Due to these offsetting forces, R&D might not be a good empirical proxy for η as
evident in my estimates. A similar result holds for the other empirical proxy: intangibility.
Third, the results show that both R&D and intangibility are strong positive proxies for α.
Consistent with some findings (Reindl, Stoughton and Zechner, 2017), this variable captures
how non-transferable a firm’s asset might be in default and thus is positively related to α.
Lastly, interestingly, the estimates imply that firm size is a strong positive proxy for α and
this is inconsistent with some previous findings (Reindl, Stoughton and Zechner, 2017). If
the same tax rates were used for both small and big firms, as was done in other studies,
then small firms’ α would have been larger than big firms’ because small firms’ leverage
is smaller than big firms’. Yet, as shown in Table 8, big firms face much larger tax shield
benefit rates (almost 3 times) than small firms do. Thus, through the lens of my model, it
implies that big firms have to face larger α than small firms do. This finding illustrates the
importance of using appropriate tax rates in estimating α and η for each subset.
Using these estimates, I do a counterfactual analysis for each subset of firms. Allowing
η to be positive can have different implications on each subset because different subsets
have different α, η and tax shield benefit rates. Table 8’s last panel summarizes such
counterfactual analysis results.
[INSERT TABLE 8]
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For example, I focus on firms sorted by R&D. η for high-R&D firms is larger than that for
low-R&D firms and thus allowing η to be positive should have larger economic consequences
on high-R&D firms. High-R&D firms have larger α and thus reinforces the commitment
problem that positive η plays. Thus, high-R&D’s leverages and default probabilities de-
crease significantly more (17.1% and 24.0%, respectively) than low-R&D’s (7.3% and 4.4%,
respectively). However, these do not necessarily translate to lower dollar amount of tax
shield benefit for high-R&D firms. Because high-R&D firms face a lower tax shield benefit
rate than low-R&D firms, high-R&D firms face lower firm value loss than low-R&D firms
despite that high-R&D firms reduce their leverage more. Accordingly, the percentage in-
crease in government tax collection is larger for low-R&D firms than it is for high-R&D
firms.
1.6.4. Firm Heterogeneity: Monte Carlo Simulations
As emphasized by Glover (2016), cross-sectional distribution of model parameters is im-
portant to consider, especially in estimating default cost and shareholder recovery rate.
Although I agree with its importance, it is empirically challenging to estimate the cross-
sectional distribution. Below, I first discuss how model misspecification at the firm level
makes it empirically challenging to estimate the cross-sectional distribution. Then, I illus-
trate that estimating for the representative firms does not suffer from model misspecification
problem. Lastly, I quantify sample-selection bias and validate bias-adjusted estimates.
To quantitatively analyze the aforementioned three points, it is the most ideal to know pop-
ulation cross-sectional distribution of model parameters. Thus, the most suitable way to
analyze this is through a Monte Carlo simulation. In order to illustrate how my analysis is
sensitive to different data-generating process (DGP), I create two simulated panel data (see
Appendix A.2 for details). Both DGPs are calibrated to resemble data on a few aspects,
including population cross-sectional mean of model parameters, which are set almost equal
to those reported in Table 5. In both simulated data set, firm heterogeneity arises due to
heterogeneous model misspecification, heterogeneous model parameters or different realiza-
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tions of earnings. The only difference between these two DGPs is as follows. I create the
first simulated panel data set by randomly drawing α and η from truncated normal PDF.
I create the second simulated panel data set by randomly drawing α and η from truncated
exponential PDF. Panel A in Table 9 shows population cross-sectional mean of shareholder
recovery rate for both DGPs.
Firm-Level Estimation
Glover (2016) estimates the population default cost to be 45% even though default cost
among population conditional on defaults is 25%, and Glover attributed the large discrep-
ancy to sample-selection bias. Even though I qualitatively agree with existence of sample-
selection bias, I want to illustrate that Glover’s particular choice of estimation method
might have significantly upward biased its estimate of the sample-selection bias.
As long as the estimation procedure cannot distinguish between different sources of het-
erogeneity, estimated cross-sectional distribution of model parameters are biased by model
misspecification. In order to illustrate my point, I study firm-level estimation, used by
Glover, which cannot distinguish between different sources of heterogeneity. Due to small
time-series data, the law of large numbers cannot help to “fix” the model misspecification
problem, and consequently firm-level estimates are biased. Firm-level estimates are upward
biased because both model-implied functions for leverage and default probability are convex
functions in default cost, α, and shareholder recovery rate, η. Consequently, cross-sectional
average of firm-level estimates are significantly upward biased. Panel B.1 in Table 9 reports
estimation bias for both set of simulated panel data.
[INSERT TABLE 9]
Numerical Validation of Structural Estimation
Similar to Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007), this paper structurally estimates for the repre-
sentative firm. This subsection numerically shows that the structural estimation procedure
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used in this paper properly uncovers population cross-sectional mean of model parameters.
The results are summarized in Panel B.2 in Table 9. As shown, the structural estimation
procedure’s estimate biases are small for both simulated panel data, yet not zero due to
finite-sample bias. Thanks to the law of large numbers, estimating for the representative
firm always yields lower bias than firm-level estimates as long as the model is nonlinear in
model parameters.
Sample-Selection Bias and Validation of Estimates
Many earlier papers attempt to estimate η and α by examining defaulted firms. Thus,
it seems natural to check my estimates against realized counterparts documented in those
papers. However, as noted by Glover (2016), sample-selection bias can be large because firms
with small η and/or small α tend to default more frequently. Thus, the sample average of η
(α) conditional on defaults can be smaller than the unconditional sample average of η (α).
I quantify sample-selection bias and report results in Panel C in Table 9. Population
cross-sectional mean of α and η is almost identical for both simulated data. Yet, cross-
sectional distributions of α and η, which follow the normal distribution, have smaller mass
on small values than those that follow exponential distribution. Thus, the magnitude of
sample-selection bias should be smaller under the first specification. Consistent with the
intuition, sample-selection bias is 5.5% for α and 2.3% for η using the first simulated data
set, whereas sample-selection bias is 8.3% for α and 3.3% for η using the second simulated
data set. As illustrated, the magnitude of sample-selection bias heavily depends on η and
α’s cross-sectional distribution.
Nonetheless, I use these bias-adjusted numbers to validate my estimates. Among defaulted
firms, direct measurement literature estimate shareholder recovery rate after default cost is
realized. Thus, the comparable number is the sample average of η1−α . The value is 5.4%
under the first simulated data and 4.2% under the second simulated data. Both numbers
are in line with empirically observed counterpart between 0.4% and 7.6%. Bias-adjusted
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default cost is 11.9% under the first simulated data and 8.4% under the second simulated
data. Both numbers are in line with the empirically observed counterpart between 10%
and 20%. This external validation exercise strongly validates my results. Lastly, I check if
the parameter estimates imply a reasonable value for creditors’ recovery rate. According
to Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database announcement in April 2017, the median recovery
for corporate bonds was 36% between 1987 and 2016. The model counterparts16 are 25.4%
using the first simulated data and 27.9% using the second simulated data. The discrepancy
in creditors’ recovery rate could arise due to different sample period.
1.6.5. Uncertainty in Shareholders’ Recovery Rate
In this subsection, I study how uncertainty in shareholder recovery rate could impact firms’
optimal leverage ex-ante.
I assume that shareholder recovery rate, η, is drawn once, immediately after firms decide
on its initial leverage. One reasonable conjecture is that uncertainty in η decreases the
commitment problem played by positive η because its power seems to have subsided due
to its uncertainty. However, the opposite can happen for the following reason. Expected
firm-value loss is a convex function in η (because XDC is proportional to
1
1−η as shown in
Equation (1.5)). Thus, the average of high η’s optimal leverage and low η’s is smaller than
medium η’s leverage. On a related note, as long as η = 1 event happens with some positive
probability, expected firm-value loss becomes infinity (again, because XDC is proportional
to 11−η as shown in Equation (1.5)) and firms optimally choose zero leverage ex-ante. Thus,
introducing uncertainty in η can allow us to match the empirically observed leverage even
with lower magnitude of η.
What does this mean for my η estimate? If uncertainty in η truly exists in the real world,
16I define creditors’ recovery rate as
(1− αr − ηr)(D(XD) + E(XD))
D(X0)
where the numerator represents the creditor’s realized recovery value and the denominator represents what
creditors are owed.
34
because the current model does not account for uncertainty, η reported in Table 5 is an
upper bound for the population cross-sectional mean of η. Although this is a very interesting
extension, quantitative analysis of the role of uncertainty in η is beyond the scope of this
paper and I will leave this for later study.
1.7. Conclusion
According to the absolute priority rule (APR), shareholders should recover nothing in de-
fault unless creditors are paid in full. However, in practice, shareholders do receive a positive
payoff in default even if creditors are not paid in full. In this paper, I develop a dynamic
tradeoff model to examine the importance of a positive shareholder recovery rate. Consis-
tent with existing empirical findings, I allow default to be costly even when shareholders
recover a positive amount as a renegotiation outcome with creditors. A positive recovery
makes shareholders more willing to default, which increases borrowing costs. In response,
firms optimally reduce leverage ex-ante. This channel helps to match distributions of both
leverage and default probability.
A structural estimation of the model yields a default cost of 17.3% and a shareholder
recovery rate of 7.1%. Counterfactual analysis reveals that allowing a positive shareholder
recovery rate decreases the leverage by 9.4%. Consequently, default probabilities decrease
by 8.1%, market betas decrease by 20.5% and credit spreads decrease by 1.7%. As firms lose
the tax shield benefit, firm values decrease by 1.5% and government tax revenue increases
by 9.9%. Lastly, lower default probability, driven by a positive shareholder recovery, implies
less frequent realization of deadweight cost. Thus, the sum of firm values and government
tax revenue increases by 0.9%. Even though this paper does not do complete welfare
analysis, these findings can still be used to shed some light on an important bankruptcy
policy question as this paper highlights its consequences. Additionally, subperiod analysis
reveals that shareholder recovery rate increased immediately after the Bankruptcy Reform
Act was passed in 1978, and a shareholder recovery rate has steadily decreased ever since.
Consistent with the empirical literature, my subset estimates show that firm size is a good
35
positive proxy for shareholder recovery rate.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics for my sample of firm data. The sample contains
246,090 firm-quarter observations, number of unique firms is 4,435 and spans from 1970Q1
to 2016Q4. Market beta is calculated based on a rolling window of 24 months of monthly
returns. Earnings growth is e˜i,t+1 = log
(∑K
j=0OIADPQi,t+1−j∑K
j=0OIADPQi,t−j
− 1
)
where K is set to 8 and
OIADPQ is operating income after depreciation. Default probabilities are constructed by
following distance-to-default model (Bharath and Shumway, 2008). Leverage is defined as
DLTTQ+DLCQ
DLTTQ+DLCQ+ME where DLTTQ, DLCQ and ME are long-term debt, short-term debt
and market equity, respectively.
Market beta Earnings Growth Default Probability Leverage
Mean 1.105 0.0060 0.0027 0.283
Median 1.050 0.0144 0.0000 0.231
Standard dev 0.858 0.3018 0.0437 0.225
Skewness 0.763 -0.9793 19.2656 0.815
Minimum -12.771 -8.3713 0.0000 0.000
Max 15.278 8.0986 1.0000 0.999
Number of obs 246,090 246,090 246,090 246,090
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Table 2: Aggregate Parameters Values
This table reports values used for aggregate parameters and their data sources. Quarterly
aggregate earnings growth volatility (σA) and quarterly real risk-free rate (r) are calibrated
based on the sample period from 1947Q1 through 2016Q4. A value for market Sharpe ratio
is obtained from Chen (2010) and a value for proportional debt issuance cost is obtained
from Altinkilic and Hansen (2000).
Description Value Source
σA Quarterly aggr earnings growth vol 0.052 NIPA
r Quarterly real risk-free rate 0.0016 FRED
ϕA Quarterly market Sharpe ratio 0.165 Chen (2010)
φD Prop’ debt issuance cost 0.015 Altinkilic and Hansen (2000)
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Table 3: Sensitivity of Moments to Parameters
This table shows the local sensitivity of model-implied moments (in columns) with respect
to model parameters (in rows). To make the sensitivities comparable across parameters and
moments, the sensitivities are normalized as ∂ moment∂ parameter× parameter’s standard errormoments’ standard error . Local sensi-
tivities are calculated around the estimates that are reported in Table 5. From left to right,
moments are mean of market beta (E(β)), variance of earnings growth (var(EG)), mean of
leverage (E(Lev)), variance of leverage (var(Lev)), skewness of leverage (skew(Lev)), mean
of default probability (E(DP )), variance of default probability (var(DP )) and skewness of
default probability (skew(DP )). Parameter definitions are as follows. b is earnings growth
beta, σF is volatility of firm-specific earnings growth shock, η is shareholder recovery rate
and α is default cost.
E(β) var(EG) E(Lev) var(Lev) skew(Lev) E(DP ) var(DP ) skew(DP )
b 0.837 0.015 0.275 0.312 −0.204 0.235 0.202 −0.088
σF 0.003 0.215 −0.006 0.280 0.154 0.280 0.251 −0.107
η −0.208 0.000 −0.317 −0.655 0.027 −0.081 −0.072 0.030
α −0.276 0.001 −0.603 −0.733 0.465 −0.530 −0.452 0.196
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Table 4: Model Fit
This table shows how well the model fits the eight moments targeted in the SMM estimation.
The first and the second rows show data moments and standard errors respectively. The
third row shows model-implied moments. The last two rows show the difference between
data and model-implied moments and t-statistics. From left to right, moments are mean
of market beta (E(β)), variance of earnings growth (var(EG)), mean of leverage (E(Lev)),
variance of leverage (var(Lev)), skewness of leverage (skew(Lev)), mean of default probabil-
ity (E(DP )), variance of default probability (var(DP )) and skewness of default probability
(skew(DP )).
E(β) var(EG) E(Lev) var(Lev) skew(Lev) E(DP ) var(DP ) skew(DP )
Data 1.105 0.078 0.283 0.019 0.451 0.003 0.002 16.869
Std. Err. (0.036) (0.010) (0.012) (0.003) (0.155) (0.001) (0.000) (3.960)
Model 1.100 0.060 0.283 0.018 0.736 0.004 0.002 16.068
Difference 0.005 0.018 -0.001 0.001 -0.285 -0.001 0.000 0.801
t-stat 0.151 1.786 -0.041 0.251 -1.839 -1.662 -0.689 0.202
Table 5: Parameter Estimates
This table reports the model’s parameter estimates from the simulated method of moments
(SMM). Here, I cluster by industries to account for apparent correlation between firms
in the same industry. I use 17 industry definitions from Kenneth French’s website. This
clustering strategy also accounts for time-series autocorrelation within firms. This is more
conservative than clustering by firms. Parameter definitions are as follows. b is earnings
growth beta, σF is volatility of firm-specific earnings growth shock, η is shareholder recovery
rate and α is default cost.
b σF η α
Estimate 0.816 0.244 0.071 0.173
Standard Error (0.019) (0.002) (0.009) (0.010)
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Table 6: The Effect of Positive Shareholders’ Recovery Rate
This table illustrates the effect of a positive shareholder recovery rate. The first column re-
ports values for the counterfactual world where shareholders are expected to recover nothing
in default. The second column allows shareholders to recover non-zero amount in default
yet forces firms to keep the same optimal policies (coupon, C, and refinancing point, XU )
as under the first column. This exercise helps to quantify how much expected firm-value
loss increases, conditional on the firms’ optimal policies. The third column summarizes the
data-matched world where shareholders are expected to recover 7.1% in default. The first
three rows are coupon, default threshold and upward refinancing boundary, all scaled by
initial earnings level. The fourth row shows panel-wide average of leverage. The fifth row
shows panel-wide average of default probabilities. The sixth row shows panel-wide average
of market betas. The last row shows panel-wide average of credit spreads.
(1) (2) (3)
η = 0 η = 7.1% η = 7.1%
Coupon (C) 1.145 1.145 1.006
Upward Refinancing Point (XU ) 3.882 3.882 3.918
Default Threshold (XD) 0.077 0.083 0.073
Leverage 0.314 0.306 0.285
Default Probability (%) 0.388 0.436 0.356
Market-beta 1.386 1.132 1.102
Credit Spread (BP) 194 201 191
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Table 7: Robustness — Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
This table reports the model’s parameter estimates from the simulated method of moments
(SMM). These estimates help to test how the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 changed
shareholder recovery rate (η) and default cost (α). Similarly to the baseline parameter
estimates, I cluster by industries to account for apparent correlation between firms in the
same industry. I use 17 industry definitions from Kenneth French’s website. This clustering
strategy also accounts for time-series autocorrelation within firms. This is more conservative
than clustering by firms. Parameter definitions are as follows. b is earnings growth beta,
σF is volatility of firm-specific earnings growth shock, ηpre is η for the pre-event subperiod
(1975Q1-1978Q3) and ηpost is η for the post-event subperiod (1981Q2-1984Q4), αpre is α
for the pre-event subperiod (1975Q1-1978Q3) and αpost is α for the post-event subperiod
(1981Q2-1984Q4).
b σF ηpre ηpost αpre αpost
Estimate 0.812 0.220 0.001 0.290 0.190 0.210
Standard Error (0.012) (0.002) (0.019) (0.017) (0.008) (0.032)
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Table 8: Robustness — Subset Based on Empirical Proxies for Shareholders’ Recovery Rate
This table reports results for subset analysis. For each proxy (size, R&D, or intangibility),
I form two subsets. At each quarter, I calculate the proxy’s cross-sectional median, and I
temporarily allocate a firm with proxy value greater than the median to High-subset and a
firm with proxy value smaller than the median to Low-subset. This generates a time-series
of subsets for a given firm. Then, I allocate the firm’s entire time-series data to one subset
that the firm spends the most time in. The first panel reports summary statistics for each
subset. The second panel reports estimates for shareholder recovery rate (η) and default
cost (α) and standard errors (in parentheses) for each subset. The last panel quantifies
economic consequences of allowing shareholders to recover a positive amount in default.
It reports percent changes on leverage, default probability, firm value and government tax
revenue.
Size R&D Intangibility
Small Big Low High Low High
Summary Statistics
Tax Shield Benefit Rate 0.048 0.132 0.112 0.063 0.105 0.098
Leverage 0.273 0.287 0.240 0.181 0.315 0.240
Default Prob 0.201 0.291 0.142 0.087 0.326 0.179
Estimates
Shareholders’ Recovery Rate (η) 0.015 0.122 0.071 0.101 0.061 0.073
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.043) (0.008) (0.014)
Default Cost (α) 0.105 0.242 0.131 0.150 0.174 0.21
(0.004) (0.028) (0.010) (0.022) (0.006) (0.012)
Economic Consequences: η = 0⇒ η 6= 0
%∆ Leverage −2.6 −14.6 −7.3 −17.1 −8.2 −11.0
%∆ Default Prob −4.3 −12.2 −4.4 −24.0 −7.3 −13.7
%∆ Firm Value −0.1 −4.0 −2.0 −1.1 −1.2 −1.2
%∆ Tax Revenue 0.6 79 146.4 11.2 7.5 7.5
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Table 9: Robustness — Firm Heterogeneity
This table illustrates how firm-level heterogeneity can impact structural estimates. For illus-
tration, I simulate two sets of panel data sets that feature firm heterogeneity due to variety
of sources: heterogeneous model parameters (α, η), heterogeneous model misspecification
and idiosyncratic shocks. The first simulated data set assumes truncated normal distri-
bution for model parameters and the table’s first column summarizes such results. The
second simulated data set assumes truncated exponential distribution for cross-sectional
distribution of model parameters and the table’s second column summarizes such results
(see Appendix Section A.2 for more detail). Panel A summarizes population cross-sectional
mean of heterogeneous model parameters. Panel B reports estimates for population cross-
sectional mean using different structural estimation procedures. Panel C reports conditional
mean in default, and quantifies sample-selection bias.
Truncated Normal Truncated Exponential
Panel A. Population Cross-sectional Mean of Heterogeneous Model Parameters
αi 17.4% 17.0%
ηi 7.1% 7.0%
Panel B. Estimates Using Different Estimation Procedures
estimation bias estimation bias
B.1 Firm-Level Structural Estimation (Glover (2016))
α 19.6% 2.2% 19.7% 2.7%
η 21.1% 14.0% 22.4% 15.4%
B.2 Structural Estimation Used in the Current Paper
α 17.7% 0.3% 16.3% 0.7%
η 7.4% 0.3% 6.5% 0.5%
Panel C. Conditional Mean Upon Default
selection bias selection bias
α 11.9% 5.5% 8.4% 8.6%
η 4.8% 2.3% 3.4% 3.6%
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Figure 1: Illustration of the Trade-off Theory
This figure illustrates the Trade-off theory. Solid line illustrates the Trade-off theory when
η = 0. Dashed line illustrates the Trade-off theory when η 6= 0. A → B illustrates
an economic intuition that the firm value decreases due to shareholders’ strategic default
action. B → C illustrates that firms actively de-lever to optimize firm value minus debt
issuance cost and illustrates a commitment problem.
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Figure 2: Identification of η and α
This figure illustrates how η and α are separately identified. Solid line is the locus of α
and η that match a given leverage. Dashed line is the locus of α and η that match a given
default probability.
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Figure 3: Time-Series Variation of Leverage and Default Probabilities
This figure illustrates how shareholder recovery rate (η) impacts time-series variation of
leverage and default probabilities. Two firms have the same model parameters except for
η: blue firm’s η is zero, whereas red firm’s η is non-zero. Both firms face the same sequence
of earnings that are shown in the top panel. Middle panel shows time-series of leverage for
both firms. Blue firm’s leverage is larger than red firm’s on average. Moreover, blue firm
upward refinances earlier at time 84 than red firm does. Consequently, blue firm’ leverage
is more volatile and more positively skewed. Similar patterns are observed in the sequence
of default probabilities (bottom panel).
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Figure 4: Evolution of Shareholder Recovery Rate and Default Cost in Percentages
This figure illustrates how structural estimates for shareholder recovery rate (upper panel)
and default cost (lower panel) change over time. Red dashed line illustrates estimates for
the entire sample: 1970Q1-2016Q4: ηˆ = 7.1%(0.9%) and αˆ = 17.3%(1.0%). Black solid line
(estimates) along with gray region (95% confidence interval) illustrate estimates for each
subperiod. ηˆ = 0.1%(1.9%) and αˆ = 19.0%(0.8%) for 1975Q1-1978Q3. ηˆ = 29.0%(1.7%)
and αˆ = 21.0%(3.2%) for 1981Q2-1984Q4. ηˆ = 19.9%(1.1%) and αˆ = 14.0%(1.3%) for
1985Q1-1994Q4. ηˆ = 3.8%(1.0%) and αˆ = 15.3%(1.1%) for 1995Q1-2004Q4. Lastly, ηˆ =
0.97%(0.3%) and αˆ = 17.1%(0.8%) for 2005Q1-2016Q4.
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Figure 5: Identification of Time-Series Change in η and α
This figure illustrates how time-series change in leverage and default probabilities help to
identify time-series change in η and α. As it moves from 1985Q1-1994Q4 to 2005Q1-2016Q4,
solid line (locus of α and η that match a leverage) shifts downward and dashed line (locus
of α and η that match a default probability) shifts downward. Intersection of thick solid
line and thick dashed line is a structural estimate for 1985Q1-1994Q4. Intersection of thin
solid line and think dashed line is a structural estimate for 2005Q1-2016Q4. As shown, as
it moves from 1985Q1-1994Q4 to 2005Q1-2016Q4, η significantly decreases yet α slightly
increases.
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CHAPTER 2 : Measurement Error in Multiple Equations
2.1. Introduction
Sometimes a mismeasured explanatory variable appears in multiple linear equations of in-
terest which are nonetheless estimated separately. What, if any, is the identification gain
that results from analyzing the system’s equations jointly, as opposed to separately, when
a common explanatory variable suffers from classical measurement error? What are use-
ful auxiliary assumptions that can help identify the system’s coefficients? How are the
system’s coefficients jointly sensitive to deviations from these auxiliary assumptions? To
address these questions, we show how the identification region for each equation’s coeffi-
cients depends on the extent of the measurement error in the proxy for the common latent
variable. When analyzing each equation separately, researchers might forgo information
about the accuracy of the proxy that obtains when using the other equations. Further,
they may reach incoherent conclusions that implicitly rest on different inference, derived
from each equation separately, on the extent of the measurement error in the proxy. In
contrast, we demonstrate how analyzing the system of equations jointly can yield tighter
sharp identification regions for the system’s coefficients than the single equation analysis.
Further, by analyzing the system of equations jointly, the paper’s framework guides the
researcher toward employing useful but also compatible identifying assumptions.
Specifically, we study identifying the coefficients in a system of linear equations that share
a mismeasured explanatory variable. Building on partial identification results in the pres-
ence of measurement error in e.g. Klepper and Leamer (1984), Leamer (1987), Bollinger
(2003), and Chalak and Kim (2018), we characterize the sharp identification regions for
the coefficients on the latent variable and the (correctly measured) covariates under the
classical measurement error assumption and demonstrate the identification gain that re-
sults from analyzing the equations jointly as opposed to separately. Roughly speaking,
this is akin to studying the efficiency gain that results from jointly estimating seemingly
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unrelated regressions (e.g. Zellner, 1962). Further, to tighten the bounds and conduct a
sensitivity analysis, we derive the sharp identification regions under any configuration of
the following three auxiliary assumptions. As we show, each of these assumptions weak-
ens a stronger benchmark assumption that point identifies the system’s coefficients. The
first auxiliary assumption weakens the assumption of “no measurement error” by impos-
ing an upper bound on the (net-of-the covariates) “noise to signal” ratio (i.e. the ratio of
the variance of the measurement error to that of the latent variable net-of-the covariates).
The second controls the fit of the model by imposing upper bounds on the coefficients of
determination that would obtain in each equation had there been no measurement error.
The third weakens the assumption that the variance matrix of the equation disturbances is
diagonal by specifying the signs of the correlations among the cross-equation disturbances,
if at all. We do not require a particular configuration of these auxiliary assumptions. In-
stead, we characterize the mapping from each configuration to the identification regions of
the coefficients. We then conduct a sensitivity analysis that studies the consequences of
deviating from the benchmark point-identifying assumptions. To facilitate inference, we
express the identification regions for the coefficients in terms of intersection bounds. We
then combine and implement results from Chernozhukov, Rigobon, and Stoker (2010) and
Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013). The resulting framework delivers a specification
test for the imposed assumptions and enables inference under sequentially stronger identi-
fying assumptions, whereby a researcher can gain confidence in results that hold true under
weaker assumptions.
To illustrate our framework, we study estimating the effects of a firm’s cash flow (internal
funds) on its investment, saving, and debt. After accounting for the firm’s marginal q (the
firm’s expected marginal return of capital), various theories offer contradictory predictions
about the sign of the effect of cash flow on each of these outcomes. Because researchers do
not directly observe marginal q, it is common to use Tobin’s q (the ratio of the firm’s market
value to its assets’ replacement value, e.g. the “market-to-book” ratio) as an error-laden
proxy for marginal q. To proceed, the literature employs various econometric methods that
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impose different assumptions on the measurement error in Tobin’s q. These methods yield
mixed empirical conclusions, sometimes corroborating contradictory theoretical predictions,
about the direction of the effects of cash flow on investment (e.g. Erickson and Whited
(2000, 2012) and Almeida, Campello, and Galvao (2010)), saving (e.g. Almeida, Campello,
and Weisbach (2004) and Riddick and Whited (2009)), and debt (e.g. Rajan and Zingales
(1995) and Erickson, Jiang and Whited (2014)). Importantly, the literature estimates each
of the investment, saving, and debt equations separately. Using data from COMPUSTAT,
we apply our framework to study the joint effects of cash flow on the investment, saving,
and debt of corporate firms in the US when Tobin’s q serves as an error-laden proxy for a
firm’s marginal q. Analyzing the equations jointly, as opposed to separately, tightens the
identification regions considerably and sometimes determines the sign of the effects of cash
flow without imposing stronger assumptions. In particular, the joint effects of cash flow
on investment, saving, and debt can be zero if and only if Tobin’s q is a noisy proxy for
marginal q, with a low reliability ratio. Otherwise, if Tobin’s q is a moderately accurate
proxy then cash flow affects investment and saving positively and debt negatively.
More broadly, this paper’s econometrics framework can be useful in any context in which
an error-laden proxy for a latent variable appears in multiple equations. For example,
individual latent “ability” may affect multiple labor market outcomes, such as wage and
hours worked, and is often proxied by a test score, such as IQ. Similarly, a medical test
score may serve as a proxy for a latent health status that may affect multiple aspects of a
patient’s behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data generating assumptions and
notation. Section 3 derives the sharp identification regions under the classical measurement
error assumption and any configuration of the auxiliary assumptions. Section 4 illustrates
the identification results using a numerical example. Section 5 describes the estimation and
inference procedure. Section 6 applies the paper’s framework to study the effects of cash
flow on corporate behavior. Section 7 concludes. Supplementary material and mathematical
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proofs are gathered in the Online Appendix.
2.2. Data Generation and Assumptions
We assume that the data is generated as follows.
Assumption A1 1 Data Generation: (i) Let ( X
k×1
′, W
1×1
, Y
p×1
′)′ be a random vector with a
finite variance. (ii) Let a structural system generate the random variables η
p×1
, ε
1×1
, U
1×1
, X,
W , and Y such that
Y ′ = X ′β + Uδ + η′ and W = U + ε (2.1)
with constant slope coefficients. The researcher observes realizations of (X ′,W, Y ′)′ but not
of (U, η′, ε).
A1 decomposes the proxy W into the “signal” component
1 U and the “noise” or error ε.
We are interested in identifying the effects δj and βj of U and X on Yj for j = 1, ..., p as
encoded in the jth outcome equation,
Yj = X
′βj + Uδj + ηj . (2.2)
X denotes the observed determinants that drive Y . Our framework does not require the
presence of these covariates, so X may be empty. When present, we allow X to enter all
the Yj equations, as can often occur in systems where multiple outcomes are determined
jointly. When Cov[(η′, ε)′, X] = 0, as we will assume shortly, excluding a component of X
from a Yj equation can point identify the system coefficients since the excluded variable
can serve as an instrumental variable (see the discussion following Theorem 2.3.1). We
do not require such exclusion restrictions. Here, the challenge in identifying (δ, β) is due
to U being unobserved and possibly correlated with X. In particular, we maintain two
1The structure Y ′ = X ′β + V γ + η′ and W = V ψ + ε, with V unobserved, is observationally equivalent
to A1. Provided the scale ψ 6= 0, only the ratio δ ≡ γψ of the coefficients on V may be (partially) identified.
To ease the notation, we use the simpler representation in which U ≡ V ψ.
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standard assumptions about the other unobservables η and ε. First, the “disturbance” η is
uncorrelated with (X ′, U)′.
Assumption A2 1 Uncorrelated Disturbance: Cov[η, (X
′, U)′] = 0.
Second, the measurement error ε is uncorrelated with (X ′, U, η).
Assumption A3 1 Uncorrelated measurement error: Cov[ε, (X
′, U, η)′] = 0.
Assumptions A1-A3 are the classical error-in-variables assumptions (see e.g. Wooldridge,
2002, p. 80). We briefly comment on certain related papers that either weaken or strengthen
A1-A3. In the case of a single equation with p = 1, Lewbel (1997) and Erickson and Whited
(2002) strengthen A1-A3 by imposing additional restrictions on the higher order moments of
(η, ε, U,X ′) that may point identify2 (β, δ). We do not require these stronger assumptions3.
Instead, we impose the uncorrelation assumptions A2-A3 and study partially identifying δ
and β. DiTraglia and Garcia-Jimeno (2017) relax A2 to allow X (or its instrument) to be
endogenous and, similarly to this paper’s joint equation analysis, they advocate analyzing
jointly the assumptions imposed on instrument exogeneity and measurement error. Krasker
and Pratt (1986) and Erickson and Whited (2005) relax A3 and characterize how highly
correlated should W and U be in order to identify the sign of δ or of a component of
β. Klepper and Leamer (1984) and Bollinger (2003) characterize the sharp identification
regions for δ and β under A1-A3. Chalak and Kim (2018) extend these results when U is
a scalar to relax the proxy exclusion restriction in A1 by allowing W to affect Y directly.
Whereas the papers discussed above consider a scalar outcome with p = 1, Leamer (1987)
studies the identification of the coefficients under A1-A3 when X is empty and Y and U are
vectors of arbitrary dimensions. Here, we build on these papers and study the identification
gain that results from imposing the auxiliary assumptions A4-A6 discussed below. For
concreteness and to gain analytical tractability, we focus on the case where U and W are
2Note that if X = (X ′1, X
′
2)
′ and one further requires E[(η′, ε)′|X1] = E[(η′, ε)′] then it may be possible
to point identify (β′, δ)′ in Y ′ = X ′β+Wδ+ η′− εδ by generating an instrument for W as a function of X1
that is excluded from X2.
3For instance, unlike in Erickson and Whited (2002), A1-A3 allow the system variables to be jointly
normally distributed.
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scalars and Y is a p× 1 vector, as we maintain in the empirical application when studying
the firm investment, saving, and debt equations. This enables us to operate in a simpler
context and to demonstrate how this type of sensitivity analysis can be usefully implemented
in empirical work.
2.2.1. Notation
To shorten the notation, for generic random vectors A and B, we write:
σ2A ≡ V ar(A) and σA,B ≡ Cov(A,B).
When A and B are nondegenerate scalars, rA,B ≡ σA,BσAσB denotes the correlation between
A and B. Further, when σC,B is square and nonsingular, we use the following succinct
notation for the linear instrumental variable (IV) regression estimand and residual
bA.B|C ≡ σ−1C,BσC,A and ′A.B|C ≡ [A− E(A)]′ − [B − E(B)]′bA.B|C
so that by construction E(A.B|C) = 0 and Cov(C, A.B|C) = 0. In particular, bA.B|C is
the vector of slope coefficients associated with B in a linear IV regression of A on (1, B′)′
using instruments (1, C ′)′. If B = C, we obtain the linear regression estimand and residual
bA.B ≡ bA.B|B and A.B ≡ A.B|B. Last, for a scalar A, we denote by
R2A.B ≡ σ−2A (σA,Bσ−2B σB,A) ≡ bB.AbA.B
the population coefficient of determination (R-squared) from a regression4 of A on B.
4If σ2B is singular, we set R
2
A.B = R
2
A.Bo where Bo is a maximal linearly independent subset of B. Further,
if either σ2A = 0 or σ
2
B = 0 then we set rA.B = 0 and R
2
A.B = 0.
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2.2.2. Linear Projection
Recall that under A2-A3, Cov[(η, ε)
′, X] = 0. Thus, provided σ2X is nonsingular, projecting
W and Y onto X gives bW.X = bU.X and
bY.X = β + bW.Xδ. (2.3)
Further, using A˜ ≡ A.X as a shorthand notation for the residual from the regression of a
vector A on X, we employ the following convenient system of projected linear equations:
Y˜ ′ = U˜δ + η˜′ and W˜ = U˜ + ε˜ (2.4)
to study identifying δ. The identification region for β then obtains using equation (2.3).
2.2.3. Auxiliary Assumptions
To tighten the identification regions obtained under A1-A3 and conduct a sensitivity analy-
sis, we consider the auxiliary assumptions A4-A6 that weaken three benchmark assumptions.
We do not require A4-A6. Instead, we characterize the identification gain that results from
imposing any configuration of these auxiliary assumptions.
Klepper and Leamer (1984), Klepper (1988), and Chalak and Kim (2018) employ assump-
tions similar to A4 and A5 when p = 1. Since we consider multiple equations, p ≥ 1, we
also study assumption A6, introduced below. Specifically, the first auxiliary assumption
weakens the “no measurement error” assumption σ2ε = 0 by imposing an upper bound κ on
the net-of-X “noise to signal ratio.”
Assumption A4 1 Bounded Net-of-X Noise to Signal Ratio: σ
2
ε ≤ κσ2U˜ where 0 ≤ κ.
For example, A4 reduces to the “no measurement error” assumption σ
2
ε = 0 when κ = 0
whereas setting κ = 1 assumes that, after projecting on X, the variance of the measurement
error is at most as large as the variance of U , σ2ε ≤ σ2U˜ . Given A1-A3, A4 equivalently
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imposes a lower bound 11+κ on ρ, the net-of-X “signal to total variance ratio”:
1
1 + κ
≤ ρ ≡ σ
2
U˜
σ2
W˜
=
σ2
U˜
σ2
U˜
+ σ2ε
.
Further, since ρ ≡ σ
2
U˜
σ2
W˜
=
R2W.U−R2W.X
1−R2W.X
(e.g. DiTraglia and Garcia-Jimeno, 2017, eq. (20)),
A4 equivalently sets a lower bound κ
∗ ≡ 1+κR2W.X1+κ on the “reliability ratio” R2W.U , so that
R2W.X ≤ κ∗ ≤ R2W.U . One may resort to any of these equivalent interpretations of A4.
Consider the coefficient of determination R2
Y˜j .U˜
≡ 1 − σ
2
ηj
σ2
Y˜j
in the Y˜j equation from display
(2.4). By A1-A3 and since W measures U with error, Lemma B.4.1 in the Online Appendix
gives that R2
Y˜j .W˜
≤ R2
Y˜j .U˜
. The second auxiliary assumption controls the fit of the model
by imposing a bound τj on how large can R
2
Y˜j .U˜
be.
Assumption A5 1 Bounded Net-of-X Coefficient of Determination: R
2
Y˜j .U˜
≤ τj where
0 < τj and R
2
Y˜j .W˜
≤ τj ≤ 1 for j = 1, .., p.
Since R2A.(X′,B)′ =
σ2
A˜
σ2A
(R2
A˜.B˜
−1)+1, A5 equivalently imposes an upper bound τ∗j ≡
σ2
Y˜j
σ2Yj
(τj−
1)+1 on the coefficient of determination R2Yj .(X′,U)′ ≡ 1−
σ2ηj
σ2Yj
in the Yj equation from display
(2.2). We let τ ≡ (τ1, ..., τp)′ and τ∗ ≡ (τ∗1 , ..., τ∗p )′.
The third auxiliary assumption weakens the assumption that σ2η is diagonal by specifying
the sign of the correlation rηj ,ηh among the cross-equation disturbances, if at all.
Assumption A6 1 Disturbance Correlation Sign Restriction: cjh ≤ rηj ,ηh ≤ cjh where
(cjh, cjh) ∈ {(−1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0), (−1, 1)}.
A6 encodes the sign restrictions (if any) imposed in A6 on the
1
2p(p−1) off-diagonal elements
of σ2η. For example, (cjh, cjh) = (−1, 0) encodes that rηj ,ηh ≤ 0 whereas if A6 does not
restrict the sign of rηj ,ηh then we set (cjh, cjh) = (−1, 1). We collect these restrictions in the
matrix c
1
2
p(p−1)×2
= (c, c) where c = (c12, ..., c(p−1)p)′ and c = (c12, ..., c(p−1)p)′. For example,
when σ2η is assumed to be diagonal, we set c = 0.
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Online Appendix A extends A6 to A
′
6 which sets cjh ≤ rηj ,ηh ≤ cjh with −1 ≤ cjh ≤ cjh ≤ 1.
In particular, A′6 may restrict the sign and/or magnitude of the correlation rηj ,ηh . While
A′6 is conceptually similar to A6, the expression for the identification region under A1-A′6
is more complex. To ease the exposition, we report these results in the Online Appendix.
Here and in the empirical analysis in Section 6, we focus on specifying the sign of rηj ,ηh , if
at all, which can be more salient in empirical work and is sometimes more easily inferred
from economic theory.
As we show in Section 3, whereas A4 directly restricts the net-of-X signal to total variance
ratio ρ (i.e. the extent of the measurement error), A5 and A6 indirectly restrict ρ. We vary
κ, τ , and c in A4-A6 to conduct a sensitivity analysis that weakens the no measurement
error assumption κ = 0 (or R2
Y˜j .W˜
= τj in A5), controls the fit of the model (R
2
Y˜j .W˜
≤ τj),
and weakens the assumption that σ2η is diagonal (c = 0). Conversely, we study for what
configuration of (κ, τ, c) does the identification region admit a plausible value or range e.g.
for a component of δ or β. To keep the exposition concise, we impose A4-A6 throughout and
obtain the results when A4, A5, or A6 is not binding as a special case in which κ → +∞,
τ = (1, ..., 1)′, or c is such that (cjh, cjh) = (−1, 1) for all j < h.
2.3. Identification
We study identifying δ, and consequently β = bY.X − bW.Xδ, under A1-A3 and demonstrate
how considering the Y equations jointly can improve on the bounds that obtain when
analyzing each Yj equation separately. Moreover, we study the consequences of imposing
any configuration of A4-A6 on the identification regions for δ and β.
2.3.1. Characterization Theorem
From Theorem 2.3.1, under A1-A3, the moments in V ar[(Y˜
′, W˜ )′] can be expressed as
σ2
W˜
= σ2
U˜
+ σ2ε , σW˜ ,Y˜ = σW˜ ,U˜δ = σ
2
U˜
δ, and σ2
Y˜
= δ′σ2
U˜
δ + σ2η.
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Dividing σW˜ ,Y˜ by σ
2
W˜
, we obtain that
bY˜ .W˜ = ρδ where ρ ≡
σ2
U˜
σ2
W˜
=
σ2
U˜
σ2
U˜
+ σ2ε
. (2.5)
Since the (net-of-X) “noise to signal ratio” ρ satisfies 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, we obtain the classic
“attenuation bias” whereby bY˜j .W˜ understates the magnitude of δj and has its sign. If there
is no measurement error (σ2ε = 0) then ρ = 1 and bY˜ .W˜ = δ. If U and X are perfectly
collinear (σ2
U˜
= 0) then ρ = 0 and bY˜ .W˜ does not identify δ. Similarly, normalizing σ
2
Y˜
by
σ2
W˜
gives that
σ−2
W˜
σ2
Y˜
= δ′ρδ + σ−2
W˜
σ2η, (2.6)
where we have that
Γ ≡ σ−2
W˜
σ2η is positive semi-definite (denoted by 0  Γ). (2.7)
For example, the normalized covariance of the cross-equation disturbances is given by
Γjh ≡ σ−2W˜ σηj ,ηh = σ
−2
W˜
σY˜j ,Y˜h − δjρδh. (2.8)
As we show in Corollary 2.3.2, the system of (in)equalities (2.3,2.5,2.6,2.7) exhausts the
information on (ρ, δ, β,Γ) implied by A1-A3. The auxiliary assumptions A4-A6 impose
additional restrictions on the parameters. A4 requires that
1
1+κ ≤ ρ, A5 imposes the lower
bound
σ2
Y˜j
σ2
W˜j
(1− τj) ≤ Γjj , and A6 may specify the (weak) sign of Γjh.
When U and X are not perfectly collinear, i.e. ρ 6= 0, Theorem 2.3.1 uses equations
(2.3,2.5,2.6) to express δ, β, and Γ as functions D, B, and G of ρ. This mapping enables
characterizing the identification region for (ρ, δ, β,Γ) in terms of restrictions on ρ only and
facilitates a sensitivity analysis that studies the consequences of deviating from the “no
measurement error” assumption ρ = 1.
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Theorem 2.3.1 Assume A1-A3 and let V ar[(X
′, U)′] be nonsingular so that 0 < ρ. Then
δ = D(ρ) ≡ 1
ρ
bY˜ .W˜ ,
β = B(ρ) ≡ bY.X − bW.X 1
ρ
bY˜ .W˜ , and
Γ = G(ρ) ≡ σ−2
W˜
σ2
Y˜
− b′
Y˜ .W˜
1
ρ
bY˜ .W˜ .
Theorem 2.3.1 reveals how if there is no measurement error (ρ = 1) then (δ, β,Γ) is
point identified. Further, even when ρ < 1, bY˜j .W˜ = 0 if and only if (δj , βj ,Γjh) =
(0, bYj .X , σ
−2
W˜
σY˜j ,Y˜h). Similarly, if the l
th element bW.X,l of bW.X is 0 then βl = bY.X,l.
Last, as discussed in Section 2, if Xl is excluded from the Yj equation so that βjl =
bYj .X,l − bW.X,l 1ρbY˜j .W˜ = 0 then, provided bYj .X,l 6= 0, ρ is point identified and it follows
that (δ, β,Γ) is also point identified.
2.3.2. Identification Regions
We characterize the sharp identification regions for (ρ, δ, β,Γ) under A1-A3 and any config-
uration of the auxiliary assumptions A4-A6 (i.e. any (k, τ, c) value). Corollary 2.3.2 states
the general result. We then discuss several special cases.
Corollary 2.3.2 Under the conditions of Theorem 2.3.1 and A4-A6 for j, h = 1, ..., p with
j < h, (ρ, δ, β,Γ) is partially identified in the sharp set5
J k,τ,c ≡ {(r,D(r), B(r), G(r)) : 0  G(r), 1
1 + κ
≤ r ≤ 1,
σ2
Y˜j
σ2
W˜j
(1− τj) ≤ Gjj(r), and
cjh ≤ sgn(Gjh(r)) ≤ cjh for j, h = 1, ..., p and j < h}.
5For a ∈ R, define the sign function: sgn(a) = −1 if a < 0 , sgn(a) = 0 if a = 0, and sgn(a) = 1 if a > 0.
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Further, ρ, δ, β, and Γ are partially identified in the sharp sets
Rk,τ,c = [R2
W˜ .Y˜
, 1] ∩ [ 1
1 + κ
, 1] ∩pj=1 [
1
τj
R2
W˜ .Y˜j
, 1]
p⋂
j,h=1
j<h
Rcjh,
where
Rcjh =

bY˜j .W˜
bY˜h.W˜
σ−2
W˜
σY˜j ,Y˜h
if (cjh, cjh) = (0, 0) and σ
−2
W˜
σY˜j ,Y˜h 6= 0
(−∞, bY˜j .W˜ bY˜h.W˜
σ−2
W˜
σY˜j ,Y˜h
] if (cjh, cjh) ∈ {(−1, 0), (0, 1)} and sgn(σ−2W˜ σY˜j ,Y˜h) 6∈ [cjh, cjh]
[
bY˜j .W˜
bY˜h.W˜
σ−2
W˜
σY˜j ,Y˜h
,∞) if (cjh, cjh) ∈ {(−1, 0), (0, 1)} and sgn(σ−2W˜ σY˜j ,Y˜h) ∈ [cjh, cjh]\{0}
∅ if (cjh, cjh) 6= (−1, 1), − sgn(bY˜j .W˜ bY˜h.W˜ ) /∈ [cjh, cjh], and σ
−2
W˜
σY˜j ,Y˜h = 0
(−∞,∞) otherwise
Dk,τ,c = {D(r) : r ∈ Rk,τ,c}, Bk,τ,c = {B(r) : r ∈ Rk,τ,c}, and Gk,τ,c = {G(r) : r ∈ Rk,τ,c}.
Using the system of (in)equalities (2.3,2.5,2.6,2.7) and the mappings in Theorem 2.3.1,
Corollary 2.3.2 characterizes the identification region J k,τ,c for (ρ, δ, β,Γ). As shown in
the proof of Corollary 2.3.2, J k,τ,c is sharp since for every (r, d, b, g) ∈ J k,τ,c there exists
(U∗, η∗, ε∗), with
σ2
U˜∗
σ2
W˜
= r and G(r) = σ−2
W˜
σ2η˜∗ , that satisfy A2-A6 and that could have
generated Y and W according to A1. Further, Corollary 2.3.2 derives the projections Rk,τ,c,
Dk,τ,c, Bk,τ,c, and Gk,τ,c of the joint region J k,τ,c onto the support of the components ρ, δ,
β, and Γ. Each of these projected regions is sharp - for example, for every d ∈ Dk,τ,c there
exists (r, d, b, g) ∈ J k,τ,c. Thus, Corollary 2.3.2 exhausts the information on (ρ, δ, β,Γ) in
A1-A6.
It is useful to examine the projected identification regions in Corollary 2.3.2 under se-
quentially stronger configurations of (k, τ, c). First, suppose that (cjh, cjh) = (−1, 1) for
all j, h = 1, ..., p with j < h, so that A6 is not binding. Then Rcjh = (−∞,∞). In
this case, we sometimes drop the superfluous superscript c and obtain Rk,τ,c = Rk,τ ≡
[R2
W˜ .Y˜
, 1] ∩ [ 11+κ , 1] ∩pj=1 [ 1τjR2W˜ .Y˜j , 1]. If κ→∞ and τ = (1, ..., 1)
′ then A4 and A5 are also
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not binding and we sometimes drop the κ and τ superscripts. Provided R2
W˜ .Y˜
6= 0, we ob-
tain Rk,τ,c = R ≡ [R2
W˜ .Y˜
, 1] since max{R2
W˜ .Y˜1
, ..., R2
W˜ .Y˜p
} ≤ R2
W˜ .Y˜
. In this case, Corollary
2.3.2 reduces to the bounds in Leamer (1987), specialized to a scalar mismeasured U , after
projecting on the covariates X. As discussed in Leamer (1987), the joint-equations bounds
improve on the single-equation bounds that obtain using each Yj equation separately. In
particular, if the dimension of Y is p = 1 then Corollary 2.3.2 gives the single-equation
bounds for ρ, δ, and β under classical measurement error (see e.g. Chalak and Kim, 2018,
corollary 3.5). As the dimension of Y increases, R2
W˜ .Y˜
may increase and the joint-equations
bounds R for ρ may become tighter. Instead, if κ <∞ or τj < 1 for some j (or both) then
A4 or A5 (or both) is in effect. In this case, if R
2
W˜ .Y˜
≤ max{ 11+κ , 1τ1R2W˜ .Y˜1 , ...,
1
τp
R2
W˜ .Y˜p
} then
imposing A4 and A5 increases the lower bound on ρ. In turn, this leads to tighter bounds
on (δ, β,Γ) via the mappings in Theorem 2.3.1. In the limit, setting κ = 0 or τj = R
2
W˜ .Y˜j
yields ρ = 1 and therefore point identifies (δ, β,Γ).
Next, consider imposing A6. To illustrate how restricting the sign of the off-diagonal ele-
ments in σ2η can help identify δ and β, consider the Yj and Yh equations and substitute for
U = W − ε in the Yj equation:
Yj = X
′βj +Wδj − εδj + ηj ,
Yh = X
′βh + Uδh + ηh.
Under A1-A3, if σηj ,ηh = 0 then Cov[(ε, ηj)
′, Yh] = 0. In this case, analyzing the Yj and
Yh equations jointly reveals how Yh may serve as an instrument for W to point identify
(δj , β
′
j)
′ = bYj .(W,X′)′|(Yh,X′)′ . Indeed, Corollary 2.3.2 shows that, even when A4-A5 are not
binding, if σηj ,ηh = 0 (i.e. (cjh, cjh) = (0, 0)) then, provided σ
−2
W˜
σY˜j ,Y˜h 6= 0, ρ =
bY˜j .W˜
bY˜h.W˜
σ−2
W˜
σY˜j ,Y˜h
is point identified. When bY˜j .W˜ |Y˜h exists and is nonzero, we can express ρ =
bY˜j .W˜
bY˜j .W˜ |Y˜h
as the
ratio of the regression and IV regression estimands. It follows from the mappings in Theorem
2.3.1 that the full vector of system coefficients (ρ, δ, β,Γ) is point identified, with δj =
bY˜j .W˜ |Y˜h and βj = bYj .X − bW.XbY˜j .W˜ |Y˜h as obtains via the IV regression bYj .(W,X′)′|(Yh,X′)′ .
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What if σηj ,ηh = 0 fails? Corollary 2.3.2 answers this question by deriving the identification
regions for ρ, δ, and β under weaker restriction in A6 on the sign of Γjh ≡ σ−2W σηj ,ηh . First,
if the identification region Gk,τjh identifies the sign of Γjh when A6 is not binding (i.e. when
(cjh, cjh) = (−1, 1) for all j < h) then imposing the (correct) sign restriction on Γjh in A.6
is uninformative about ρ, δ, and β. Otherwise, restricting the sign of Γjh in A6 can rule
out a region of Rk,τ . Specifically, recall that Gk,τjh is given by
Gk,τjh = {σ−2W˜ σY˜j ,Y˜h − bY˜j .W˜
1
r
bY˜h.W˜ : r ∈ R
k,τ}.
Thus, provided σ−2
W˜
σY˜j ,Y˜h is nonzero
6, 0 ∈ int(Gk,τjh ) if and only if
bY˜j .W˜ bY˜h.W˜
σ−2
W˜
σY˜j ,Y˜h
∈ int(Rk,τ ).
Corollary 2.3.2 demonstrates how restricting the sign of Γjh can rule out elements of Rk,τ
that are either smaller or larger than
bY˜j .W˜
bY˜h.W˜
σ−2
W˜
σY˜j .Y˜h
, as encoded in Rcjh. In turn, this can
tighten the identification regions for δ and β. Last, if Corollary 2.3.2 yields Rk,τ,c = ∅ then
the model is misspecified and we reject the assumptions imposed in A1-A6.
To conclude this section, we point out that imposing restrictions on the signs and/or mag-
nitudes of some of the coefficients δj or βjl may tighten the identification region of ρ, and
therefore of δ, β, and Γ using Theorem 2.3.1’s mappings. We do not pursue this here;
instead, we focus on the auxiliary assumptions A4-A6 which do not directly restrict δ or β.
2.4. Numerical Example
To illustrate the shape of the identification regions in Section 3, we consider the following
numerical example. We generate X, W , and Y according to A1, as follows:
X = Uϕ+ ηX , W = U + ε, and Yj = X1βj1 +X2βj2 + Uδj + ηj for j = 1, 2, 3,
6If σ−2
W˜
σY˜j ,Y˜h = 0 then restricting the sign of Γjh is either contradictory or uninformative about ρ,
depending on the sign of bY˜j .W˜ bY˜h.W˜ , as encoded in Rcjh.
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where ηX
2×1
≡ (ηX1 , ηX2)′, X
2×1
≡ (X1, X2)′, η
3×1
≡ (η1, η2, η3)′, and Y
3×1
≡ (Y1, Y2, Y3)′. We let
ηX , U , ε, and η be jointly independent and normally distributed with mean 0 so that A2
and A3 hold. We allow the components of ηX (respectively η) to be correlated. It follows
that (X ′,W, Y ′) is normally distributed and we can analytically express the identification
regions for ρ, δ, and β in terms of the elements of V ar[(η′X , U, ε, η
′)′]. In this example, we
set the equation coefficients to
β =

1 0.7
0.85 0.95
1.1 1.2
 , δ =

0.7
1.05
0.84
 , and ϕ =
 0.3
0.14
 ,
and the variances of ηX , U , ε, and η to
σ2 = 3, σ
2
U = 5, σηX =
 1 0.14
0.14 1
 , and σ2η =

1.1 −0.31 0.63
−0.31 1.99 −0.59
0.63 −0.59 2.25
 .
We obtain that ρ = 0.53 and thus any restriction 0.89 = σ
2

σ2
U˜
≤ κ in A4 is valid. Further, we
obtain that R2
W˜ .Y˜1
= 0.31, R2
W˜ .Y˜2
= 0.34, R2
W˜ .Y˜3
= 0.27, and R2
W˜ .Y˜
= 0.44.
Using a grid search, we approximate 4 types of identification regions, illustrated in Figure
1. The first is the single-equation identification regions Sj that consider each Yj equation
separately. The second is the joint-equations region J that considers the Y equations jointly.
Sj and J obtain under A1-A3 only (i.e. when κ =∞, τ = (1, 1, 1)′, and (cjh, cjh) = (−1, 1)
for all j < h). The third identification region is the joint-equations bounds J κ,τ that obtains
under A1-A5, with κ = 1 and τ = (0.7, 0.7, 0.7)
′. The fourth region J κ,τ,c obtains under
A1-A6, with κ and τ as in J κ,τ , where c imposes the (correct) sign restrictions rη1,η2 ≤ 0,
rη1,η3 ≥ 0, rη2,η3 ≤ 0. Figure 1 illustrates these regions by plotting their two dimensional
projections onto the (ρ, δj), (ρ, βj1), and (ρ, βj2) spaces for j = 1, 2, 3. The plus sign denotes
the true parameter values. Further, the asterisk corresponds to the regression estimand
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bY.(W,X′)′ and the cross sign corresponds to the identification region J κ,τ,c∗ (the IV regression
estimand) where c∗ incorrectly sets ση1,η2 = 0 and leaves ση1,η3 and ση2,η3 unrestricted. Each
graph in Figure 1 superimposes 4 identification regions represented in different shades. The
darker regions are nested within the lighter regions. The lightest and second lightest shades
correspond respectively to the single-equation and joint-equations identification regions Sj
and J . The second darkest region corresponds to the joint-equations region J κ,τ and
yields the lower bound 11+κ = 0.5 in Rκ,τ . Last, the darkest region corresponds to the
joint-equations region J κ,τ,c.
Table 10 uses the analytical expressions in Section 3 to report several bounds, including
those that correspond to the projections in Figure 1. The first and second columns report
the sharp projections of the single-equation and joint-equations identification regions Sκ,τj
for j = 1, 2, 3 and J κ,τ respectively under A1-A5. Note that projecting Sκ,τj yields different
bounds for ρ, depending on j. The third column reports the joint-equations bounds J κ,τ,c
under A1-A6 with the (correct) sign restrictions rη1,η2 ≤ 0, rη1,η3 ≥ 0, rη2,η3 ≤ 0. The fourth
column reports the (IV regression) point estimand J κ,τ,c∗ where c∗ incorrectly assumes
that ση1,η2 = 0, with ση1,η3 and ση2,η3 unrestricted. The last column reports the regression
estimand bY.(W,X′)′ which would point identify δ and β if there is no measurement error in
W . Table 10 reports the bounds when κ = ∞ and τ = (1, 1, 1)′ (i.e. when A4-A5 are not
binding) in the upper panel as well as when κ = 1 and τ = (0.7, 0.7, 0.7)′ in the lower panel.
Figure 1 and Table 1 illustrate how the true parameter values are elements of the nested
sets J κ,τ,c ⊆ Sκ,τ1 × ... × Sκ,τp which become tighter as stricter valid restrictions on κ, τ ,
and/or c are imposed.
2.5. Estimation and Inference
For inference, we implement a procedure that delivers 1− α (e.g. 50% or 95%) confidence
regions for each of the partially identified parameters ρ, δj , βjl, and Γjh for j, h = 1, ..., p
and l = 1, ..., k. The procedure consists of three steps. First, we express each of the bounds
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in Corollary 2.3.2 as a function7 of the vector of estimands8
pi ≡ (vec(bY.(W,X′)′)′, b′W.(Y,X′)′ , b′W.(Y1,X′)′ , ..., b′W.(Yp,X′)′ , vec(bY.X)′, b′W.X , σ−2W˜ vec(σ
2
Y˜
)′)′,
where9 vec(σ2
Y˜
) collects the 12p(p + 1) variance and covariance elements of σ
2
Y˜
. Further,
we construct an estimator pˆi for pi and give conditions under which pˆi is
√
n consistent and
asymptotically normally distributed. Second, we employ results on intersection bounds to
construct a 1 − α confidence region CRρ1−α for the parameter ρ that is partially identified
in Rκ,τ,c for any (κ, τ, c) configuration. The last step uses the mappings, given in Theorem
2.3.1, that express δj , βjl, and Γjh as functions of (pi, ρ) to construct 1−α confidence regions
for the partially identified parameters δj , βjl, and Γjh.
2.5.1. Estimation of pi
We estimate pi using the plug-in estimator pˆi:
pˆi ≡ (vec(bˆY.(W,X′)′)′, bˆ′W.(Y,X′)′ , bˆ′W.(Y1,X′)′ , ..., bˆ′W.(Yp,X′)′ , vec(bˆY.X)′, bˆ′W.X , σˆ−2W˜ vec(σˆ
2
Y˜
)′),
Specifically, given observations {Ai, Bi}ni=1 corresponding to random column vectors A and
B, let A¯ ≡ 1n
∑n
i=1Ai and denote the sample covariance (with σˆ
2
A = σˆA,A) and the linear
regression estimator and sample residuals by:
σˆA,B ≡ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(Bi− B¯)(Ai− A¯)′, bˆA.B ≡ σˆ−2B σˆA,B, and ˆ′A.B,i ≡ (Ai− A¯)′− (Bi− B¯)′bˆA.B.
Under conditions sufficient for the law of large numbers and central limit theorem (see
e.g. White (2001) for primitive conditions), the estimator pˆi for pi is
√
n consistent and
7An alternative would express the bounds in Corollary 2.3.2 as a function of V ar[(1, Y ′,W,X ′)′] and
constructs an estimator for these moments.
8Throughout this discussion, we assume that σ2
Y˜
is nonsingular. Otherwise, we drop the redundant Y
elements from (Y,X ′)′ in b′W.(Y,X′)′ and R
2
W˜ .Y˜
.
9Let A
m×q
= [ A1
m×1
, ..., Aq
m×1
]. Then vec(A)
mq×1
≡ (A′1, ..., A′q)′. Further, if q = m and A is symmetric then we let
vec(A)
1
2
m(m+1)×1
≡ [A11, ..., Amm, A12, ..., A1m, ...., A(m−1)1, ..., A(m−1)m]′ collect the diagonal and upper-diagonal
elements of A.
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asymptotically normally distributed. For this, let µ2A = E(AA
′) and define the square
block-diagonal matrix Q:
Q ≡ diag{ I
p×p⊗µ
2
(1,W,X′)′ , µ
2
(1,Y,X′)′ , µ
2
(1,Y1,X′)′ ..., µ
2
(1,Yp,X′)′ , Ip×p⊗µ
2
(1,X′)′ , µ
2
(1,X′)′ , I1
2
p(p+1)× 1
2
p(p+1)
⊗σ2
W˜
},
where the moments in the diagonal blocks correspond to the estimands in pi.
Theorem 2.5.1 Assume A1(i) and that Q is nonsingular. Suppose further that:
(i) 1n
∑n
i=1(1, Y
′
i ,Wi, X
′
i)
′(1, Y ′i ,Wi, X
′
i)
p→µ2(1,Y ′,W,X′)′ and
(ii) n−1/2
n∑
i=1

vec[(1,Wi, X
′
i)
′Y.(W,X′)′,i]
(1, Yi, X
′
i)
′W.(Y,X′)′,i
(1, Y1i, X
′
i)
′W.(Y1,X′)′,i
...
(1, Ypi, X
′
i)
′W.(Yp,X′)′,i
vec[(1, X ′i)
′Y.X,i]
(1, X ′i)
′W.X,i
vec(Y.X,i
′
Y.X,i − σ2Y˜ )

d→N(0,Ξ) where Ξ ≡ V ar

vec[(1,W,X ′)′Y.(W,X′)′ ]
(1, Y,X ′)′W.(Y,X′)′
(1, Y1, X
′)′W.(Y1,X′)′
...
(1, Yp, X
′)′W.(Yp,X′)′
vec[(1, X ′)′Y.X ]
(1, X ′)′W.X
vec(Y.X
′
Y.X)

.
Then
√
n(pˆi−pi) d→N(0,Σ) where Σ obtains by removing from Σ∗ ≡ Q−1ΞQ′−1 the rows and
columns corresponding to the regression intercepts.
We estimate Σ using the relevant submatrix of the heteroskedasticity-robust estimator
Σˆ∗ ≡ Qˆ−1ΞˆQˆ′−1 for Σ∗ (see e.g. White, 1980). For example, we estimate the component
Cov(XYj .X , XYh.X) of Ξ using its counterpart
1
n
∑n
i=1XiˆYj .X,iˆYh.X,iX
′
i in Ξˆ.
2.5.2. Inference on ρ
To form a 1− α confidence region for the parameter ρ that is partially identified in Rκ,τ,c,
we express the identification region for ρ as a finite number of intersection bounds
Rκ,τ,c(λ) ≡ [ρlo(λ), ρuo (λ)] ≡ ∩Mv=1[ρlv(λ), ρuv (λ)] ≡ ∩Mv=1Rv(λ),
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which may depend on a vector of nuisance parameters λ
2T×1
(T ≡ 12p(p− 1)), a function of
pi:
λ
2T×1
= (σ−2
W˜
σY˜1,Y˜2 , σ
−2
W˜
σY˜1,Y˜3 , ..., σ
−2
W˜
σY˜p−1,Y˜p , bY˜1.W˜ bY˜2.W˜ , bY˜1.W˜ bY˜3.W˜ , ..., bY˜p−1.W˜ bY˜p.W˜ ).
Further, for a given λ, each of the bounds ρlv(λ) and ρ
u
v (λ) can be expressed as a function
of pi. For example, in the numerical example in Section 4, the identification region Rκ,τ,c
under A1-A6 (with Γ12 ≤ 0, Γ13 ≥ 0, and Γ23 ≤ 0) for ρ is
Rκ,τ,c(λ) = ∩8v=1[ρlv(λ), ρuv (λ)]
= [R2
W˜ .Y˜
, 1] ∩ [ 1
1 + κ
, 1] ∩ [ 1
τ1
R2
W˜ .Y˜1
, 1] ∩ [ 1
τ2
R2
W˜ .Y˜2
, 1] ∩ [ 1
τ3
R2
W˜ .Y˜3
, 1]
∩ (−∞, bY˜1.W˜ bY˜2.W˜
σ−2
W˜
σY˜1,Y˜2
] ∩ [bY˜1.W˜ bY˜3.W˜
σ−2
W˜
σY˜1,Y˜3
,∞) ∩ (−∞, bY˜2.W˜ bY˜3.W˜
σ−2
W˜
σY˜2,Y˜3
]
where the last three intersected regions Rc12(λ), Rc13(λ), and Rc23(λ) in Rκ,τ,c(λ) obtain
from Corollary 2.3.2 based on the signs of the nuisance parameters (here T = 3)
λ
2T×1
= (σ−2
W˜
σY˜1,Y˜2 , σ
−2
W˜
σY˜1,Y˜3 , σ
−2
W˜
σY˜2,Y˜3 , bY˜1.W˜ bY˜2.W˜ , bY˜1.W˜ bY˜3.W˜ , bY˜2.W˜ bY˜3.W˜ ).
Thus, λ determines whether eachRcjh(λ) is ∅, (−∞,∞), (−∞,
bY˜j .W˜
bY˜h.W˜
σ−2
W˜
σY˜j ,Y˜h
), or [
bY˜j .W˜
bY˜h.W˜
σ−2
W˜
σY˜j ,Y˜h
,∞).
Known Nuisance Parameters
First, suppose that the nuisance parameter λ is known (or that A6 is not binding and
λ is irrelevant). As discussed in Manski and Pepper (2009) and Chernozhukov, Lee, and
Rosen (2013), the sample analog estimator R̂κ,τ,c(λ) ≡ ∩Mv=1 [ρˆlv(λ), ρˆuv (λ)] tends to be bi-
ased “inward” in finite samples, leading to estimates that are narrower on average than
Rκ,τ,c(λ). Further, the sampling error may vary with v, across the intersected regions
Rv(λ), which complicates the inference on Rκ,τ,c(λ). To overcome these difficulties, we
follow Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013) and use the “precision-corrected” estimators
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for ρlv(λ) and ρ
u
v (λ), v ∈ V ≡ {1, ...,M} in order to construct estimators for ρlo(λ) and ρuo (λ)
as follows:
ρˆlo(λ; 1−α21) ≡ sup
v∈V
[ρˆlv(λ)−cl1−α21(λ)selv(λ)] and ρˆuo (λ; 1−α21) ≡ infv∈V[ρˆ
u
v (λ)+c
u
1−α21(λ)se
u
v (λ)]
where 1− α21 is a significance level with α21 ≤ 12 , selv(λ) (seuv (λ)) is the standard error for
the plug-in estimators ρˆlv(λ) (ρˆ
u
v (λ)), and c
l
1−α21(λ) (c
u
1−α21(λ)) is a suitably selected critical
value, discussed below, such that
Pr[ρˆlo(λ; 1−α21) ≤ ρlo(λ)] ≥ 1−α21− o(1) and Pr[ρuo (λ) ≤ ρˆuo (λ; 1−α21)] ≥ 1−α21− o(1).
In particular, setting α21 =
1
2 yields half-median-unbiased estimators ρˆ
l
o(λ;
1
2) and ρˆ
u
o (λ;
1
2).
Using Bonferroni’s inequality yields the confidence region CIR1−α21(λ) for the set Rκ,τ,c(λ):
CIR1−α21(λ) ≡ [ρˆlo(λ; 1−
α21
2
), ρˆuo (λ; 1−
α21
2
)] such that lim inf
n→∞ Pr[R
κ,τ,c(λ)⊆CIR1−α21(λ)] ≥ 1−α21.
CIR1−α21(λ) is a valid, but conservative, confidence region for ρ ∈ Rκ,τ,c(λ). To conduct
inference on ρ directly, we invert a test statistic that combines the lower and upper bounds.
This yields an asymptotically valid 1 − α21 (e.g. 95%) confidence regions CIρ1−α21(λ) for
the parameter ρ that is partially identified in Rκ,τ,c(λ):
lim inf
n→∞ Pr[ρ∈CI
ρ
1−α21(λ)] ≥ 1− α21.
In particular, we apply the results in10 Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013, theorem 4 and
example 1) for estimation and inference with parametrically estimated bounding functions
in a “saturated” model with a finite number of intersections. To select cl1−α21(λ) and
cu1−α21(λ) and construct the bias-adjusted estimates ρˆ
l
o(λ; 1 − α21) and ρˆuo (λ; 1 − α21) and
the confidence region CIρ1−α21(λ), we implement their algorithm 1. For brevity, we describe
the details of the algorithm in Online Appendix B.1.
10See also Chernozhukov, Kim, Lee, and Rosen (2015).
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Estimated Nuisance Parameters
In practice, λ must be estimated and the confidence regions must be adjusted to account
for this estimation. Since λ is a function of pi, we have that
√
n(λˆ − λ) d→N(0,Σλ), where
Σλ obtains using the delta method, and the estimators λˆ and Σˆλ are the plug-in estimators
that use pˆi. We then construct a 1− α22 confidence region Λ1−α22 for λ
2T×1
by inverting the
Wald statistic which has an asymptotic χ22T distribution:
Λ1−α22 = {` :
√
n(λˆ− `)′Σˆ−1λ
√
n(λˆ− `) ≤ cλ1−α22}
where cλ1−α22 is the 1−α22 quantile of χ22T . By Proposition 3 of Chernozhukov, Rigobon, and
Stoker (2010), we form the union over ` ∈ Λ1−α22 to obtain the bias-corrected estimators
ρˆlo(1− α2) = min
`∈Λ1−α22
ρˆlo(`; 1− α21) and ρˆuo (1− α2) = max
`∈Λ1−α22
ρˆuo (`; 1− α21)
where α2 = α21 + α22, such that:
Pr[ρˆlo(1− α2) ≤ ρlo] ≥ 1− α2 − o(1) and Pr[ρuo ≤ ρˆuo (1− α2)] ≥ 1− α2 − o(1),
as well as the 1− α2 (e.g. 95%) confidence regions CIρ1−α2 for ρ ∈ Rκ,τ,c:
CRρ1−α2 =
⋃
`∈Λ1−α22
CIρ1−α21(`) such that lim infn→∞ Pr[ρ∈CR
ρ
1−α2 ] ≥ 1− α2
Note that if CRρ1−α2 = ∅ then we reject, at the 1 − α2 significance level, the assumptions
imposed in A1-A6. For example, if CR
ρ
0.95 = ∅ when c = 0 then one rejects (under A1-A5)
that σ2η is diagonal. Otherwise, imposing tighter restrictions on (κ, τ, c) can yield a tighter
confidence region. This depends on the extent of the identification gain from imposing
A4-A6 as well as on the precision of the estimates, including the nuisance parameters λ.
For example, if the sign of σ−2
W˜
σY˜j ,Y˜h is imprecisely estimated then forming the union over
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Λ1−α22 may effectively mute the impact of the σηj ,ηh restriction in A6 on CR
ρ
1−α2 .
In the empirical application, we report the confidence regions CRρ0.5, which conveys similar
information to the half-median-unbiased bound estimates, as well as CRρ0.95. For this, we
set α22 = 0.02 and let α21 = 0.48 or α21 = 0.03 respectively.
2.5.3. Inference on δj, βjl, and Γjh
Each identification region for δj , βjl, and Γjh for j, h = 1, ..., p, j < h, and l = 1, ..., k in
Corollary 2.3.2 is of the form
θ ∈ Hk,τ,c = {H(pi; r) : r ∈ Rκ,τ,c},
where Rκ,τ,c is the identification region for ρ under any given (κ, τ, c) configuration, and
H(·; r) is a function of pi, given in Theorem 2.3.1. For example,
Dκ,τ,cj = {
1
r
bY˜j .W˜ : r ∈ Rκ,τ,c}.
Using the delta method, we have that for each r ∈ (0, 1], the estimator H(pˆi; r) for H(pi; r)
is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed:
√
n(H(pˆi; r)−H(pi; r)) d→N(0,∇piH(pi; r)Σ∇piH(pi; r)′).
For brevity, Online Appendix B.2 gives the expressions for H(pi; r) and∇piH(pi; r) for each of
the parameters δj , βjl, and Γjh. If Rκ,τ,c is known then, by proposition 2 of Chernozhukov,
Rigobon, and Stoker (2010), one can construct a confidence region for θ by forming the
union of CRθ1−α1(r) over r ∈ Rκ,τ,c. When Rκ,τ,c is estimated, the confidence region must
be adjusted accordingly. Using the 1 − α2 confidence region CRρ1−α2 for ρ ∈ Rκ,τ,c, we
construct an asymptotically valid 1 − α1 − α2 confidence region CRθ1−α1−α2 for θ ∈ Hk,τ,c
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by applying Proposition 3 of Chernozhukov, Rigobon, and Stoker (2010) to form the union:
CRθ1−α1−α2 =
⋃
r∈CRρ1−α2
CRθ1−α1(r).
In the empirical application, we report the confidence regions CRθ0.5 and CR
θ
0.95 for δj and
βjl (or the vector (β1l, ..., βpl)
′). For this, we set α21 = α22 = 0.02 and let α1 = 0.46 or
α1 = 0.01 respectively.
2.6. Tobin’s q in Corporate Investment, Saving, and Debt Equations
How does a firm’s cash flow affect its investment, saving, and debt? After accounting for a
firm’s marginal q, q theory predicts that cash flow does not affect a firm’s investment (under
the classical assumptions11, Tobin’s q is a sufficient statistic for the optimal investment pol-
icy). Further, given marginal q, various theoretical models predict that cash flow may affect
a firm’s saving and debt either positively or negatively. For instance, Almeida, Campello,
and Weisbach (2004) study a model, in which cash flow is not related to productivity shocks
and physical capital depreciates completely in a single period, that predicts that cash flow
affects a firm’s saving positively. On the other hand, under the assumptions that cash flow
may be related to productivity and that physical capital may depreciate partially in a single
period, the model in Riddick and Whited (2009) predicts that the effect of cash flow on
a firm’s saving is negative. Similarly, tradeoff theory (see e.g. Miller, 1977) predicts that
a firm with a high cash flow faces a lower expected bankruptcy cost and borrows more
whereas pecking order theory (see e.g. Myers and Majluf, 1984) postulates that a firm with
a high cash flow borrows less because external financing is costly relative to internal funds.
Because marginal q is unobserved, researchers often employ Tobin’s q as a proxy for it. The
literature imposes different assumptions on the measurement error in Tobin’s q and reports
contradictory findings. For example, Erickson and Whited (2000, 2012) apply the econo-
11This result assumes quadratic investment adjustment costs, constant return to scale, perfect competition,
and an efficient financial market (see Hayashi, 1982).
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metric method in Erickson and Whited (2002), which uses higher order moments12 to point
identify the equation coefficients, and cannot reject that the effect of cash flow on invest-
ment may be zero, thereby corroborating the prediction of q theory. Almeida, Campello,
and Galvao (2010) use lagged variables in a panel structure as instrumental variables to
address the measurement error in Tobin’s q and find that cash flow affects investment pos-
itively, contradicting the theoretical prediction in the absence of financing frictions (see
also Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988; Gilchrist and Himmelberg 1995; Love, 2003).
Similarly, using regression analysis, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) find that a
firm’s cash flow affects its saving positively whereas Riddick and Whited (2009) use higher
order moments to account for measurement error in Tobin’s q and find that cash flow af-
fects saving negatively. Last, Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Hennessy and Whited (2005)
study firm profitability and cash flow respectively and find that either variable negatively
affects debt (see also Gomes and Schmid (2010)) and Erickson, Jiang and Whited (2014)
corroborate this finding for profitability when using higher order moments to account for
measurement error.
We build on this literature and apply this paper’s framework to examine the identification
gain that results from considering the investment, saving, and debt equations jointly under
the classical measurement error assumption. Further, we conduct a sensitivity analysis that
studies the robustness of the empirical estimates to deviations from the no measurement
error assumption, restrictions on the fit of the model, or deviations from the assumption
that the variance matrix of the disturbances is diagonal.
2.6.1. Data
We follow the literature closely in selecting the sample and constructing the variables (see
e.g. Almeida and Campello, 2007; Erickson and Whited, 2012; Erickson, Jiang, and Whited,
2014). Specifically, we use data from COMPUSTAT on industrial firms13 between 1970 to
12Erickson and Whited (2002) strengthen A2-A3 to require ε, η, and (X
′, U)′ to be jointly independent.
13Specifically, we apply 4 firm filters: INDFMT=INDL (industrial), DATAFMT=STD (standardized data
reporting), POPSRC=D (domestic (North American)), and CONSOL=C (consolidated).
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2017. We remove financial firms (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code 6000 to
6999) and regulated firms (SIC code 4900 to 4999). To exclude small firms, we delete
observations in which a firm has at most $2 million in real total assets (COMPUSTAT
item: AT) or $5 million in real capital (COMPUSTAT item: PPEGT) at either the end or
the beginning of a time period. Further, we deflate all the Compustat items that enter into
the construction of the variables by the Federal Reserve Economic Data’s (yearly average)
Producer Price Index, with 1982 as a base year. For each cross section, we construct the
variables as follows and normalize14 them by the firm’s total assets15. We define investment
as capital expenditure (CAPX) normalized by the beginning-of-the-period total assets AT.
Saving is defined as a one-year change in cash and short-term investments (CHE) normalized
by the beginning-of-the-period AT. We use gross debt to define leverage as short and long-
term debt (DLTT+DLC) divided by the current AT. We measure (lagged) Tobin’s Q at
the beginning of the period by (PRCC F×CSHO)+AT−CEQ−TXDBAT where PRCC F is stock
price, CSHO is number of common shares outstanding, CEQ is common equity, and TXDB
is deferred taxes. We define16 cash flow as the sum of income before extraordinary items
(IB) and depreciation and amortization (DP) normalized by the beginning-of-the-period
AT. Last, we define firm size as the natural logarithm of real net sales (SALE). In what
follows, Y1, Y2, and Y3 denote investment, saving, and debt respectively, U denotes the
unobserved17 marginal q, W denotes Tobin’s q and serves as a proxy for U , X1 denotes
cash flow, and X2 denotes firm size
18. Section 6.6 considers including asset tangibility X3 in
14We deflate flow variables by the firm’s beginning-of-the-period (i.e. lagged) total assets and stock
variables by the current period’s total assets.
15The investment literature deflates the variables by either the firm’s capital or its total assets (see e.g.
Erickson and Whited, 2012). Since we also consider the saving and debt equations, we construct Tobin’s q
as the “market-to-book ratio” and deflate all the variables by total assets, as is common in these literatures
(e.g. Riddick and Whited (2009) and Erickson, Jiang, and Whited, (2014)).
16Alternatively, the literature sometimes examine the effect of profitability (defined by operating income
before depreciation (OIBDP) normalized by the beginning-of-the-period AT) on e.g. debt. Cash flow and
profitability are highly correlated in our sample.
17We treat Y and X as perfectly measured whereas we let W measure U with error. It is of interest to
extend the analysis to allow several or all variables to be measured with error (see e.g. Erickson, Jiang, and
Whited, 2014), e.g. due to different accounting practices. Nevertheless, we note that, unlike Y and X, the
expected marginal return on capital U (marginal q) is intrinsically unobserved.
18We follow the saving and debt literatures and condition on firm size (see e.g. Almedia, Campello, and
Weisbach (2004), Riddick and Whited (2009), and Erickson, Jiang and Whited (2014)).
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X, defined by the total net property, plant and equipment (PPENT) divided by the current
AT. We delete firm-year observations with missing data on one of these variables. Last,
we winsorize the smallest and largest percentile of the variables in the panel in order to
limit the impact of outliers. The final sample is an unbalanced panel of 161, 960 firm-year
observations, with 3, 375 firms per year on average. Table 2 reports the summary statistics
for the panel variables.
2.6.2. Bounds under Sequentially Stronger Assumptions
We begin our analysis by applying our framework to each cross section in our sample. This
allows the equation coefficients to vary across years. For example, Erickson, Jiang and
Whited (2014) provide evidence suggesting that the assumption that the slope coefficients
are constant over time may not hold. To illustrate our results, Sections 6.2 and 6.3 focus on
the middle year in our sample, 1993. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 report the results for all the cross
sections and for the full panel respectively. Table 3 reports the 50% and 95% confidence
regions in 1993 for ρ, δj , and βjl when κ = ∞ and τ = (1, 1, 1)′, with A4 and A5 not
binding. Column 1 reports the results corresponding to the single equation bounds Sκ,τj .
This yields different identification regions for ρ across the investment, saving, and debt
equations and wide bounds on the cash flow coefficients in each of these equations. Column
2 reports the results for the joint-equations bounds J κ,τ . Considering the three equations
jointly yields considerably tighter identification regions than the single-equations bounds.
For example, the single-equation 50% and 95% confidence regions for the effect of cash flow
on saving are [−∞, 0.181] and (−∞, 0.223) respectively whereas the corresponding joint-
equation confidence regions are [−0.115, 0.181] and (−0.270, 0.223). Nevertheless, in year
1993, the 95% confidence region for each of the effects of cash flow on investment, saving
and debt in J κ,τ contains 0. For example, the 95% confidence region for the effect β11 of
a $1 increase in cash flow on investment is (−0.397, 0.278). Column 3 reports the results
for J κ,τ,c when A6 sets c such that the investment and saving disturbances are negatively
correlated, the investment and debt disturbances are positively correlated, and the saving
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and debt disturbances are negatively correlated. This yields comparable confidence regions
to J κ,τ . In this case, the identification gain from imposing A6 (with the c configuration
above) is offset by the decrease in the precision of the estimates. Column 4 reports the
(IV-type) results under J κ,τ,c∗ when A6 sets c∗ = 0 so that the variance matrix of the
disturbances is diagonal. For instance, c∗ = 0 rules out that the disturbances contain a
common component (a fixed effect) that simultaneously influences the firm’s investment,
saving, and debt. We do not reject this specification in year 1993 and obtain the 95%
confidence region (0.050, 0.244) for the net-of-X signal to total variance ratio ρ (note that
the 50% confidence region for ρ is empty). Last, column 5 reports the results from the
regression estimator which would be consistent if there is no measurement error in Tobin’s q.
The regression estimates for δ1, δ2, and δ3 are possibly attenuated relative to the bounds in
J κ,τ , J κ,τ,c, and J κ,τ,c∗ . Further, the regression estimates that cash flow affects investment
and saving positively (β11 > 0 and β21 > 0) and debt negatively (β31 < 0).
Table 4 illustrates the consequences of imposing A4 and A5 and reports the results for
year 1993 when κ = 1.166 and τ = (0.886, 0.896, 0.898)′, so that the estimated κ∗ and
τ∗ are 0.5 and (0.9, 0.9, 0.9)′. Setting κ∗ = 0.5 assumes that at least half of the variance
of Tobin’s q is due to marginal q. For instance, this coincides with the largest reliability
ratio estimate (0.473 with standard error 0.064) for the market-to-book ratio obtained using
the fifth order cumulant estimator in Erickson, Jiang, and Whited (2014, table 5). Setting
τ∗j = 0.9 assumes that, in each equation, the coefficient of determination
19 would not exceed
0.9 had there been no measurement error. Under these settings, the A4 restriction that the
reliability ratio R2W.U is at least as large as 50% forces the identification regions Sκ,τj , J κ,τ ,
and J κ,τ,c (with c encoding the same sign restrictions as in Table 3) to coincide. The
bounds imply that cash flow affects investment and saving positively and debt negatively.
Last, the 95% confidence region for J κ,τ,c∗ , when A6 assumes that σ2η is diagonal, is empty
and the data rejects this specification at the 5% level. Thus, in year 1993, under A1-A3
and A5, imposing a moderate lower bound κ
∗ = 0.5 on the reliability ratio of Tobin’s q is
19R2
Y˜1.W˜
, R2
Y˜2.W˜
, and R2
Y˜3.W˜
are estimated to be 3.66%, 0.9%, and 3.56% respectively.
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incompatible with the assumption that the cross-equation disturbances are uncorrelated.
2.6.3. Sensitivity Analysis
If κ = 0 then there is no measurement error and (δ, β,Γ) is point identified. Next, we study
the sensitivity of the identification regions for the cash flow coefficients βj1 for j = 1, 2, 3 to
deviations from κ = 0. For this, we set τ = (1, 1, 1)′ in A5 and directly control the extent
of the measurement error by varying κ in A4. Using the sample from the middle year 1993,
Figure 2 plots the 50% and 95% confidence regions for the partially identified β11, β21 and
β31 as κ ranges from 0 to ∞ (or equivalently as κ∗ ranges from 1 to R2W.X). It plots the
regions under A1-A4 when each equation is analyzed separately (Sκj ), the three equations
are analyzed jointly (J κ), and the three equations are analyzed jointly and A6 is imposed
(J κ,c with c set as in Tables 3 and 4). The 95% confidence region for the effect β11, β21,
or β31 of cash flow contains 0 only when the reliability ratio R
2
W.U is at least as small as
16.6% (κ ≥ 6.02), 17.3% (κ ≥ 5.66), and 24.1% (κ ≥ 3.55) respectively. Otherwise, β11 and
β21 are each estimated to be significantly positive and β31 to be negative.
Table 5 studies the joint consequences of measurement error on the identification of the
coefficients (β11, β21, β31) on cash flow in the three equations. This safeguards against
maintaining empirical conclusions about β11, β21, and β31 that rest on different implicit
inference, derived from each equation separately, on the extent of the measurement error
in Tobin’s q. Further, it enables testing theories that consider multiple outcomes simul-
taneously. For this, we construct a 95% confidence region for (β11, β21, β31) under A1-A4
and report the smallest κ, and the corresponding largest κ∗, such that a null hypotheses
about (β11, β21, β31) is not rejected. In particular, if the reliability ratio of the proxy ex-
ceeds κ∗, the reported threshold value of κ∗, then the null hypothesis is rejected. Table 5
considers the 8 possible null hypotheses corresponding to the possible signs of the elements
of (β11, β21, β31). In one extreme, for all values of κ
∗, the hypothesis that cash flow affects
investment and saving positively and debt negatively is not rejected. In another extreme, if
the reliability ratio of Tobin’s q is larger than 15.7% then any hypothesis on (β11, β21, β31)
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in which the effect of cash flow on investment and saving is zero (or nonpositive) is rejected.
Further, under the maintained assumptions, the joint effects of cash flow on investment,
saving, and debt can be zero if and only if Tobin’s q is a noisy proxy for marginal q, with a
reliability ratio less than 17.7%. Otherwise, if Tobin’s q is a moderately accurate proxy for
marginal q, with R2W.U ≥ 25.7%, then any joint theory of investment, saving, and debt that
does not predict (0 < β11, 0 < β21, β31 < 0) is rejected under the maintained assumptions.
2.6.4. Results for all the Cross Sections
Whereas Sections 6.2 and 6.3 focus on the middle year 1993, Figure 3 plots the 50% and
95% confidence regions for βj1 (the coefficients on cash flow) that is partially identified in
Bj1, Bc∗j1 , or Bκ,τ,cj1 , j = 1, 2, 3, for each cross section in our sample (years 1970 to 2017). The
first column reports the joint equations bounds for βj1 ∈ Bj1 under A1-A3. In some years,
the 95% confidence region for the coefficient on cash flow in the investment, saving, or debt
equations contain zero. Otherwise, the 95% confidence region for the effect of cash flow
falls in the positive range for investment or saving and in the negative range for debt. The
second column report the bounds for βj1 ∈ Bc∗j1 under A1-A3 and the A6 diagonal restriction
c∗ = 0. We reject this specification in 19 of the 48 years at the 96% level (i.e. CRρ0.96 = ∅
and hence CRθ0.95 = ∅). When nonempty, the confidence regions for βj1 ∈ Bc
∗
j1 yield mixed
results across different years. The third column reports the bounds for βj1 ∈ Bκ,τ,cj1 under
A1-A6 where, for each year, we set κ and τ such that the estimated κ
∗ and τ∗ are 0.5 and
(0.9, 0.9, 0.9). Setting κ∗ = 0.5 assumes that Tobin’s q is a moderately accurate proxy for
marginal q. Further, as before, c sets rη1,η2 ≤ 0, rη1,η3 ≥ 0, rη2,η3 ≤ 0 in A6. We reject this
specification at the 96% level in 5 years (1973, 1974, 1978, 1984, and 2008). For most of the
remaining years, under this specification, the 95% confidence region for the effect of cash
flow falls in the positive range for investment or saving and in the negative range for debt.
Interestingly, we note that, in the last column of Figure 3, the time trends in the effects
of cash flow on investment and saving appear relatively flat. In contrast, the magnitude of
the effect of cash flow on debt diminishes over time. We leave investigating this time-series
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trend to other work.
2.6.5. Results for the Full Panel
Although the paper’s framework does not require panel data, we illustrate how it can be
applied to the full panel. As in e.g. Almeida, Campello, and Galvao (2010) and Erickson,
Jiang, and Whited (2014), we assume that the slope coefficients are constant over time
and we maintain that the data on firms are missing at random from certain years of the
unbalanced panel. We note that imposing assumptions on the serial correlation of the
measurement error may generate instruments that can point identify the system coefficients
(see e.g. Almeida, Campello, and Galvao (2010) who employ similar panel data methods to
estimate the coefficient on cash flow in the investment equation). To keep the scope of the
paper focused and manageable, we leave a detailed study of using panel data to estimate
a system of equations with mismeasured variables to other work. Instead, our goal here is
to provide a basic extension of our framework to the panel case, as summarized in Online
Appendix C.
We treat the number of time periods in the panel as fixed and the number of firms to be
large. After stacking each firm’s observations, our analysis proceeds analogously to the
cross section case. In particular, the robust standard errors for pi are clustered at the
firm level. We consider the panel case without fixed effects as well as when the outcome
equations include year and firm fixed effects. In the latter case, we include the year indicator
variables in X and we remove the firm fixed effects by applying a within transformation20.
We note that in this case the auxiliary assumptions A4-A6 should be interpreted relative to
the within-transformed variables21. See Online Appendix C for further details.
Table 6 replicates the analysis in Tables 3 and 4 using the full panel and reports the results
for the cash flow coefficients. As in the cross section analysis, the joint equation bounds
20Alternatively, one can consider (first-)differencing the data.
21One may consider imposing assumptions on the serial correlation of the variables to facilitate relating
the (sensitivity analysis) restrictions imposed on the within-transformed variables via (κ, τ, c) to equivalent
(or sufficient) restrictions on the level variables.
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improve substantially over the single equation bounds. Specifically, for the specification
under A1-A3 without fixed effects, the 95% confidence regions for the effect of cash flow
βj1 ∈ Bj1 falls in the positive range for investment and in the negative range for debt.
Imposing the A6 sign restrictions encoded in c tightens the bounds further (βj1 ∈ Bcj1)
and the effect of cash flow on saving is now estimated to be positive at the 95% level.
On the other hand, we reject at the 96% level the specification that imposes the diagonal
restriction in A6 (βj1 ∈ Bc∗j1 ). We also report the bounds when A4-A5 set κ and τ such that
κ∗ and τ∗ are estimated to be 0.5 and (0.9, 0.9, 0.9)′ respectively. This yields 95% confidence
regions that are close to the regression estimates, whereby cash flow is estimated to affect
investment and saving positively and debt negatively. Last, similar results obtain when
including year and firm fixed effects in the equations, except that the sign of the effect of
cash flow on investment is no longer recovered under only A1-A3 but remains significantly
positive under the sign restrictions in A6.
2.6.6. Accounting for Asset Tangibility
Similarly to e.g. Hennessy and Whited (2005), the specification for the debt equation above
does not condition on the tangibility of the firm’s assets. Following some specifications for
the debt equation (e.g. Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Erickson, Jiang and Whited (2014)),
we replicate our analysis after augmenting X to include X3, the firm’s asset tangibility.
Here too, we do not require that X3 is excluded from the investment and saving equations -
instead, we allow X3 to freely affect all the system’s outcome variables. The analysis yields
results that are qualitatively similar in certain respects to the results above. Specifically,
Figure 4 in the Online Appendix replicates Figure 3, after augmenting X with X3, and
yields results that share similar features. Here too, the bounds for βj1 ∈ Bj1 sometimes
fall in the positive (negative) range for investment and saving (debt). We note that, after
accounting for asset tangibility, we reject the diagonal specification in A1-A6 (βj1 ∈ Bc∗j1 ),
reported in the second column, in 5 (as opposed to 19) of the 48 years. Further, the bounds
under A1-A6 (βj1 ∈ Bκ,τ,cj1 ) in the last column remain close to the regression estimates and
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this specification is now rejected in 11 (as opposed to 5) years. Last, Table 7 in the Online
Appendix replicates the panel data analysis in Table 6 after augmenting X with X3 and,
here too, the results share similar features to those in Table 6. To summarize the differences,
for the specification without fixed effects, the 95% confidence region for the effect of cash
flow on investment under A1-A3 now contains zero but remains in the positive range when
the disturbance sign restrictions are imposed in A6. Also, for the specification with year
and firm fixed effects, the estimates for the effect of debt remain negative whereas the sign
of the effect of cash flow on investment and saving is no longer recovered under A1-A3 nor
after imposing the sign restrictions in A6. The bounds for βj1 ∈ Bκ,τ,cj1 when A1-A6 assume
that Tobin’s q is a moderately accurate proxy of marginal q continue to be close to the
regression estimates, with cash flow estimated to affect investment and saving positively
and debt negatively.
2.7. Conclusion
This paper studies the identification of the coefficients in a system of linear equations that
share a mismeasured explanatory variable. We characterize the sharp identification regions
for the coefficients under the classical measurement error assumption and demonstrate the
identification gain that results from analyzing the equations jointly as opposed to sepa-
rately. To tighten these regions and conduct a sensitivity analysis, we characterize the
sharp identification regions under any configuration of three auxiliary assumptions that
weaken benchmark point-identifying assumptions. The first weakens the assumption of “no
measurement error” by imposing an upper bound on the net-of-the covariates “noise to
signal” ratio. The second controls the fit of the model by imposing an upper bound on the
coefficients of determination that would obtain in each equation had there been no measure-
ment error. The third weakens the assumption that the variance matrix of the disturbances
is diagonal by specifying the signs of the covariances of the cross-equation disturbances, if at
all. For inference, we implement results on intersection bounds. Using data from COMPU-
STAT, we apply our framework to study the effects of cash flow on the investment, saving,
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and debt of corporate firms in the US when Tobin’s q is used as an error-laden proxy for
marginal q. We find that analyzing the equations jointly, as opposed to separately, tightens
the identification regions considerably and sometimes permits recovering the sign of the
effects of cash flow without imposing stronger assumptions. Further, the effects of cash flow
on investment, saving, and debt can be zero if and only if Tobin’s q is a noisy proxy for
marginal q, with a low reliability ratio. Otherwise, cash flow affects investment and saving
positively and debt negatively.
Several extensions are of interest. It would be useful to extend this paper’s econometrics
framework to accommodate multiple latent variables, a nonlinear specification, or weaker
assumptions on the measurement error. Further, the paper’s empirical results call for the
development of theoretical models that jointly determine the firm’s investment, saving, and
debt. Also, the results stress the benefits of improved measures of Tobin’s q in identify-
ing the investment, saving, and debt equation coefficients (see e.g. Erickson and Whited
(2005, 2008) and Peters and Taylor (2017)). Another inquiry would further investigate the
estimated decrease over time in the magnitude of the effect of cash flow on debt.
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Figure 6: Identification Regions
Identification regions Sj (light) for j = 1, 2, 3, J , J κ,τ , and J κ,τ,c (dark) for κ = 1,
τ = (0.7, 0.7, 0.7)′ and c set to the (correct) sign restrictions rη1,η2 ≤ 0, rη1,η3 ≥ 0, rη2,η3 ≤ 0.
The plus, asterisk, and cross signs correspond to the true parameter values, bY.(W,X′)′ , and
J κ,τ,c∗ respectively, where c∗ incorrectly sets ση1,η2 = 0 (with ση1,η3 and ση2,η3 unrestricted).
83
Table 10: Numerical Example
DGP Sκ,τj J κ,τ J κ,τ,c J κ,τ,c
∗
bY.(W,X′)′
κ→∞ and τ = (1, 1, 1)′
ρ 0.527 [0.315 , 1] [0.441 , 1] [0.441 , 0.604] 0.604
δ1 0.700 [0.369 , 1.171] [0.369 , 0.835] [0.610 , 0.835] 0.610 0.369
β11 1 [0.551 , 1.316] [0.871 , 1.316] [0.871 , 1.086] 1.086 1.316
β12 0.700 [0.543 , 0.811] [0.655 , 0.811] [0.655 , 0.730] 0.730 0.811
ρ 0.527 [0.342 , 1] [0.441 , 1] [0.441 , 0.604] 0.604
δ2 1.050 [0.553 , 1.618] [0.553 , 1.253] [0.915 , 1.253] 0.915 0.553
β21 0.850 [0.308 , 1.324] [0.656 , 1.324] [0.656 , 0.979] 0.979 1.324
β22 0.950 [0.761 , 1.116] [0.882 , 1.116] [0.882 , 0.995] 0.995 1.116
ρ 0.527 [0.269 , 1] [0.441 , 1] [0.441 , 0.604] 0.604
δ3 0.840 [0.442 , 1.643] [0.442 , 1.003] [0.732 , 1.003] 0.732 0.442
β31 1.100 [0.334 , 1.479] [0.945 , 1.479] [0.945 , 1.203] 1.203 1.479
β32 1.200 [0.932 , 1.333] [1.146 , 1.333] [1.146 , 1.236] 1.236 1.333
κ = 1 and τ = (0.7, 0.7, 0.7)′
ρ 0.527 [0.500 , 1] [0.500 , 1] [0.500 , 0.604] 0.604
δ1 0.700 [0.369 , 0.737] [0.369 , 0.737] [0.610 , 0.737] 0.610 0.369
β11 1 [0.965 , 1.316] [0.965 , 1.316] [0.965 , 1.086] 1.086 1.316
β12 0.700 [0.688 , 0.811] [0.688 , 0.811] [0.688 , 0.730] 0.730 0.811
ρ 0.527 [0.500 , 1] [0.500 , 1] [0.500 , 0.604] 0.604
δ2 1.050 [0.553 , 1.106] [0.553 , 1.106] [0.915 , 1.106] 0.915 0.553
β21 0.850 [0.797 , 1.324] [0.797 , 1.324] [0.797 , 0.979] 0.979 1.324
β22 0.950 [0.931 , 1.116] [0.931 , 1.116] [0.931 , 0.995] 0.995 1.116
ρ 0.527 [0.500 , 1] [0.500 , 1] [0.500 , 0.604] 0.604
δ3 0.840 [0.442 , 0.884] [0.442 , 0.884] [0.732 , 0.884] 0.732 0.442
β31 1.100 [1.058 , 1.479] [1.058 , 1.479] [1.058 , 1.203] 1.203 1.479
β32 1.200 [1.185 , 1.333] [1.185 , 1.333] [1.185 , 1.236] 1.236 1.333
This table reports population identification regions and point estimands.
σ2ε
σ2
U˜
= 0.89 and R2
W˜ .Y˜
= 0.44. c
correctly sets (c12, c12) = (c23, c23) = (−1, 0) and (c13, c13) = (0, 1) whereas c∗ incorrectly sets
(c∗12, c
∗
12) = (0, 0) and (c
∗
13, c
∗
13) = (c
∗
23, c
∗
23) = (−1, 1).
84
Table 11: Summary Statistics
Summary statistics based on 161,959 firm-year observations in an unbalanced panel from
year 1970 to 2017, with an average of 3,375 firms per year. In each year, investment, saving,
debt, cash flow, and asset tangibility are normalized by the firm’s total assets, Tobin’s q is
the market-to-book ratio, and firm size is the log of the firm’s sales.
Investment Saving Debt Tobin’s Q Cash Flow Firm Size Tangibility
mean 0.084 0.009 0.261 1.633 0.071 5.327 0.354
std dev 0.098 0.106 0.214 1.147 0.137 1.949 0.236
min 0.002 -0.298 0.000 0.526 -0.536 0.391 0.022
max 0.593 0.541 1.016 7.364 0.390 10.216 0.925
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Table 12: Bounds for the Investment, Saving, and Debt Equations for Year 1993
Sκ,τj J κ,τ J κ,τ,c J κ,τ,c
∗
bY.(W,X′)′
ρ [0.037 , 1] [0.076 , 1] [0.069 , 1] - -
(0.019 , 1) (0.055 , 1) (0.051 , 1) (0.050 , 0.244) -
δ1 [0.016 , 1.136] [0.016 , 0.360] [0.016 , 0.409] [0.055 , 0.400] 0.018
(0.012 , 1.382) (0.012 , 0.438) (0.012 , 0.497) (0.041 , 0.486) (0.013 , 0.022)
β11 [-1.308 , 0.242] [-0.243 , 0.242] [-0.309 , 0.242] [-0.297 , 0.187] 0.228
(-1.800 , 0.278) (-0.397 , 0.278) (-0.484 , 0.278) (-0.467 , 0.229) (0.190 , 0.266)
β12 [-0.010 , 0.052] [-0.010 , 0.009] [-0.010 , 0.012] [-0.008 , 0.012] -0.009
(-0.012 , 0.073) (-0.012 , 0.016) (-0.012 , 0.020) (-0.010 , 0.019) (-0.011 , -0.007)
ρ [0.009 , 1] [0.076 , 1] [0.069 , 1] - -
(0.000 , 1) (0.055 , 1) (0.051 , 1) (0.050 , 0.244) -
δ2 [0.007 , ∞] [0.007 , 0.213] [0.007 , 0.242] [0.025 , 0.237] 0.009
(0.002 , ∞) (0.002 , 0.309) (0.002 , 0.351) (0.008 , 0.343) (0.004 , 0.015)
β21 [-∞ , 0.181] [-0.115 , 0.181] [-0.154 , 0.181] [-0.146 , 0.154] 0.165
(-∞ , 0.223) (-0.270 , 0.223) (-0.328 , 0.223) (-0.317 , 0.203) (0.120 , 0.209)
β22 [-0.003 , ∞] [-0.003 , 0.009] [-0.003 , 0.010] [-0.002 , 0.010] -0.002
(-0.004 , ∞) (-0.004 , 0.014) (-0.004 , 0.016) (-0.003 , 0.016) (-0.004 , -0.000)
ρ [0.035 , 1] [0.076 , 1] [0.069 , 1] - -
(0.024 , 1) (0.055 , 1) (0.051 , 1) (0.050 , 0.244) -
δ3 [-1.641 , -0.033] [-0.697 , -0.033] [-0.791 , -0.033] [-0.773 , -0.115] -0.035
(-1.873 , -0.028) (-0.796 , -0.028) (-0.903 , -0.028) (-0.883 , -0.097) (-0.041 , -0.030)
β31 [-0.311 , 1.994] [-0.311 , 0.654] [-0.311 , 0.787] [-0.202 , 0.762] -0.287
(-0.372 , 2.728) (-0.372 , 0.961) (-0.372 , 1.136) (-0.276 , 1.103) (-0.352 , -0.221)
β32 [-0.078 , 0.012] [-0.026 , 0.012] [-0.031 , 0.012] [-0.030 , 0.008] 0.011
(-0.107 , 0.016) (-0.038 , 0.016) (-0.045 , 0.016) (-0.044 , 0.012) (0.008 , 0.015)
The sample size is 3,454 observations. Y1, Y2, and Y3 denote Investment, Saving, and Debt respectively
and X = [Cash Flow,Firm Size]. c sets (c12, c12) = (c23, c23) = (−1, 0) and (c13, c13) = (0, 1) whereas
c∗ = 0. 50% and 95% confidence regions are in brackets and parentheses respectively.
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Table 13: Bounds for the Investment, Saving, and Debt Equations for Year 1993
Sκ,τj J κ,τ J κ,τ,c J κ,τ,c
∗
bY.(W,X′)′
ρ [0.486 , 1] [0.486 , 1] [0.486 , 1] - -
(0.486 , 1) (0.486 , 1) (0.486 , 1) - -
δ1 [0.016 , 0.040] [0.016 , 0.040] [0.016 , 0.040] - 0.018
(0.012 , 0.049) (0.012 , 0.049) (0.012 , 0.049) - (0.013 , 0.022)
β11 [0.188 , 0.242] [0.188 , 0.242] [0.188 , 0.242] - 0.228
(0.151 , 0.278) (0.151 , 0.278) (0.151 , 0.278) - (0.190 , 0.266)
β12 [-0.010 , -0.008] [-0.010 , -0.008] [-0.010 , -0.008] - -0.009
(-0.012 , -0.006) (-0.012 , -0.006) (-0.012 , -0.006) - (-0.011 , -0.007)
ρ [0.486 , 1] [0.486 , 1] [0.486 , 1] - -
(0.486 , 1) (0.486 , 1) (0.486 , 1) - -
δ2 [0.007 , 0.024] [0.007 , 0.024] [0.007 , 0.024] - 0.009
(0.002 , 0.034) (0.002 , 0.034) (0.002 , 0.034) - (0.004 , 0.015)
β21 [0.134 , 0.181] [0.134 , 0.181] [0.134 , 0.181] - 0.165
(0.090 , 0.223) (0.090 , 0.223) (0.090 , 0.223) - (0.120 , 0.209)
β22 [-0.003 , -0.001] [-0.003 , -0.001] [-0.003 , -0.001] - -0.002
(-0.004 , 0.001) (-0.004 , 0.001) (-0.004 , 0.001) - (-0.004 , -0.000)
ρ [0.486 , 1] [0.486 , 1] [0.486 , 1] - -
(0.486 , 1) (0.486 , 1) (0.486 , 1) - -
δ3 [-0.077 , -0.033] [-0.077 , -0.033] [-0.077 , -0.033] - -0.035
(-0.088 , -0.028) (-0.088 , -0.028) (-0.088 , -0.028) - (-0.041 , -0.030)
β31 [-0.311 , -0.212] [-0.311 , -0.212] [-0.311 , -0.212] - -0.287
(-0.372 , -0.148) (-0.372 , -0.148) (-0.372 , -0.148) - (-0.352 , -0.221)
β32 [0.008 , 0.012] [0.008 , 0.012] [0.008 , 0.012] - 0.011
(0.005 , 0.016) (0.005 , 0.016) (0.005 , 0.016) - (0.008 , 0.015)
The sample size is 3,454 observations. Y1, Y2, and Y3 denote Investment, Saving, and Debt respectively
and X = [Cash Flow,Firm Size]. c sets (c12, c12) = (c23, c23) = (−1, 0) and (c13, c13) = (0, 1) whereas
c∗ = 0. 50% and 95% confidence regions are in brackets and parentheses respectively.
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Figure 7: Sensitivity of Partial Identification Region for Cash Flow Coefficients
50% (dark) and 95% (light) confidence regions for the partially identified coefficients βj1 on
cash flow for j = 1, 2, 3 (investment, saving, and debt) for year 1993. We set τ = (1, 1, 1)′
and consider the regions Sκj , J κ, and J κ,c when κ ∈ [0,∞) and c sets (c12, c12) = (c23, c23) =
(−1, 0) and (c13, c13) = (0, 1). The vertical dashed line indicates the smallest κ (largest κ∗)
value such that the 95% confidence region contains zero. This corresponds to 6.018 (0.1658),
5.662 (0.1732), and 3.552 (0.2409) for j = 1, 2, 3 respectively.
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Table 14: Test of Joint Hypothesis
Joint test for the possible signs of the components of (β11, β21, β31) under A1-A4 at the 5%
level for year 1993. κ∗ is the largest κ∗ such that H0 is not rejected. κ is the smallest κ
such that H0 is not rejected.
β11 − − − − + + + +
H0 β21 − − + + − − + +
β31 + − + − + − + −
κ∗ 0.157 0.157 0.177 0.177 0.197 0.197 0.257 1
κ 6.483 6.483 5.486 5.486 4.723 4.723 3.230 0
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Figure 8: Evolution of Identification Region over Time
50% (dark) and 95% (light) confidence regions for βj1 (cash flow) for j = 1, 2, 3 (investment,
saving, and debt) from year 1970 to 2017. We consider the regions Bj1, Bc∗j1 , and Bκ,τ,cj1
where c∗ = 0, κ and τ are such that κˆ∗ = 0.5 and τˆ∗ = (0.9, 0.9, 0.9)′, and c is such that
(c12, c12) = (c23, c23) = (−1, 0) and (c13, c13) = (0, 1). The shaded vertical bars indicate
years in which the maintained assumptions are rejected at the 96% level.
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Table 15: Bounds on the Cash Flow Coefficients in the Investment, Saving, and Debt
Equations Using the Full Panel
Sκ,τj J κ,τ J κ,τ,c J κ,τ,c
∗
bY.(W,X′)′
Results without fixed effects for κ =∞ and τ = (1, 1, 1)′
β11 [-0.242 , 0.197] [0.096 , 0.197] [0.193 , 0.197] - 0.196
(-0.258 , 0.198) (0.092 , 0.198) (0.192 , 0.198) - (0.187 , 0.205)
β21 [-0.279 , 0.124] [-0.010 , 0.124] [0.120 , 0.124] - 0.124
(-0.296 , 0.126) (-0.016 , 0.126) (0.119 , 0.126) - (0.116 , 0.131)
β31 [-0.352 , 0.453] [-0.352 , -0.087] [-0.352 , -0.345] - -0.351
(-0.355 , 0.485) (-0.355 , -0.076) (-0.355 , -0.341) - (-0.369 , -0.332)
Results without fixed effects for κ∗ = 0.5 and τ∗ = (0.9, 0.9, 0.9)′
β11 [0.189 , 0.197] [0.189 , 0.197] [0.193 , 0.197] - 0.196
(0.187 , 0.198) (0.187 , 0.198) (0.192 , 0.198) - (0.187 , 0.205)
β21 [0.115 , 0.124] [0.115 , 0.124] [0.120 , 0.124] - 0.124
(0.113 , 0.126) (0.113 , 0.126) (0.119 , 0.126) - (0.116 , 0.131)
β31 [-0.352 , -0.333] [-0.352 , -0.333] [-0.352 , -0.345] - -0.351
(-0.355 , -0.330) (-0.355 , -0.330) (-0.355 , -0.341) - (-0.369 , -0.332)
Results with year and firm fixed effects for κ =∞ and τ = (1, 1, 1)′
β11 [-0.627 , 0.130] [-0.493 , 0.130] [0.017 , 0.130] - 0.129
(-0.632 , 0.131) (-0.497 , 0.131) (0.016 , 0.131) - (0.122 , 0.137)
β21 [-2.504 , 0.172] [-0.248 , 0.172] [0.096 , 0.172] - 0.172
(-2.542 , 0.173) (-0.255 , 0.173) (0.094 , 0.173) - (0.161 , 0.182)
β31 [-0.367 , 17.982] [-0.367 , -0.270] [-0.367 , -0.349] - -0.366
(-0.368 , 18.855) (-0.368 , -0.265) (-0.368 , -0.347) - (-0.381 , -0.351)
Results with year and firm fixed effects for κ∗ = 0.5 and τ∗ = (0.9, 0.9, 0.9)′
β11 [0.084 , 0.130] [0.084 , 0.130] [0.084 , 0.130] 0.129
[0.083 , 0.131] [0.083 , 0.131] [0.083 , 0.131] - (0.122 , 0.137)
β21 [0.141 , 0.172] [0.141 , 0.172] [0.141 , 0.172] - 0.172
(0.139 , 0.173) (0.139 , 0.173) (0.139 , 0.173) - (0.161 , 0.182)
β31 [-0.367 , -0.359] [-0.367 , -0.359] [-0.367 , -0.359] - -0.366
(-0.368 , -0.357) (-0.368 , -0.357) (-0.368 , -0.357) - (-0.381 , -0.351)
The sample is an unbalanced panel of 161,959 firm-year observations. Y1, Y2, and Y3 denote Investment,
Saving, and Debt respectively and X = [Cash Flow,Firm Size]. When year fixed effects are included, X
also includes year indicator variables. When firm fixed effects are included, the equations’ variables
undergo a within transformation. c sets (c12, c12) = (c23, c23) = (−1, 0) and (c13, c13) = (0, 1) whereas
c∗ = 0. Robust standard errors for pi are clustered by firm. 50% and 95% confidence regions are in
brackets and parentheses respectively.
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APPENDIX for “Shareholder Recovery and Leverage”
A.1. Estimation Procedure
The objective here is to estimate parameters: b, σF , η and α.
First of all, why do simulation at all? Don’t I have everything in closed-forms? I do have
closed-forms for firm value, equity value and debt value. But I do not have closed-forms for
my moments because moments are path-dependent and a simulated sample is an unbalanced
panel. Thus, I rely on simulations to generate model counterparts.
In order to address firm heterogeneity in the data, I account for firm fixed effects in calcu-
lating the higher-order moments. More specifically, let us assume that firm i’s data at time
t is dit. I convert dit to d˜it by accounting for firm fixed effects as follows:
d˜it = dit − 1
Ti
Ti∑
t=1
dit +
1∑N
i=1 Ti
N∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
dit
Using the above, I construct 8× 1 data moments vector M . Similarly, for parameter θ, for
s-th simulated collection of earnings sample path, I calculate the model-implied moments
Ms(θ). Similar to the data counterpart, I account for firm fixed effects in the simulated data.
Then, I estimate θ by minimizing SMM-weight weighted distance between data moments
and model-implied moments:
θˆ = arg min
θ
(
M − 1
S
S∑
s=1
Ms(θ)
)′
W
(
M − 1
S
S∑
s=1
Ms(θ)
)
Here, W is covariance matrix of data-moments after accounting for time-series and intra-
industry dependence:1
W =
(
1∑N
i=1 Pi
N∑
i=1
[
uiu
′
i
])−1
1Here, I cluster by industries to account for apparent correlation between firms in the same industry. I use
17 industry definitions from Kenneth French’s website. This clustering strategy also accounts for time-series
autocorrelation within firms. This is more conservative than clustering by firms.
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where ui is an 8×Pi matrix of influence functions. Here, N is the number of industries and
Pi is the sample size for the industry i.
In calculating standard errors, I correct standard errors for the sampling variability in
initially estimating µ. To that end, I update W as follows (Newey and McFadden, 1994):
W˜ =
(
1∑N
i=1 Pi
N∑
i=1
[(
ui(µˆ)− ∂ui(µ)
∂µ
uµi
)(
ui(µˆ)− ∂ui(µ)
∂µ
uµi
)′])−1
where ui(µˆ) is an influence function for 8 moments for given µˆ and u
µ
i is an influence function
for the earnings growth mean. Then, the standard errors for parameter estimates are given
by: √√√√ N∑
i=1
Pi(θˆ − θ0)→ N
(
0,
(
1 +
1
S
)
((H0)
′W˜H0)−1
)
where H0 = E
[
∂Ms(θ0)
∂θ
]
.
I first simulate S = 10 time-series of the aggregate earnings growth. For each time series of
the aggregate earnings growth, I simulate 4,435 firm-specific sample paths as there are 4,435
unique firms in my panel data set. In each simulation, I generate a sample path of 50+Ti
quarters long earnings Xi,t. I discard the first 50 quarters of simulated earnings to reduce
solutions’ dependence on Xi,t at time t = 0. I set Ti to actual time-series length of firm
i in order to simulate the unbalanced panel as shown in Figure 9. This small time-series
sample bias is important because default probability is significantly sensitive to how long Ti
is. For example, for firms whose earnings growth was hit by negative shock, they would not
have had enough time to recover under the shorter time, and thus their time-series sample
average of default probability would have been larger compared to what would have been
if they had been given a longer time.
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Figure 9: Distribution of Time-Series Length in Quarters
A.2. Simulated Panel Data
Using the models that are described in Section 1.3, I simulate panel data of leverage and
default probability and moderately “taint” the simulated data with a model misspecifica-
tion. I simulate panel data of leverage and default probability for 4,435 firms to mimic the
true number of unique firms in the data. For a sequence of earnings level, {Xi,t}, firm i’s
observable leverage and observable default probabilities at time t are:
l(αi, ηi;Xi,t) + 
l
i
d(αi, ηi;Xi,t)
where l and d are aforementioned functions of leverage and default probability, respectively,
in terms of αi and ηi. I randomly draw firm fixed effects 
l
i from normal distribution
li ∼ N (0%, 4%2) in order to simulate a model misspecification. I use two different cross-
sectional distributions of αi and ηi.
First, I randomly draw ηi and αi from truncated normal distributions: ηi ∼ T N (7.1%, 4.2%2)
and αi ∼ T N (17.4%, 10.4%2), respectively. Here, a model misspecification accounts for
13.8% of the total cross-sectional variation for leverage. Second, I randomly draw ηi and αi
from truncated exponential PDF, λα exp(−λααi) and λη exp(−ληηi), respectively. λα and
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λη are chosen to set the cross-sectional mean of ηi and αi equal to 17.0% and 7.0%. Here, a
model misspecification accounts for 3.6% of the total cross-sectional variation for leverage.
Note that the above formulation captures different sources of firm heterogeneity: default
cost, αi, shareholder recovery rate, ηi, 
l
i, or realized sequence of Xi,t.
A.3. Mathematical Appendix
A.3.1. Solution
For an arbitrary value for XD, XU and C, I first derive the debt value. Debt is a contingent
claim to an after-tax interest payment. Thus, debt value D(X) satisfies the following ODE:
1
2
σXX
2D
′′
+ µˆXD
′
+ (1− τi)C = rD
Boundary conditions are
D(XD) = (1− α− η)(1− τcd)XD
r − µˆ
D(XU ) = D(X0)
The first boundary condition captures that creditors recover only 1− α− η fraction of the
remaining unlevered firm value and the second boundary condition captures that creditors
receive the par-value if the debt gets called at the refinancing point. Closed form solution
for debt value is:
D(Xt) =
(1− τi)C
r
+A1X
λ+
t +A2X
λ−
t
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where2
λ± =
(
1
2
− µˆ
σ2X
)
±
√(
1
2
− µˆ
σ2X
)2
+
2r
σ2X
Similarly, for an arbitrary value for XD, XU and C, equity value is:
E(Xt) = sup
τD
EQ
[∫ τD
0
e−rs(1− τcd)(Xt − C)ds+ e−rτD · E(XD)
]
where τD ≡ inf{t : Xt ≤ XD}.
Here, it is important to note that the above tries to maximize equity value for given coupon
amount C. This implies that “optimal” default decision XD is made without internalizing
the default decision’s impact on cost of debt and leverage. For example, if the default
decision was made after internalizing its decision’s impact on cost of debt, the optimal
default decision is not to default at all, i.e., XD = ∞. As firms never choose to default,
this effectively makes expected firm-value loss zero and thus firms choose to max out their
leverage to enjoy the tax shield benefit. However, this is possible only when shareholders
commit to constantly supplying cash by issuing equity even when firms’ earnings are signif-
icantly low. This is economically unfeasible and unrealistic and thus I make an assumption
that “optimal” default decision was made without regard to its impact on cost of debt and
leverage.
Again, following the contingent claims approach, equity value E(X) satisfies the following
ODE:
1
2
σXX
2E
′′
+ µˆXE
′
+ (1− τcd)(X − C) = rE
2Here, A1 < 0 and A2 < 0 where[
A1
A2
]
=
[
X
λ+
D X
λ−
D
X
λ+
U −Xλ+0 Xλ−U −Xλ−0
]−1 [
(1− α− η) (1−τcd)XD
r−µˆ − (1−τi)Cr
0
]
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Boundary conditions are:
E(XD) =
η(1− τcd)XD
r − µˆ
E(XU ) = [(1− φD)D(XU ) + E(XU )]−D(X0) = XU
X0
[(1− φD)D(X0) + E(X0)]−D(X0)
The first boundary condition captures that shareholder recover η fraction of the remaining
unlevered firm value and the second boundary condition captures that shareholders receive
the firm value minus debt issuance cost and original debt’s par value. The second equality
in the second boundary arises due to homogeneity. Analytical solution for E(Xt) is:
E(Xt) =
1− τcd
r − µˆ Xt −
(1− τcd)C
r
+B1X
λ+
t +B2X
λ−
t
where B1 represents additional benefit for being allowed to upward refinance and B2 rep-
resents additional benefit for being allowed to default.3
The last remaining step is to solve for an optimal coupon C, upward refinancing point XU
and default threshold XD. C and XU are determined at time 0 (initial point or refinancing
point) by solving the following maximization problem:
[C,XU ] = arg max
C∗,X∗U
(E(X0;C
∗, X∗U ) + (1− φD)D(X0;C∗, X∗U ))
The equity value at the time of debt issuance is equal to the total firm value. Thus,
shareholders’ incentives are aligned with the maximization of the total firm value. Here, XD
is determined based on the following smooth pasting conditions (see the heuristic derivation
3Here, B1 > 0 and B2 > 0 where[
B1
B2
]
=
[
X
λ+
D X
λ−
D
X
λ+
U − XUX0 X
λ+
0 X
λ−
U − XUX0 X
λ−
0
]−1
[
(1−τcd)C
r
+ (η − 1) (1−τcd)XD
r−µˆ(
XU
X0
(1− φ)− 1
)(
A1X
λ+
0 +A2X
λ−
0 +
(1−τi)C
r
)
+ XU
X0
(
(1−τcd)
r−µˆ X0 − (1−τcd)Cr
)
−
(
(1−τcd)
r−µˆ XU − (1−τcd)Cr
)]
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of smooth pasting condition in Appendix A.3.2)
lim
Xt↓XD
E
′
(Xt) =
η(1− τcd)
r − µˆ
A few points are worth noting here. First, XD can be smaller than C, i.e., firms are allowed
to costlessly issue equity. Second, as emphasized by Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev (2010),
due to fluctuations in the earnings and the assumed cost of refinancing, the firm’s actual
leverage drifts away from its optimal target. In the model, the firm is at its optimally chosen
leverage ratio only at time 0 and subsequent refinancing dates.
Now, I solve for government tax revenue. Following the contingent claims approach, I solve:
1
2
σXX
2G
′′
+ µˆXG
′
+ (τcdX − τcdiC) = rG
I impose the following boundary conditions:
lim
Xt→XD
G(Xt) = 0
lim
Xt→XU
G(Xt) =
XU
X0
G(X0)
The first boundary condition specifies that the government does not collect any future tax
if firms declare bankruptcy. The second boundary condition captures the homogeneity of
the problem. Then, the analytical solution for G(Xt) is:
4
4Here, G1 and G2 satisfy:[
G1
G2
]
=
[
X
λ+
D X
λ−
D
XU
X0
X
λ+
0 −Xλ+U XUX0 X
λ−
0 −Xλ−U
]−1 [− τcd
r−µˆXD +
τcdiC
r(
XU
X0
− 1
)
τcdiC
r
]
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A.3.2. Smooth Pasting Condition
As a reminder, a function for equity value is
E(Xt) =
1− τcd
r − µˆ Xt −
(1− τcd)C
r
+B1X
λ+
t +B2X
λ−
t
First, because XD is chosen to maximize E(X), we need to have:
B′1(XD) = 0 and B
′
2(XD) = 0
Second, the value-matching condition specifies that
1− τcd
r − µˆ XD −
(1− τcd)C
r
+B1(XD)X
λ+
D +B2(XD)X
λ−
D =
η(1− τcd)XD
r − µˆ
where B1 and B2 are functions of XD. Let us take a derivative of both sides with respect
to XD
1− τcd
r − µˆ +B
′
1(XD)X
λ+
D +B1(XD)λ+X
λ+−1
D +B
′
2(XD)X
λ−
D +B2(XD)λ−X
λ−−1
D =
η(1− τcd)
r − µˆ
Substituting B′1(XD) = 0 and B′2(XD) = 0, we have:
1− τcd
r − µˆ +B1(XD)λ+X
λ+−1
D +B2(XD)λ−X
λ−−1
D =
η(1− τcd)
r − µˆ
Thus, we have:
lim
Xt↓XD
E
′
(Xt) =
η(1− τcd)
r − µˆ
and this is exactly the smooth pasting condition.
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A.3.3. Firm Characteristics
This section summarizes formulas for each firm characteristic. I define the leverage as
follows:
D(Xt)
D(Xt) + E(Xt)
Based on Harrison (1985), I define default probability under physical measure as:
DP (Xt)
=

Φ
(
log
(
XD
Xt
)
−(µ−σ2X/2)T
σX
√
T
)
+
(
Xt
XD
)1−2(µ)/σ2X
Φ
(
log
(
XD
Xt
)
+(µ−σ2X/2)T
σX
√
T
)
if Xt ≥ XD
1 Otherwise
where I set T = 1.
Next, I discuss the formula for the market beta. The equity return is:
dRt =
dE(Xt) + (1− τcd)(Xt − C)dt
E(Xt)
=
(
(1− τcd)(Xt − C)
E(Xt)
+
E′(Xt)Xt
E(Xt)
µ+
1
2
E
′′
(Xt)X
2
t
E(Xt)
σ2X
)
dt
+
E′(Xt)Xt
E(Xt)
(bσAdW
A
t + σFdW
F
t )
Let xAt be a log of aggregate earnings X
A
t . Then,
dxAt = σAdW
A
t
Using this, a term for market beta is:
Market beta =
1
dt
Et[dxAt dRt]/
1
dt
vart[dx
A
t ] =
E
′
(Xt)Xt
E(Xt)
b
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Lastly, I define credit spread as:
C
D(Xt)
A.3.4. Proof
This subsection lists all of the proofs for all of the propositions when upward refinancing
is suppressed. I allow upward refinancing in the simulation and numerically show that the
same intuition still carries through.
D(Xt) =
(1− τi)C
r
+ A˜2
(
Xt
C ·XDC
)λ−
where
A˜2/C = −1− τi
r
+ (1− α− η)(1− τcd)XDC
r − µˆ < 0
On the contrary, as η increases, E(Xt) increases because shareholders gain η and XDC is de-
termined to maximize E(Xt). Similarly, this increase gets magnified by larger
(
Xt
C·XDC
)λ−
.
E(Xt) =
1− τcd
r − µˆ Xt −
(1− τcd)C
r
+ B˜2
(
Xt
C ·XDC
)λ−
B˜2/C =
1− τcd
r
+ (η − 1)(1− τcd)XDC
r − µˆ > 0
Proof of Proposition 2: I can approximately write the leverage as:
lev =
D(Xt)
E(Xt) +D(Xt)
≈
(1−τi)C
r
(1−τcd)
r−µˆ Xt +
τcdiC
r
where the second approximate equality exists because default probability is typically very
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small. Then, I can write partial derivative terms as:
∂lev
∂η
=
∂lev
∂C
∂C
∂η
∂lev
∂α
=
∂lev
∂C
∂C
∂α
Because ∂lev∂C > 0, proving
∂lev
∂η < 0 and
∂lev
∂α < 0 is equivalent to proving that
∂C
∂η < 0 and
∂C
∂α < 0. So, let us focus on terms for C. The optimization problem to solve for C is as
follows:
C = arg max
C∗

1− τcd
r − µˆ X0 +
τcdi − φD(1− τi)
r
C∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
Benefit
+
(
X0
XDC
)λ−
((1− φD)A2c +B2c)C∗(1−λ−)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost

where A2c = A2/C and B2c = B2/C. The closed form solution for optimal coupon C is
C =
[
τcdi − φD(1− τi)
r
]−1/λ−
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tax Shield Benefit−1/λ−
· X0
XDC︸ ︷︷ ︸
1/Default Threshold
· [−(1− λ−)((1− φD)A2c +B2c)]1/λ−︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss1/λ−
(A.1)
Because ∂C∂α < 0 and
∂C
∂η < 0, I can say that C decreases over α and η. Intuitively,
the denominator of the second term shows that C decreases as shareholders strategically
determine high threshold XDC . High XDC implies a high default probability thus a high
expected firm-value loss and low optimal C. The third term represents the loss of firm value
upon bankruptcy adjusted for debt issuance cost. High loss of firm value ((1−φD)A2c+B2c)
implies low C. 
Proof of Proposition 3 As shown in Section A.3.3, for given µ, b and σF , there is mono-
tonic relation between default probability and XD (default threshold). Thus, comparative
statistics between default probability and η and α is equivalent to that between XD and α
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and η. Using closed forms for C and XDC , I derive closed-form terms for XD:
XD
X0
=
[
τcdi − φD(1− τi)
r
]−1/λ−
· [−(1− λ−)((1− φD)A2c +B2c)]1/λ−
Here, XD decreases over α and η because
∂XD
∂α < 0 and
∂XD
∂η < 0. Intuitively, for given
C, the rise in η increases both default probability and value loss. Thus, C has to decrease
sufficiently enough to offset high expected firm-value loss driven by an increase in both
default probability and value loss. Thus, the decrease in C more than offsets the increase
in XDC . As a result, XD decreases over η and so does default probability. 
Proof of Proposition 5: Now, I prove for market beta:
Market beta = b
E′X
E
E′X =
1− τcd
r − µˆ X +B2λ−
(
X
C ·XDC
)λ−
E =
1− τcd
r − µˆ X −
(1− τcd)C
r
+B2
(
X
C ·XDC
)λ−
Thus, I have:
Market beta =
E′(Xt)Xt
E(Xt)
b =
(
1 +
(1− τcd)C
r · E + (λ− − 1)
B2
E
(
Xt
C ·XDC
)λ−)
b
Because ∂Market betaη < 0, this proves the proposition. Intuitively, conditional on leverage,
shareholders’ strategic action first decreases market beta. After allowing firms to de-lever
in response, its distress risk decreases and market beta further decreases. One interesting
point to note is that as X gets very close to XD, the market beta becomes less sensitive to
η because equity gets converted to a fixed fraction of unlevered asset value in default. 
Proof of Proposition 6: I set φD = 0 and show closed-form expression for the credit
spread.
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CD(X0)
=
1
1−τi
r +A2/C
(
X0
XD
)λ−
=
1
1−τi
r +
−τcdi
r(1−λ−)
(
1 +
1
1−λ−
1−τcd
τcdi
1+
−λ−
1−λ−
1−τcd
τcdi
α
1−η
)
It is immediately clear that the credit spread decreases over η. Intuitively, lower default
probability caused by the commitment problem more than offsets creditors’ higher value loss
(normalized by C) and results in a lower credit spread. Again, this commitment problem
exists because α is non-zero and thus the credit spread decreases over η. If α is 0, then the
above formula clearly tells you that the credit spread does not change over η. 
Proof of Proposition 7: Let me prove the proposition by illustrating my points in
Figure 1. I need to prove that point A always corresponds to higher firm value than point
C does. To that end, I prove this by contradiction. Let us assume otherwise: point C’s
firm value is greater than point A’s. Now, pick a point D on the solid curve that has the
same coupon rate as point C. Because the solid curve always sits above the dotted curve
(∵ (1− φD)D(Xt) +E(Xt) always decreases as η increases), point D’s firm value is greater
than point C’s. This implies that point D’s firm value is greater than point A’s. This
contradicts that point A is the optimal point on the solid curve. This completes the proof.

Proof of Proposition 8: Government tax revenue G(Xt) is:
G(Xt) =
τcd
r − µˆXt −
τcdiC
r
+ G˜2
(
Xt
C ·XDC
)λ−
where
G˜2/C =
τcdi
r
− τcd
r − µˆXDC
As η increases, C decreases and thus government tax revenue G(Xt) increases and this
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completes the proof. On the related note, G˜2 illustrates an interesting intuition. Upon
firms’ default, even though the government loses potential tax revenue on the firm’s future
income stream, the government is no longer exploited by corporations. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Here, I prove that leverage and DP (default probability) have
different sensitivities with respect to η and α.
∂DP/∂η
∂DP/∂α
=
(∂DP/∂XD)∂XD/∂η
(∂DP/∂XD)∂XD/∂α
=
∂XD/∂η
∂XD/∂α
where ∂XD∂η and
∂XD
∂α are:
∂XD
∂η
=
∂(C ·XDC)
∂η
= C · ∂XDC
∂η
+XDC · ∂C
∂η
∂XD
∂α
=
∂(C ·XDC)
∂α
= C · ∂XDC
∂α
+XDC · ∂C
∂α
= XDC · ∂C
∂α
where the last equality holds because ∂XDC∂α = 0.
Now, let us think of a leverage.
lev =
D(X0)
E(X0) +D(X0)
≈
(1−τi)C
r
(1−τcd)
r−µˆ X0 +
τcdiC
r
⇒ ∂lev/∂η
∂lev/∂α
=
(∂lev/∂C)∂C/∂η
(∂lev/∂C)∂C/∂α
=
∂C/∂η
∂C/∂α
Thus,
∂DP/∂η
∂DP/∂α
6= ∂lev/∂η
∂lev/∂α
Two points are worth making. First, we point out that ∂DP/∂η∂DP/∂α <
∂lev/∂η
∂lev/∂α because XDC
∂C
∂η <
∂XD
∂η < 0. Second, when
∂XDC
η = 0, the above becomes equality and implies that leverage
and default probability cannot separately identify α and η. 
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A.3.5. Upward Refinancing
Even when upward refinancing is allowed, the economic channels, discussed in Section 1.3.2,
still hold. As debt becomes more costly, firms internalize higher costs and optimally choose
to de-lever and refinance less frequently.
Figure 10: Illustration of trade-off theory when upward refinancing is allowed
When η = 0 (left panel), firm value is maximum at 80.23 when optimal coupon C is 0.66
and XU is 3.7. However, η 6= 0 (right panel), firm value is maximum at 79.75 when coupon
C is 0.59 and XU = 3.75. This clearly illustrates that high η implies lower firm value, lower
leverage and less frequent upward refinancing.
A.3.6. The Whole Economy
Here, I examine the case when upward refinancing is suppressed. I show that the value of
the entire economy, D(X) + E(X) + G(X), increases over η as lower default frequencies
lead to smaller loss of default cost. This can be easily seen below:
D(X) + E(X) +G(X) =
X
r − µˆ + (A2 +B2 +G2)
(
X
C ·XDC
)λ−
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where
(A2 +B2 +G2)/C = −[α(1− τcd) + τcd] · XDC
r − µˆ
Here, α(1− τcd)XDCr−µˆ is the deadweight loss from the firms as a whole whereas τcd XDCr−µˆ is the
government’s loss of future tax revenue.
A.4. Data Variables
A.4.1. Firm-level Variable Definitions
Variables Excluding Default Probabilities
• Earnings growth: e˜i,t+1 = log
(∑K
j=0OIADPQi,t+1−j∑K
j=0OIADPQi,t−j
− 1
)
where K is set to 8 and
OIADPQ is operating income after depreciation.
• Market beta: calculated based on rolling window of 24 months of monthly returns.
• Leverage: DLTTQ+DLCQDLTTQ+DLCQ+ME where DLTTQ, DLCQ and ME are long-term debt,
short-term debt and market equity, respectively.
Default Probabilities
Because level of default probability is an important matching moment, it warrants a sepa-
rate discussion. At large, there are two ways to derive default probability. The first is the
Merton distance-to-default model, which is based on Merton (1974). The second is based on
the hazard model and is used by several papers including Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi
(2008). I use the former approach, which is more compatible with the model-implied mo-
ments that use Merton-style default probability. Specifically, I follow Bharath and Shumway
(2008) to construct default probability, which is found to closely match various corporate
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default probability measures. Its definition is
pi = Φ
(
− log VB − (µv − σ
2
v
2 )
σv
)
where Φ is a cumulative normal distribution function, V is the market value of assets, B
is the amount of debt that’s due for that quarter, µv is the expected asset return and σv
is the asset return volatility. Because V , B, µv and σv are all unobservable, each of these
warrant a separate discussion.
First, let us discuss how I derive B and V . In order to derive distance-to-default over the
next one year, Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) and Vassalou and Xing (2004) assume
that short-term debt plus one half long-term debt come due in a year. As Campbell et al.
noted, “This convention is a simple way to take account for the fact that long-term debt
may not mature until after the horizon of the distance to default calculation.” Extending
upon this convention, in order to derive distance-to-default in the next quarter as opposed
to next year, Gomes, Grotteria and Wachter (2018) assume that one quarter of Campbell
et al.’s comes due within the next quarter. Accordingly, I set B to DLCQ/4 +DLTTQ/8.
Due to the lack of data on market value of debt, I use B to proxy market value of debt and
set V to market value of equity plus B. Second, following Bharath and Shumway (2008),
I use monthly equity returns to calculate average equity returns and set it to µv. Third,
following Bharath and Shumway (2008), I set σv to
σv =
E
E + F
σE +
F
E + F
(0.05/
√
3 + 0.25 · σE)
where σE is the quarterly volatility of the equity returns and 0.05/
√
3 + 0.25 · σE is the
quarterly volatility of the bond that is due in a quarter. I estimated σE using the daily
returns of trailing 3 months.
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Tax Rates
First, I augment the sample with panel data of corporate marginal tax rates,5 which were
constructed according to Graham (1996a,b). They provide both before-financing marginal
tax rates (MTR) and after-financing MTR. Both measure firms’ MTR by incorporating
many features present in the tax code, such as tax-loss carryforwards and carrybacks, the
investment tax credit, and the alternative minimum tax. Before-financing MTR are based
on taxable income before financing expenses are deducted, whereas after-financing MTR
are based on taxable income after financing expenses are deducted. As Graham (1998)
argues, by construction, after-financing MTR are endogenously affected by the choice of
financing. Because the model treats τc exogenous of firms’ financing decision, this paper
uses before-financing MTR to set corporate earnings tax rates τc
Second, I closely follow Graham (2000) to construct τi and τd. As documented in Graham
(2000), I set τi = 47.4% for 1981 or prior, 40.7% between 1982 and 1986, 33.1% for 1987,
28.7% between 1988 and 1992, and 29.6% afterwards. Based on these estimates for τi, I
estimate τd as [d + (1 − d)gα]τi. The dividend-payout ratio d is the firm-quarter-specific
dividend distribution divided by trailing twelve-quarters moving average of earnings. Since
d needs to be less than or equal to 1, if d is greater than 1, I set it to 1. If dividend is missing,
I set d = 0. The proportion of long-term capital gains that is taxable (g) is 0.4 before 1987
and 1.0 afterwards. I assume that the variable measuring the benefits of deferring capital
gains, α, equals 0.25. The long-term capital gains rate, gτi has a maximum value of 0.28
between 1987 and 1997, 0.2 between 1998 and 2003 (Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997) and 0.15
afterwards (Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003).
It is worth noting that τc is different across firms because firms face different tax-loss
carryforwards/carrybacks, the investment tax credit and the alternative minimum tax. τd
5I would like to thank John Graham for sharing panel data of corporate marginal tax rates. https:
//faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/taxform.html. I impute missing marginal tax rates with the time-
series average for each firm if the firm is covered in Graham’s database or panel-wide-average if the firm is
not covered at all.
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is different across firms because dividend-payout ratios are different. However, for given
year, τi is the same across firms because I assume that marginal investors face the same
τi. Also, I assume that τc and τi stay constant for all four quarters for any given year
(due to data limitation) whereas τd can potentially change every quarter due to varying
dividend-payout ratios.
A.4.2. Aggregate Variables
Variable Definitions
• Aggregate earning: Source: NIPA, Section 1, Table 1.14, Series: Line 8 Net Operating
Surplus, Quarterly series from 1947Q1 to 2016Q4
• Consumer price index: Source: FRED, Series: CPIAUCNS (Consumer Price Index
for All Urban Consumers: All Items), Monthly series from 1913Jan through 2016Dec
• Nominal risk free rate: Source: FRED, Series: TB3MS (3-Month Treasury Bill: Sec-
ondary Market Rate), Monthly series from 1934Jan through 2016Dec
Variable Construction
• Realized Inflation=[CPI(t)−CPI(t− 1)]/CPI(t− 1) where CPI(t) is the consumer
price index in year-quarter t computed as the average monthly CPI for that year-
quarter.
A.5. Magnitude of Credit Spread
Using the estimates reported in Table 5, as noted in Table 6’s column (5), quarterly credit
spreads are 191 bp. These credit spreads are much larger than what is empirically observed
and contrast with Morellec, Nikolov and Schurhoff (2012)’s success in matching quarterly
credit spreads at 53bp. The main reason for this discrepancy is the value used for earnings
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growth volatility, σF . Using σF = 0.13806 that is reported in Morellec et al. and keeping
everything else equal, my model-implied quarterly credit spreads are 56bp, which is very
close to Morellec’s. The large sensitivity of credit spreads with respect to σF is noted in
Morellec et al.’s Table 1.
However, lowering σF decreases quarterly default probabilities from 0.36% to 0.003%, which
is counterfactually small. More importantly, σˆF = 0.2444 is a relatively conservative mea-
sure, as implied earnings growth variance is under-matched relative to its data counterpart
(see Table 4). More specifically, if σF is chosen just to match earnings growth moments,
then σˆF = 0.2786, which is apparently greater than σˆF = 0.2444. Lastly, the current model
features bonds with infinite maturity and thus is not suitable to match data counterparts
that have finite maturity. Noting this limitation, it is still interesting to study how much
credit spreads change over η and thus I continue reporting such results.
A.6. Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978 (BRA)
First, let us review the literature’s stance on how BRA changed shareholder recovery rate.
Hackbarth, Haselmann and Schoenherr (2015) argues that BRA increased shareholder re-
covery rate due to four specific clauses. First, relative to the old code, BRA added equity as
one additional class to confirm a reorganization plan. Second, managers were given a 120-
day exclusivity period to propose the plan. Third, if no plan could be agreed upon, a new
procedure, called cramdown, allowed firms to continue operating while a buyer was sought.
This was considered a costly and time-consuming process and thus acted as a disciplinary
tool in negotiations in favor of shareholders. Lastly, firms could now declare bankruptcy
even when firms were solvent, thus shareholders can use the threat of bankruptcy as a
strategic tool against creditors. Thus, BRA increased shareholder recovery rate.
Now, let us discuss how BRA could have changed default cost. Prior to 1978, as discussed in
Section 1.2, an increasing number of firms sought to file under shareholder-friendly Chapter
6Morellec et al. report annual volatility of earnings growth at 28.86%. Thus, σF =
√
0.14432 − (bˆσˆA)2 =
0.1380.
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11 rather than Chapter 10. However, applying for Chapter 11 required an expensive hearing
(LoPucki and Whitford, 1990). Moreover, as discussed in Section 1.2, the prior bankruptcy
laws were considerably ambiguous (Posner, 1997; King, 1979). BRA addressed both of
these issues. BRA permitted creditors to take less than full payment, in order to expedite
or insure the success of the reorganization.7 This effectively made it easy to deviate from
APR. BRA reduced the ambiguity present in the bankruptcy law by spelling out a number
of provisions important in enabling the shareholders to reorganize (Skeel, 2001)8 and this
could have reduced friction in the bankruptcy process. Taken together, this could decrease
time spent in bankruptcy and thus reduce lawyers’ fees, which are typically charged by the
hour, and opportunity cost caused by delayed investment due to uncertain future and loss
of business relationships with customers and suppliers. In other words, BRA could have
effectively decreased default cost.9 However, the above argument goes against one of the
notorious bankruptcy cases in the post-BRA era, specifically that of Eastern Airlines, which
lost 50% of its value during bankruptcy (Weiss and Wruck, 1998). Again, it is not clear
how BRA changed default cost. Obvious way to test my hypothesis is to check how BRA
changed time spent in bankruptcy. However, data on bankruptcy cases during pre-BRA are
limited and thus makes it hard to compare. This warrants a need for a structural estimation
that can identify changes in unobservable firm characteristics.
7H.R. Rep No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 224 (1978))
8The list includes an automatic stay, an exclusive period, the ability to use cash collateral and/or obtain
post-petition financing, the ability to assume or reject leases and other executory contracts, the ability to
sell assets free and clear of liens, the ability to retain and compensate key employees and the ability to reject
or renegotiate labor contracts and pension benefits.
9This explanation is consistent with the literature’s use of time spent in bankruptcy as a proxy for default
cost (Bris, Welch and Zhu, 2006).
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APPENDIX for “Measurement Error in Multiple Equations”
B.1. Restricting the Correlations among the Disturbances
We extend A6 to A
′
6 which restricts the sign and/or magnitude of the correlation rηj ,ηh
between ηj and ηh.
Assumption A′6 1 Disturbance Correlation Restriction: cjh ≤ rηj ,ηh ≤ cjh where −1 ≤
cjh ≤ cjh ≤ 1.
In particular, provided σ2
Y˜j
σ2
Y˜h
6= 0, from the proof of Corollary B.1.1 we have that
rηj ,ηh =
ρrY˜j ,Y˜h − rW˜ ,Y˜jrW˜ ,Y˜h
(ρ−R2
W˜ .Y˜j
)
1
2 (ρ−R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)
1
2
.
A′6 may restrict the sign of rηj ,ηh as encoded by the sign of the function
Sjh(r) ≡ r × rY˜j ,Y˜h − rW˜ ,Y˜jrW˜ ,Y˜h .
Further, A′6 may restrict the magnitude of rηj ,ηh (either r
2
ηj ,ηh
≤ c2 or c2 ≤ r2ηj ,ηh) as encoded
by the sign of the function
Mjh(r; c) ≡ (r × rY˜j ,Y˜h − rW˜ ,Y˜jrW˜ ,Y˜h)
2 − c2(r −R2
W˜ .Y˜j
)(r −R2
W˜ .Y˜h
).
As shown in the proof of Corollary B.1.1, when R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
6= 1, the discriminant of the quadratic
function Mjh(·; c) is given by
∆jh(c) ≡ c2[R4W˜ .(Y˜j .Y˜h)′(1−R
2
Y˜j .Y˜h
)2 − (1− c2)(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
−R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)2],
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and, when R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
6= c2, the roots of Mjh(·; c) are given by
ρ−jh(c) ≡
Fjh(c)−∆jh(c) 12
2(R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
− c2) and ρ
+
jh(c) ≡
Fjh(c) + ∆jh(c)
1
2
2(R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
− c2)
where
Fjh(c) ≡ −R2W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′(1−R
2
Y˜j .Y˜h
) + (1− c2)(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
+R2
W˜ .Y˜h
).
Corollary B.1.1 uses Sjh(r) and Mjh(r) to encode the sign and magnitudes restrictions in
A′6 and to express the identification region for (ρ, δ, β,Γ) under A1-A′6.
Corollary B.1.1 Under the conditions of Theorem 2.3.1, A4, A5, and A
′
6 for j, h = 1, ..., p
with j < h, (ρ, δ, β,Γ) is partially identified in the sharp set
J k,τ,c ≡ {(r,D(r), B(r), G(r)) : 0  G(r), 1
1 + κ
≤ r ≤ 1,
σ2
Y˜j
σ2
W˜j
(1− τj) ≤ Gjj(r),
and cjh ≤
Gjh(r)
[Gjj(r)Ghh(r)]
1
2
≤ cjh for j, h = 1, ..., p and j < h}.
Further, ρ is partially identified in the sharp set
Rk,τ,c = [R2
W˜ .Y˜
, 1] ∩ [ 1
1 + κ
, 1] ∩pj=1 [
1
τj
R2
W˜ .Y˜j
, 1]
p⋂
j,h=1
j<h
Rcjh,
with
Rcjh =

r :
Sjh(r) ≤ 0 and Mjh(r; cjh) ≤ 0 ≤Mjh(r; c¯jh) if cjh ≤ c¯jh ≤ 0 and σ2Y˜jσ
2
Y˜h
6= 0
{Sjh(r) ≤ 0 and Mjh(r; cjh) ≤ 0} or
{0 ≤ Sjh(r) and Mjh(r; c¯jh) ≤ 0}
if cjh < 0 < c¯jh and σ
2
Y˜j
σ2
Y˜h
6= 0
0 ≤ Sjh(r) and Mjh(r; c¯jh) ≤ 0 ≤Mjh(r; cjh) if 0 ≤ cjh ≤ c¯jh and σ2Y˜jσ
2
Y˜h
6= 0
r ∈ ∅ if 0 /∈ [cjh, c¯jh] and σ2Y˜jσ
2
Y˜h
= 0.
−∞ < r <∞ if 0 ∈ [cjh, c¯jh] and σ2Y˜jσ
2
Y˜h
= 0.

,
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where, provided σ2
Y˜j
σ2
Y˜h
6= 0, we have
0 ≤ Sjh(r)⇔

rW˜ ,Y˜j
rW˜ ,Y˜h
rY˜j ,Y˜h
≤ r when 0 < rY˜j ,Y˜h
rW˜ ,Y˜jrW˜ ,Y˜h ≤ 0 when rY˜j ,Y˜h = 0
r ≤ rW˜ ,Y˜j rW˜ ,Y˜hrY˜j ,Y˜h when rY˜j ,Y˜h < 0
,
and if R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
= 1 then 0 ≤Mjh(r; c) = (1− c2)(r −R2W˜ .Y˜j )
2 whereas if R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
6= 1 then
0 ≤Mjh(r; c)⇔
−∞ < r <∞ when 0 < c2 < 1−
R4
W˜ .(Y˜j .Y˜h)
′ (1−R2Y˜j .Y˜h )
2
(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
−R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)2
r ∈ (−∞, ρ−jh(c)] ∪ [ρ+jh(c),∞) when c2 = 0 < R2Y˜j .Y˜h or 1−
R4
W˜ .(Y˜j .Y˜h)
′ (1−R2Y˜j .Y˜h )
2
(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
−R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)2
≤ c2 < R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
r ≤
−R2
W˜ .Y˜j
R2
W˜ .Y˜h
R2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)
′−(R2W˜ .Y˜j+R
2
W˜ .Y˜h
)
when c2 = R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
and R2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′
< R2
W˜ .Y˜j
+R2
W˜ .Y˜h
0 ≤ (1−R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
)R2
W˜ .Y˜j
R2
W˜ .Y˜h
when c2 = R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
and R2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′
= R2
W˜ .Y˜j
+R2
W˜ .Y˜h
−R2
W˜ .Y˜j
R2
W˜ .Y˜h
R2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)
′−(R2W˜ .Y˜j+R
2
W˜ .Y˜h
)
≤ r when c2 = R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
and R2
W˜ .Y˜j
+R2
W˜ .Y˜h
< R2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′
r ∈ [ρ+jh(c), ρ−jh(c)] when R2Y˜j .Y˜h < c
2
Last, δ, β, and Γ are partially identified in the sharp sets Dk,τ,c = {D(r) : r ∈ Rk,τ,c},
Bk,τ,c = {B(r) : r ∈ Rk,τ,c}, and Gk,τ,c = {G(r) : r ∈ Rk,τ,c}.
The bounds in Corollary B.1.1 yield those from Corollary 2.3.2 when (cjh, cjh) is set to
(−1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0), or (−1, 1). In particular, when R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
6= 0, the proof of Corollary
B.1.1 gives
ρ−jh(0) = ρ
+
jh(0) =
rW˜ ,Y˜jrW˜ ,Y˜h
rY˜j ,Y˜h
=
σW˜ ,Y˜jσW˜ ,Y˜h
σ2
W˜
σY˜j ,Y˜h
,
so that 0 ≤Mjh(ρ; 0)⇔ ρ ∈ (−∞,∞) and Mjh(ρ; 0) ≤ 0⇔ ρ =
σW˜ ,Y˜j
σW˜ ,Y˜h
σ2
W˜
σY˜j ,Y˜h
. Also,
ρ−jh(−1) = ρ−jh(1) = R2W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′ and ρ
+
jh(−1) = ρ+jh(1) = 0.
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Thus, when R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
< 1, Mjh(ρ; 1) = Mjh(ρ;−1) ≤ 0 ⇔ ρ ∈ (−∞, 0] ∪ [R2W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′ ,∞).
Since R2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′
≤ R2
W˜ .Y˜
, this magnitude restriction is not binding in Rk,τ,c. It follows that
Corollary B.1.1 yields the same bound Rk,τ,c from Corollary 2.3.2, with Rcjh determined by
the magnitude restriction encoded in Mjh(ρ; 0) ≤ 0 when cjh = c¯jh = 0 and by the sign
restrictions, if any, encoded in Sjh(r) otherwise.
B.2. Supplementary Material on Inference
B.2.1. Algorithm for Inference on ρ
In order to apply only one algorithm that delivers ρˆlo(λ; 1 − α21), ρˆuo (λ; 1 − α21), and
CIρ1−α21(λ), it is useful to adopt the following notation. For r ∈ [0, 1], we let
gl(pi; r, λ) = (gl1(pi; r, λ), ..., g
l
M (pi; r, λ)) where g
l
v(pi; r, λ) ≡ r − ρlv(λ) for v = 1, ...,M , and
gu(pi; r, λ) = (gu1 (pi; r, λ), ..., g
u
M (pi; r, λ)) where g
u
v (pi; r, λ) ≡ ρuv (λ)− r for v = 1, ...,M.
Thus, ρlv(λ) = −glv(pi; 0, λ) and2 ρuv (λ) = gu(pi; 0, λ). Further, we collect all the lower and
upper bounds, denoted by gcv(pi; r, λ) for v = 1, ..., 2M , into
gc(pi; r, λ) = (gl(pi; r, λ)′, gu(pi; r, λ)′)′.
We estimate gc(pi; r, λ) using the consistent plug-in estimator gc(pˆi; r, λ). Using the delta
method, the linearly independent subset gc∗(pˆi; r, λ) of gc(pˆi; r, λ) (recall that some of bounds
in gc(pi; r, λ) are constant or linearly dependent, e.g. in the single equation case or under
the diagonal restrictions in A6) is asymptotically normally distributed:
√
n(gc∗(pˆi; r, λ)− gc∗(pi; r, λ)) d→N(0,∇pigc∗(pi; r, λ)Σ∇pigc∗(pi; r, λ)′).
2We employ gl(pi; 0, λ) to transform the lower bounds for ρ into upper bounds for −ρ. We then use a
single algorithm (for an upper bound) when estimating the lower and upper bounds for ρ.
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Note that ∇pigc(pi; r, λ) does not depend on r. Section B.2 collects the expressions for
gc(pi; r, λ), and ∇pigc(pi; r, λ).
Next, for each ` ∈ Λ1−α22 , we implement algorithm 1 in Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen
(2013). To compute, CIρ1−α21(`), we invert a test statistic and perform a grid search over
(0, 1]. For a thorough discussion of the algorithm3, we refer the reader to Chernozhukov,
Lee, and Rosen (2013) and Chernozhukov, Kim, Lee, and Rosen (2015).
1. Let α ≤ 12 and Vc ≡ V l ∪ Vu ≡ {1, ...,M} ∪ {M + 1, ..., 2M}.
If the target output is:
(a) ρˆlo(`; 1− α) or ρˆuo (`; 1− α) then set m = l or u and r = 0.
(b) CIρ1−α(`) then set m = c and r ∈ (0, 1].
2. Set γ˜ = 1− 0.1logn . Simulate S draws Z1, .., ZS from N(0, I2M ).
3. For each v ∈ Vc, compute4 hˆ(v; `) = [1(v = 1), ...,1(v = 2M)][∇pigc(pˆi; r, `)Σˆ∇pigc(pˆi; r, `)′] 12
and set se(v; `) = 1√
n
∥∥∥hˆ(v; `)∥∥∥.
4. Define Vm+ = {v ∈ Vm : se(v; `) 6= 0}. Compute
cVm(γ˜; `) = γ˜-quantile of { sup
v∈Vm+
hˆ(v; `)Zs∥∥∥hˆ(v; `)∥∥∥ , s = 1, ..., S}
and
Vˆm = {v ∈ Vm+ : gmv (pˆi; 0, `) ≤ min
v∈Vm+
[gmv (pˆi; 0, `)+cVm(γ˜; `)se(v; `)]+2cVm(γ˜; `)se(v; `)}.
3We adjust the algorithm in Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013) slightly since some of our bounds are
deterministic (e.g ρ ≤ 1). Specifically, we use the estimated bounds to calculate the critical value. Then we
report the smallest upper bound among the precision-corrected estimators and the deterministic bounds.
4∇pigc(pˆi; r, `)Σˆ∇pigc(pˆi; r, `)′ may be positive semi-definite and its matrix square root is computed using
a singular value decomposition.
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5. Compute
cVˆm(`) = (1− α)-quantile of { sup
v∈Vˆm
hˆ(v; `)Zs∥∥∥hˆ(v; `)∥∥∥ , s = 1, ..., S}.
6. Compute
gmo (pˆi; r, `) = inf
v∈Vm
[gmv (pˆi; r, `)) + cVˆm(`)se(v; `)]
If m = l or u then report
ρˆlo(`; 1− α) = −glo(pˆi; 0, `) or ρˆuo (`; 1− α) = guo (pˆi; 0, `)
Otherwise, if m = c then report
CIρ1−α(`) = {r ∈ (0, 1] : gco(pˆi; r, `) ≥ 0}.
In the single equation bounds or when A6 does not bind, the value ` of the nuisance param-
eters does not affect the bounds. Otherwise, let t = 1, ..., T enumerate the T ≡ 12p(p − 1)
(jt, ht) pairs, jt, ht = 1, ..., p with jt < ht, that correspond to the first T components of λ.
From Corollary 2.3.2, we have that if ` is such that (cjtht , cjtht) 6= (−1, 1), −sgn(`T+t) /∈
[cjtht , cjtht ], and `t = 0 then Rcjtht(`) = ∅. As such, we drop from Λ1−α22 the elements that
satisfy these conditions since these have no effect on CRρ1−α2 =
⋃
`∈Λ1−α22
CIρ1−α21(`). For the
remaining components ` of Λ1−α22 , CI
ρ
1−α21(`) depends only on the signs (negative, zero, or
positive) of the elements of the first T components of `
2T×1
. To speed up the computation,
we remove from Λ1−α22 the components that are redundant, so that each admissible sign
configuration of the first T components of ` is represented only once in
⋃
`∈Λ1−α22
CIρ1−α21(`).
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B.2.2. Delta Method
Recall that the nuisance parameters λ ≡ gλ(pi), the vector of lower and upper bounds
gcv(pi; r, λ) in the intersection bounds algorithm for inference on ρ, and the parameters δj ,
βjl, and Γjh, j, h = 1, ..., p and l = 1, ..., k, (written in the form θ ≡ H(pi; ρ)) can all be
expressed as functions of the estimands
pi′
1×B
≡ ( pi′1
1×p(k+1)
, pi′2
1×(p+k)
, pi
′
3
1×p(1+k)
, pi
′
4
1×pk
, pi
′
5
1×k
, pi
′
6
1×p
, pi
′
7
1× 1
2
p(p−1)
)
= [vec(bY.(W,X′)′)
′, b′W.(Y,X′)′ , (b
′
W.(Y1,X′)′ , ..., b
′
W.(Yp,X′)′), vec(bY.X)
′,
b′W.X , σ
−2
W˜
(σ2
Y˜1
, ..., σ2
Y˜p
), σ−2
W˜
(σY˜1,Y˜2 , ..., σ
2
Y˜p−1,Y˜p
)].
Since the plug-in estimator pˆi satisfies
√
n(pˆi − pi) d→N(0,Σ), the delta method gives
√
n(λˆ− λ) d→N(0,∇pigλ(pi)Σ∇pigλ(pi)′),
√
n(gc∗(pˆi; r, λ)− gc∗(pi; r, λ)) d→N(0,∇pigc∗(pi; r, λ)Σ∇pigc∗(pi; r, λ)′), and
√
n(H(pˆi; r)−H(pi; r)) d→N(0,∇piH(pi; r)Σ∇piH(pi; r)′),
for any r ∈ (0, 1]. In what follows, we provide specific expressions for gλ, ∇pigλ(pi),
gc(pi; r, λ), ∇pigc(pi; r, λ), H(pi; r) and ∇piH(pi; r).
Nuisance Parameters
The 2T = p(p− 1) nuisance parameters are collected in
λ = (λ1, · · · , λ2T )′ = gλ(pi) ≡ (σ−2W˜ σY˜1,Y˜2 , ..., σ
−2
W˜
σ2
Y˜p−1,Y˜p
, bY˜1.W˜ bY˜2.W˜ , ..., bY˜p−1.W˜ bY˜p.W˜ )
′.
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It follows that, for t = 1, ..., T , the components of ∇pigλ(pi)
p(p−1)×B
are given by
∇pigλt (pi)
1×B
=
[
0
1×[p(k+1)+(p+k)+p(1+k)+pk+k+p]
ı′t
1× 1
2
p(p−1)
]
where ıt
1
2
p(p−1)×1
is the unit vector with 1 in the tth position and 0 elsewhere, and for
t = T + 1, ..., 2T
∇pigλt (pi)
1×B
=
[
ı′jt
1×p
⊗
[
bY˜ht .W˜
0
1×k
]
+ ı′ht
1×p
⊗
[
bY˜jt .W˜
0
1×k
]
0
1×[(p+k)+p(1+k)+pk+k+p+ 1
2
p(p−1)]
]
.
Lower and Upper Intersection bounds
Consider the joint equation bounds with λ = `∗ with (cjtht , cjtht) ∈ {(−1, 0), (0, 1)} and
sgn(`∗t ) ∈ [cjtht , cjtht ]\{0} for t = 1, ..., T . In this case, we have gc(pi; r, λ) = (gl(pi; r, λ)′, gu(pi; r, λ)′)′
with
gl(pi; r, `∗)
M×1
=

r −R2
W˜ .Y˜
r − 11+κ
r − 1τ1R2W˜ .Y˜1
...
r − 1τpR2W˜ .Y˜p
r − bY˜1.W˜ bY˜2.W˜
σ−2
W˜
σY˜1,Y˜2
...
r − bY˜p−1.W˜ bY˜p.W˜
σ−2
W˜
σY˜p−1,Y˜p

and gu(pi; r, `∗)
M×1
=

1− r
1− r
1− r
...
1− r
∞
...
∞

where M ≡ 2 + p+ T (recall T ≡ 12p(p− 1)) and
R2
W˜ .Y˜
= bY˜ .W˜ bW˜ .Y˜ =
p∑
h=1
bYh.(W,X′)′,1bW.(Y ′,X′)′,h and R
2
W˜ .Y˜j
= bY˜j .W˜ bW˜ .Y˜j = bYj .(W,X′)′,1bW.(Yj ,X′)′,1.
In this case, the components of ∇pigc(pi; r, `∗)
2M×B
are given by
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1. For v = 1
∇pigc1(pi; r, `∗)
1×B
=
[ ∑p
h=1 ı
′
h
1×p
⊗
[
−bW.(Y ′,X′)′,h 0
1×k
] [
−bY˜ .W˜
1×p
0
1×k
]
0
]
2. for v = 2,
∇pigc2(pi; r, `∗)
1×B
= 0,
3. for v = 2 + j and j = 1, ..., p
∇pigcv(pi; r, `∗)
1×B
=
[
ı′j
1×p
⊗
[
− 1τj bW˜ .Y˜j 01×k
]
0
1×(p+k)
ı′j
1×p
⊗
[
− 1τj bY˜j .W˜ 01×k
]
0
]
4. for v = 2 + p+ t and t = 1, ...., T ,
∇pigcv(pi; r, `∗)
1×B
=
[
∇pi1glv(pi; r, `∗)
1×p(k+1)
0 ∇pi7glv(pi; r, `∗)
1× 1
2
p(p−1)
]
,
where
∇pi1glv(pi; r, `∗)
1×p(k+1)
= ∇pi1(r −
bY˜jt .W˜
bY˜ht .W˜
σ−2
W˜
σY˜jt ,Y˜ht
)
= (σ−2
W˜
σY˜jt ,Y˜ht
)−1{ ı′jt
1×p
⊗
[
−bY˜ht .W˜ 01×k
]
+ ı′ht
1×p
⊗
[
−bY˜jt .W˜ 01×k
]
}
and
∇pi7glv(pi; r, `∗)
1× 1
2
p(p−1)
= ∇pi7(r −
bY˜jt .W˜
bY˜ht .W˜
σ−2
W˜
σY˜jt ,Y˜ht
) = ı′t
1×T
⊗
bY˜jt .W˜
bY˜ht .W˜
(σ−2
W˜
σY˜jt ,Y˜ht
)2
,
5. for v = 2 + p+ T + 1, ..., 2(2 + p+ T )
∇pigcv(pi; r, `∗)
1×B
= 0
Above, we set λ = `∗ where (cjtht , cjtht) ∈ {(−1, 0), (0, 1)} and sgn(`∗t ) ∈ [cjtht , cjtht ]\{0}
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for t = 1, ..., T ≡ 12p(p − 1). More generally, we consider any arbitrary ` ∈ Λ1−α22 and
define the matrix P
2M×2M
(M ≡ 2 + p+T ) to operationalize how the nuisance parameters λ
determines whether Rcjh contains an upper or lower bound, if at all, according to Corollary
2.3.2. In particular, for λ = `, we let
gc(pi; r, `)
2M×1
= Pgc(pi; r, `∗)
2M×1
and ∇pigc(pi; r, `)
2M×B
= P∇pigc(pi; r, `∗)
2M×B
where we set the vth row Pv of P as follows, for t = 1, ...,
1
2p(p− 1):
1. Set P = I
2M×2M
.
2. If (cjtht , cjtht) = (0, 0) and `t 6= 0 then change PM+(2+p+t) to −ı2+p+t.
3. If (cjtht , cjtht) ∈ {(−1, 0), (0, 1)} and sgn(`t) 6∈ [cjtht , cjtht ] then change (a) P2+p+t to
ıM+(2+p+t) and (b) PM+(2+p+t) to −ı2+p+t.
4. If (cjtht , cjtht) ∈ {(−1, 0), (0, 1)} and sgn(`t) ∈ [cjtht , cjtht ]\{0} then keep (a) P2+p+t
as ı2+p+t and (b) PM+(2+p+t) as ıM+(2+p+t).
5. Otherwise, change P2+p+t to ıM+(2+p+t).
Moreover, for the jth single equation bounds, P mutes the irrelevant bounds as follows:
1. Change P1 to ıM+(2+p+1)
2. For h = 1, ..., p, if h 6= j then change P2+h to ıM+(2+p+h)
3. For t = 1, ..., 12p(p− 1), change P2+p+t to ıM+(2+p+t).
δj, βjl, and Γjh
We have that δj is given by:
δj = Dj(pi; r) ≡ 1
r
bY˜j .W˜ for j = 1, ..., p,
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where we let pi enter explicitly in Dj . It follows that
∇piDj(pi; r)
1×B
=
[
ı′j
1×p
⊗
[
1
r 01×k
]
0
]
.
Similarly, βjl is given by:
βjl = Bjl(pi; r) ≡ bYj .X,l − bW.X,l
1
r
bY˜j .W˜ for j = 1, ..., p and l = 1, ..., k
It follows that
∇piBjl(r)
1×B
=
[
ı′j
1×p
⊗
[
−1r bW.X,l 01×k
]
0
1×(p+k)
0
1×p(k+1)
ı′j
1×p
⊗ ı′l
1×k
− ı′l
1×k
⊗ 1r bY˜j .W˜ 01×p 01× 1
2
p(p−1)
]
.
Last, Γjh is given by:
Γjh = Gjh(pi; r) ≡ σ−2W˜ σY˜j ,Y˜h − bY˜j .W˜
1
r
bY˜h.W˜ for j ≤ h and j, h = 1, ..., p.
Letting ı′(j,h)
1× 1
2
p(p+1)
take the value 1 at the entry (j, h) corresponding to σ−2
W˜
σY˜j ,Y˜h , we have
∇piGjh(pi; r)
1×B
=
[
ı′j
1×p
⊗
[
−1r bY˜h.W˜ 01×k
]
+ ı′h
1×p
⊗
[
−1r bY˜j .W˜ 01×k
]
0 ı′(j,h)
1× 1
2
p(p+1)
]
.
Joint Confidence Regions We sometimes construct a confidence region for the vector of
parameters β·l = (β1l, β2l, β3l)′ associated with the variable Xl in the system of Y equations.
For a given (κ, τ, c) and α1, α21 and α22, we construct a 1− α2 confidence region CRρ1−α2
for ρ. For each r ∈ CRρ1−α2 , the delta method gives the asymptotic distribution of the
plug-in estimator Bˆ·1(pi; r) for
B·1(pi; r) = bY.X,l − bW.X,l 1
r
bY˜ .W˜ .
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Specifically, we have that
√
n(B·1(pˆi; r)−B·1(pi; r)) d→N(0,ΣB·1(r)) where ΣB·1(r) = ∇piB·1(pi; r)Σ∇piB·1(pi; r)′
and ∇piB·1(pi; r)
p×B
stacks the expressions ∇piBjl(pi; r)
1×B
for j = 1, ..., p derived above. We
construct a 1 − α1 confidence region CRB·11−α1(r) for B·1(pi; r), by inverting the following
Wald statistic which has an asymptotic χ2p distribution:
CRB·11−α1(r) = {b·1 ∈ B∗·1 :
√
n(B·1(pˆi; r)− b·1)′Σ−1B·1(r)
√
n(B·1(pˆi; r)− b·1) ≤ c1−α1}
where c1−α1 denotes the 1−α1 quantile of χ2p and where we search over an initial neighbor-
hood B∗·1. For instance, we let B∗·1 be the cube that contains each of the p unidimensional
95% confidence regions:
B∗·1 = {(b11, ..., bp1) : Bj1(pˆi; r)−3se(Bj1(pˆi; r)) ≤ bj1 ≤ Bj1(pˆi; r)+3se(Bj1(pˆi; r)) for j = 1, ..., p}.
Last, we construct the confidence region CRβ·11−α1−α2 for β·1 by forming the union:
CRβ·11−α1−α2 =
⋃
r∈CRρ1−α2
CRB·11−α1(r)
and use CRβ·11−α1−α2 to form decisions regarding a null hypothesis for (β11, ..., βp1).
B.3. Extension of the Framework to Panel Data
Consider the unbalanced panel equations with firm fixed effects γi:
Yit
1×p
′ = γi
1×p
′ +X ′it
1×k
β
k×p
+ Uit
1×1
δ
1×p
+ ηit
1×p
′ and Wit
1×1
= Uit
1×1
+ εit
1×1
for i = 1, ..., n and t ∈ Si.
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We assume that the data is missing at random from certain time periods. Specifically, we let
T denote5 the total number of time periods in the panel and Si, for i = 1, ..., n, denote the
subset of T in which the data on firm i are observed, with Ti denoting the cardinality of Si.
When time fixed effects are included, Xit contains Ti − 1 indicator variables corresponding
to the years in Si. We let E(ηit) = µη and E(εit) = µε for i = 1, .., n and t ∈ Si and we
consider the case where n is large relative to T1, ..., Tn.
Letting A¯i ≡ 1Ti
∑
t∈Si
Ait and A¨it ≡ Ait − A¯i, the fixed effect γi drops out from the Y¨it
equation:
Y¨ ′it
1×p
= X¨ ′it
1×k
β
k×p
+ U¨it
1×1
δ
1×p
+ η¨′it
1×p
and W¨it
1×1
= U¨it
1×1
+ ε¨it
1×1
.
Letting A¨i
Ti×k
≡ [A¨′i1, ..., A¨′iTi ]′, we obtain the panel analogue of assumption A1:
Y¨i
Ti×p
= X¨i
Ti×k
β
k×p
+ U¨i
Ti×1
δ
1×p
+ η¨i
Ti×p
and W¨i
Ti×1
= U¨i
Ti×1
+ ε¨i
Ti×1
for i = 1, ..., n.
Suppose that A2-A3 hold for this equation. Specifically, let
Cov[ηit, (Xis, Uis)] = 0 and Cov[εit, (Xis, Uis, ηis)] = 0 for i = 1, ..., n and t, s ∈ Si.
This imposes “strict exogeneity” across time periods, as is common when applying a within
transformation. Given that A¨it ≡ Ait − 1Ti
∑
t∈Si
Ait, we obtain
Cov[η¨it, (X¨is, U¨is)] = 0 and Cov[ε¨it, (X¨is, U¨is, η¨is)] = 0 for i = 1, ..., n and t, s ∈ Si.
Let the binary indicator Iit, i = 1, ..., n and t = 1, ..., T denote whether the observation
(Yit, Xit,Wit) is missing (at random). Let Ii
T×1
stack Iit for t = 1, ..., T . Let
σA¨i,B¨i ≡ E( A¨′i
a×Ti
B¨i
Ti×b
) = E(
∑
t∈Si
A¨it
a×1
B¨′it
1×b
) =
T∑
t=1
E(IitA¨it
a×1
B¨′it
1×b
) =
T∑
t=1
E(Iit)E(A¨it
a×1
B¨′it
1×b
).
5The number of time periods T should not be confused with the dimension of the nuisance parameter
λ
2T×1
in Online Appendix B.
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In particular, we have σX¨i,η¨i = 0 and σX¨i,ε¨i = 0. Further, let
bA¨i.B¨i ≡ σ−2B¨i σB¨i,A¨i and 
′
A¨it.B¨it
≡ A¨′it − B¨′itbA¨i.B¨i .
Then, provided σ2
X¨i
is nonsingular,
β = bY¨i.X¨i − bW¨i.X¨iδ.
Let A˜it ≡ A¨it.X¨it and A˜i = [A˜′i1, ..., A˜′iTi ]′. By A1-A3, we obtain
Y˜i
Ti×p
= U˜i
Ti×1
δ
1×p
+ η˜i
Ti×p
and W˜i
Ti×1
= U˜i
Ti×1
+ ε˜i
Ti×1
.
In particular, we have
σ2
W˜i
= σ2
U˜i
+ σ2ε˜i , σW˜i,Y˜i = σW˜i,U˜iδ = σ
2
U˜i
δ, and σ2
Y˜i
= δ′σ2
U˜i
δ + σ2η˜i .
Provided σ2
W˜i
is nonsingular, we have
bW˜i.Y˜i = σ
−2
W˜i
σW˜i,Y˜i = ρδ and σ
−2
W˜i
σ2
Y˜i
= δ′ρδ + σ−2
W˜i
σ2η˜i ,
where
ρ = σ−2
W˜i
σ2
U˜i
= E(
∑
t∈Si
W˜itW˜
′
it)
−1E(
∑
t∈Si
U˜itU˜
′
it).
Given ρ 6= 0, we obtain the representation from Theorem 3.1 and we can apply the re-
sults of the paper to the transformed variables. For inference, we use the robust stan-
dard errors that are clustered at the firm level. For example, we estimate bA¨i.B¨i and
A¨i.B¨i
Ti×a
= (′
A¨i1.B¨i1
, ..., ′
A¨iTi .B¨iTi
)′ using their plug in sample analogues
bˆA¨i.B¨i ≡ (
1
n
n∑
i=1
B¨′i
b×Ti
B¨i
Ti×b
)−1(
1
n
n∑
i=1
B¨′i
b×Ti
A¨i
Ti×a
) and ˆ′
A¨it.B¨it
1×a
= A¨′it − B¨′itbˆA¨i.B¨i
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and estimate the asymptotic variance of
√
n(bˆA¨i.B¨i − bA¨i.B¨i) by
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
B¨′i
b×Ti
B¨i
Ti×b
)−1(
1
n
n∑
i=1
B¨′i
k×Ti
ˆA¨i.B¨i
Ti×p
ˆ′
A¨i.B¨i
p×Ti
B¨′i
Ti×k
)(
1
n
n∑
i=1
B¨′i
b×Ti
B¨i
Ti×b
)−1
Note that the interpretation of A4-A6 applies to the stacked and within-transformed vari-
ables. In particular, A4 assumes that
σ2ε˜i = E(
∑
t∈Si
ε˜2it) =
T∑
t=1
E(Iit)E(ε˜
2
it) ≤ κσ2U˜i = κE(
∑
t∈Si
U˜2it) = κ
T∑
t=1
E(Iit)E(U˜
2
it).
For this to hold, it suffices that E(ε˜2it) ≤ κE(U˜2it) for t = 1, ..., T . A5 assumes that
R2
Y˜ji.U˜i
= 1−
σ2η˜ji
σ2
Y˜ji
= 1− E(
∑
t∈Si η˜
2
jit)
E(
∑
t∈Si Y˜
2
jit)
= 1−
∑T
t=1E(Iit)E(η˜
2
jit)∑T
t=1E(Iit)E(Y˜
2
jit)
≤ τj ,
and it suffices for this that R2
Y˜jit.U˜it
= 1− σ
2
η˜jit
σ2
Y˜jit
≤ τj for t = 1, ..., T . And A6 assumes that
cjh ≤ rη˜ji,η˜hi =
E(
∑
t∈Si η˜jitη˜hit)
E(
∑
t∈Si η˜
2
jit)
1
2E(
∑
t∈Si η˜
2
hit)
1
2
=
∑T
t=1E(Iit)E(η˜jitη˜hit)
[
∑T
t=1E(Iit)E(η˜
2
jit)]
1
2 [
∑T
t=1E(Iit)E(η˜
2
hit)]
1
2
≤ cjh,
which holds if one imposes the same sign restriction on Cov(η˜jit, η˜hit) for t = 1, ..., T.
The panel analysis without fixed effects proceeds similarly but omits the within transfor-
mation (i.e. it sets γi = γ for i = 1, ..., n and A¨it = Ait − 1n 1Ti
n∑
i=1
∑
t∈Si
Ait).
B.4. Mathematical Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.3.1: By A2-A3, Cov[(η
′, ε)′, X] = 0. Since V ar(X) is nonsingular,
A1 gives
β = bY.X − bW.Xδ.
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A2-A3 also give σU˜ ,ε = 0 and σU˜ ,η = σε,η = 0. Using ε˜ = ε−E(ε) and η˜ = η−E(η) together
with Y˜ ′ = U˜δ + η˜′ and W˜ = U˜ + ε˜, we have
σ2
W˜
= σ2
U˜
+ σ2ε , σW˜ ,Y˜ = σW˜ ,U˜δ = σ
2
U˜
δ, and σ2
Y˜
= δ′σ2
U˜
δ + σ2η.
Since V ar[(X ′, U)′] is nonsingular, σ2
U˜
6= 0. Thus, σ2
W˜
6= 0 and
bY˜ .W˜ ≡ σ−2W˜ σW˜ ,Y˜ = ρδ and σ
−2
W˜
σ2
Y˜
= δ′ρδ + Γ.
Since ρ 6= 0, we obtain
δ = D(ρ) ≡ 1
ρ
bY˜ .W˜
β = B(ρ) ≡ bY.X − bW.XD(ρ) = bY.X − bW.X 1
ρ
bY˜ .W˜ , and
Γ = G(ρ) ≡ σ−2
W˜
σ2
Y˜
−D(ρ)′ρD(ρ) = σ−2
W˜
σ2
Y˜
− b′
Y˜ .W˜
1
ρ
bY˜ .W˜ .
Lemma B.4.1 Under the conditions of Theorem 2.3.1, R2
Y˜j .W˜
≤ R2
Y˜j .U˜
.
Proof of Lemma B.4.1: If σ2
Y˜j
= 0, set R2
Y˜j .W˜
= R2
Y˜j .U˜
= 0. If 0 < σ2
Y˜j
, we have
R2
Y˜j .W˜
=
σ2
W˜
σ2
Y˜j
b2
Y˜j .W˜
=
σ2
W˜
σ2
Y˜j
(δjρ)
2 and
R2
Y˜j .U˜
= 1− σ
2
ηj
σ2
Y˜j
=
1
σ2
Y˜j
(σ2
Y˜j
− σ2ηj ) =
1
σ2
Y˜j
δ2jσ
2
U˜
=
σ2
W˜
σ2
Y˜j
δ2j ρ
It follows that
R2
Y˜j .U˜
−R2
Y˜j .W˜
=
σ2
W˜
σ2
Y˜j
(δ2j ρ− δ2j ρ2) =
σ2
W˜
σ2
Y˜
ρ(1− ρ)δ2j ≥ 0.
Proof of Corollary 2.3.2: The identification set J k,τ,c obtains from A1-A6 and the
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(V ar[(Y˜ ′, W˜ )′]) moments given by (in)equalities (2.3,2.5,2.6,2.7), using the expressions in
Theorem 2.3.1. To show that J k,τ,c is sharp, let d = D(r), b = B(r), and g = G(r). We
show that for each (r, d, b, g) ∈ J k,τ,c there exist random variables (U∗, η∗, ε∗) such that
Y ′ = X ′b + U∗d + η∗ and W = U∗ + ε∗ that satisfy A2-A6. Specifically, (X,U∗, ε∗, η∗)
satisfy A2-A3, Cov[η
∗, (X ′, U∗)′] = 0, Cov[ε∗, (η∗, X ′, U∗)′] = 0. Further,
σ2
U˜∗
σ2
W˜
= r and thus
A4 holds, σ
2
ε∗ ≤ κσ2U˜∗ . Last, G(r) = σ
−2
W˜
σ2η˜∗ and therefore A5 holds since, when σ
2
Y˜j
6= 0,
1−
σ2η∗j
σ2
Y˜j
=
σ2
W˜
σ2
Y˜j
(
σ2
Y˜j
σ2
W˜
−Gjj(r)) ≤
σ2
W˜
σ2
Y˜j
[
σ2
Y˜j
σ2
W˜
−
σ2
Y˜j
σ2
W˜
(1− τj)] = τj ,
and A6 holds since cjh ≤ sgn(Gjh(r)) ≤ cjh.
To construct these variables we proceed similarly to Chalak and Kim (2018, proof of corol-
lary 3.2). In particular, we let V be any random variable such that V˜ ≡ V.X is nondegen-
erate and satisfies
σW˜ .V˜ =
√
rσV˜ σW˜ and σY˜ .V˜ =
1√
r
σV˜ σW˜
σY˜ .W˜
σ2
W˜
.
Note that these covariance restrictions are coherent. Specifically,
V ar(V˜ , W˜ , Y˜ ′) =

σ2
V˜
√
rσV˜ σW˜
σV˜ σW˜√
r
σW˜ .Y˜
σ2
W˜√
rσV˜ σW˜ σ
2
W˜
σW˜ .Y˜
σV˜ σW˜√
r
σY˜ .W˜
σ2
W˜
σY˜ ,W˜ σ
2
Y˜

is positive semi-definite because 0 < σ2
V˜
and its Schur complement
0  σ2
(W˜ ,Y˜ ′)′ − σ(W˜ ,Y˜ ′)′,V˜ σ−2V˜ σV˜ ,(W˜ ,Y˜ ′)′ =
 (1− r)σ2W˜ 0
0 σ2
W˜
G(r)

is positive semi-definite since it is block diagonal with 0 ≤ (1− r)σ2
W˜
and 0  G(r).
For instance, to construct V , set σV˜ to some value (e.g. σV˜ = 1) and let ϑ be any ran-
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dom variable that is uncorrelated with (X ′,W, Y )′ (e.g. a residual from a regression on
(X ′,W, Y ′)). When σ2
(W˜ ,Y˜ ′)′ is nonsingular, one can use the above restrictions on σW˜ .V˜ and
σY˜ .V˜ to construct bV˜ .(W˜ ,Y˜ ′)′ and the scalar
κ = { 1
σ2ϑ
[σ2
V˜
− b′
V˜ .(W˜ ,Y˜ ′)′σ
2
(W˜ ,Y˜ ′)bV˜ .(W˜ ,Y˜ ′)′ ]}
1
2
(κ is set such that the variance of the generated V˜ is σ2
V˜
) in order to generate
V˜ = (W˜ , Y˜ )bV˜ .(W˜ ,Y˜ ′)′ + κϑ.
If σ2
(W˜ ,Y˜ )′ is singular, one can generate V˜ by omitting the redundant Y˜ components from
the above regression construction. Last, V = X ′bV.X+ V˜ +E[V −X ′bV.X ] obtains by setting
bV.X and E(V ) to some value (e.g. zero).
Then it suffices to construct U∗, ε∗, and η∗ as follows
W ≡ (X ′, V )bW.(X′,V )′ + {W.(X′,V )′ + E[W − (X ′, V )bW.(X′,V )′} ≡ U∗ + ε∗,
and, if r 6= 1,
Y ≡ (X ′, V, ε∗)bY.(X′,V,ε∗)′+{Y.(X′,V,ε∗)′+E[Y−(X ′, V, ε∗)bY.(X′,V,ε∗)′ ]} ≡ (X ′, V, ε∗)bY.(X′,V,ε∗)′+η∗
whereas if r = 1 then rW˜ ,V˜ = 1 and W.(X′,V )′ = W˜ .V˜ = 0 and
Y = (X ′, V )bY.(X′,V )′ + {Y.(X′,V )′ + E[Y − (X ′, V )bY.(X′,V )′ ]} ≡ (X ′, V )bY.(X′,V )′ + η∗.
In particular, (X,U∗, ε∗, η∗) satisfy A2-A3 since by construction Cov[η∗, (X ′, U∗)′] = 0 and
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Cov[ε∗, (η∗, X ′, U∗)′] = 0. To verify that A1 holds, note that if r 6= 1,
Y = V bY˜ .V˜ +X
′(bY.X − bV.XbY˜ .V˜ ) + ε∗bY.ε∗ + {Y.(X′,V,ε∗)′ + E[Y − (X ′, V, ε∗)bY.(X′,V,ε∗)′ ]}
= V bW˜ .V˜ d+X
′(bW.X − bV.XbW˜ .V˜ )d+X ′(bY.X − bW.Xd) + ε∗bY.ε∗ + η∗
= (X ′, V )bW.(X′,V )′d+X ′b+ η∗
≡ U∗d+X ′b+ η∗
where the first equality uses Cov[ε∗, (X ′, V )′] = 0 and partitioned regression, the second
equality makes use of
bY˜ .V˜ = σ
−2
W˜
σY˜ .V˜ = σ
−2
W˜
1√
r
σW˜σV˜
σY˜ .W˜
σ2
W˜
= σ−2
W˜
1
r
σW˜ .V˜ bY˜ .W˜ = bW˜ .V˜ d,
and the third equality uses partitioned regression, b = bY.X − bW.Xd, and
bY.ε∗ = bY˜ .W.(X′,V )′
=
σY˜ ,W.(X′,V )′
σ2W.(X′,V )′
=
1
σ2W˜ .V˜
Cov(Y˜ , W˜ − V˜ bW˜ .V˜ )
=
1
(1− r)σ2
W˜
[σY˜ .W˜ −
( 1√
r
σW˜σV˜
σY˜ .W˜
σ2
W˜
)
√
rσV˜ σW˜
σ2
V˜
] = 0.
If r = 1, a similar calculation gives,
Y = (X ′, V )bY.(X′,V )′ + {Y.(X′,V )′ + E[Y − (X ′, V )bY.(X′,V )′ ]}
= (X ′, V )bW.(X′,V )′d+X ′b+ η∗ ≡ U∗d+X ′b+ η∗.
Last, to verify that A4-A6 hold, it suffices to verify that
σ2
U˜∗
σ2
W˜
=
V ar(V˜ bW˜ .V˜ )
σ2
W˜
=
σ2
W˜ .V˜
σ2
V˜
σ2
W˜
= r, and
G(r) = σ−2
W˜
σ2
Y˜
− b′
Y˜ .W˜
1
r
bY˜ .W˜ = σ
−2
W˜
(d′σ2
U˜∗d+ σ
2
η˜∗)− b′Y˜ .W˜
1
r
bY˜ .W˜ = σ
−2
W˜
σ2η˜∗ .
Next, we derive the identification region Rk,τ,c for ρ. First, we show that R2
W˜ .Y˜
≤ ρ ≤ 1.
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If σY˜ ,W˜ = 0 then R
2
W˜ .Y˜
= 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Suppose that σY˜ ,W˜ 6= 0. Since 0 < ρ and 0  Γ then
for any vector x
p×1
, we have
0 ≤ ρx′σ−2
W˜
σ2
Y˜
x− x′b′
Y˜ .W˜
bY˜ .W˜x.
Suppose that σ2
Y˜
is positive definite so that 0 < σW˜ ,Y˜ σ
−2
Y˜
σY˜ ,W˜ (this is without loss of
generality since we can drop the redundant Y˜ components otherwise). In particular, for
x = σ−2
Y˜
σY˜ ,W˜ , we obtain
R2
W˜ .Y˜
= σ−2
W˜
σW˜ ,Y˜ σ
−2
Y˜
σY˜ ,W˜ =
(σW˜ ,Y˜ σ
−2
Y˜
)σY˜ ,W˜σ
−2
W˜
σ−2
W˜
σW˜ ,Y˜ (σ
−2
Y˜
σY˜ ,W˜ )
(σW˜ ,Y˜ σ
−2
Y˜
)σ−2
W˜
σ2
Y˜
(σ−2
Y˜
σY˜ ,W˜ )
≤ ρ ≤ 1.
Second, by A4, we have 1 − ρ = σ
2
ε
σ2
W˜
≤ κ σ
2
U˜
σ2
W˜
= κρ and thus ρ ∈ [ 11+κ , 1]. Third, by A5,
we have that for j = 1, ..., p, R2
Y˜j .U˜
= (1 − σ
2
ηj
σ2
Y˜j
) ≤ τj (recall that if σ2Y˜j = 0 then we set
R2
Y˜j .U˜
= R2
W˜ .Y˜j
= 0). Multiplying by
σ2
Y˜j
σ2
W˜
and substituting for Γjj we obtain
b′
Y˜j .W˜
1
ρ
bY˜j .W˜ =
σ2
Y˜j
σ2
W˜
− (σ−2
W˜
σ2
Y˜j
− b′
Y˜j .W˜
1
ρ
bY˜j .W˜ ) ≤ τj
σ2
Y˜j
σ2
W˜
and thus 1τjR
2
W˜ .Y˜j
= 1τj b
2
Y˜j .W˜
σ2
W˜
σ2
Y˜j
≤ ρ ≤ 1. Last, the set Rcjh obtains since 0 < ρ and
Γjh = Gjh(ρ) = σ
−2
W˜
σY˜j ,Y˜h − bY˜j .W˜ 1ρbY˜h.W˜ so that
Gjh(ρ) ≤ 0 if and only if

bY˜j .W˜
bY˜h.W˜
σ−2
W˜
σY˜j .Y˜h
≤ ρ when σ−2
W˜
σY˜j .Y˜h < 0
0 ≤ bY˜j .W˜ bY˜h.W˜ when σ
−2
W˜
σY˜j .Y˜h = 0
ρ ≤ bY˜j .W˜ bY˜h.W˜
σ−2
W˜
σY˜j .Y˜h
when 0 < σ−2
W˜
σY˜j .Y˜h
.
Combining the results, we have ρ ∈ Rk,τ,c = [R2
W˜ .Y˜
, 1]∩ [ 11+κ , 1]∩pj=1 [ 1τjR2W˜ .Y˜j , 1]
p
∩
j,h=1
j<h
Rcjh.
To show that Rk,τ,c is sharp, it suffices to show that every r ∈ Rk,τ,c corresponds to a point
(r, d, b, g) ∈ J k,τ,c. First, we show that 0  G(r). If R2
W˜ .Y˜
= 0 then G(r) = σ−2
W˜
σ2
Y˜
 0.
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Otherwise, note that
G(1) = σ−2
W˜
σ2
Y˜
− b′
Y˜ .W˜
bY˜ .W˜ = σ
−2
W˜
[σ2
Y˜
− σY˜ ,W˜σ−2W˜ σW˜ ,Y˜ ] = σ
−2
W˜
E(Y˜ .W˜ 
′
Y˜ .W˜
)  0.
Further, when R2
W˜ .Y˜
6= 0, 0  G(R2
W˜ .Y˜
). Specifically, 0 < σ4
W˜
R2
W˜ .Y˜
and
σ4
W˜
R2
W˜ .Y˜
G(R2
W˜ .Y˜
) = (R2
W˜ .Y˜
σ2
W˜
)σ2
Y˜
− σY˜ ,W˜σW˜ ,Y˜ = V ar(b′W˜ .Y˜ Y˜ )σ2Y˜ − σY˜ ,W˜σW˜ ,Y˜  0
since and for any vector x
p×1
, applying the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality gives
x′V ar(b′
W˜ .Y˜
Y˜ )σ2
Y˜
x− x′σY˜ ,W˜σW˜ ,Y˜ x
= V ar(b′
W˜ .Y˜
Y˜ )V ar(x′Y˜ )− [Cov(x′Y˜ , W˜ )]2
= V ar(b′
W˜ .Y˜
Y˜ )V ar(x′Y˜ )− [Cov(x′Y˜ , b′
W˜ .Y˜
Y˜ )]2 ≥ 0
where we make use of W˜ ′ = Y˜ ′bW˜ .Y˜ + 
′
W˜ .Y˜
and Cov(Y˜ , W˜ .Y˜ ) = 0 in the last equality.
Then for any r ∈ Rk,τ,c ⊆ [R2
W˜ .Y˜
, 1] there exists 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 such that 1r = λ+ (1− λ) 1R2
W˜ .Y˜
and it follows that
0  G(r) = λG(1) + (1− λ)G(R2
W˜ .Y˜
).
Clearly, 11+κ ≤ r ≤ 1. Further, for j = 1, ..., p, if σ2Y˜j = 0 then we set
1
τj
R2
W˜ .Y˜j
= 0 ≤ r
whereas if σ2
Y˜j
6= 0 then 1τj b2Y˜j .W˜
σ2
W˜
σ2
Y˜j
= 1τjR
2
W˜ .Y˜j
≤ r implies that
σ2
Y˜j
σ2
W˜
(1−τj) ≤
σ2
Y˜j
σ2
W˜
−b2
Y˜j .W˜
1
r =
Gjj(r). Last, from the expression for Gjh(r), we have that cjh ≤ sgn(Gjh(r)) ≤ cjh for every
r ∈ Rk,τ,c and j, h = 1, ..., p with j < h.
The sharp bounds Dk,τ , Bk,τ , and Gk,τ for δ, β, and Γ follow from the mappings D(·), B(·),
and G(·) in Theorem 2.3.1.
Proof of Theorem 2.5.1: First, for random column vectors A and B, we collect the
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regression intercept and slope estimands as follows
A′ = [E(A)′ − E(B)′bA.B] +B′bA.B + ′A.B ≡ (1, B′)b∗A.B + ′A.B.
Given observations {Ai, Bi}ni=1, denote the linear regression intercept (bˆ0A.B) and slope (bˆA.B)
estimators and the sample residual (ˆA.B,i) by:
b˜A.B = (bˆ
0
A.B, bˆ
′
A.B)
′ ≡ ( 1
n
n∑
i=1
(1, B′i)
′(1, B′i))
−1(
1
n
n∑
i=1
(1, B′i)
′A′i) and ˆ
′
A.B,i ≡ A′i−(1, B′i)b˜A.B.
Further, we collect into pi∗ the following estimands
pi∗ ≡ [vec(b∗Y.(W,X′)′)′, b∗′W.(Y,X′)′ , b∗′W.(Y1,X′)′ , ..., b∗′W.(Yp,X′)′ , vec(b∗Y.X)′, b∗′W.X , σ−2W˜ vec(σ
2
Y˜
)′],
and into p˜i the corresponding estimators:
p˜i ≡ [vec(b˜Y.(W,X′)′)′, b˜′W.(Y,X′)′ , b˜′W.(Y1,X′)′ , ..., b˜′W.(Yp,X′)′ , vec(b˜Y.X)′, b˜′W.X , σˆ−2W˜ vec(σˆ
2
Y˜
)′].
Last, let µˆ2A =
1
n
∑n
i=1AiA
′
i,
Qˆ ≡ diag{ I
p×p⊗µˆ
2
(1,W,X′)′ , µˆ
2
(1,Y,X′)′ , µˆ
2
(1,Y1,X′)′ , ..., µˆ
2
(1,Yp,X′)′ , Ip×p⊗µˆ
2
(1,X′)′ , µˆ
2
(1,X′)′ , I1
2
p(p+1)× 1
2
p(p+1)
⊗σˆ2
W˜
}.
and
L ≡ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[vec((1,Wi, X
′
i)
′Y.(W,X′)′,i)′, (1, Yi, X ′i)W.(Y,X′)′,i,
(1, Y1i, X
′
i)W.(Y1,X′)′,i, ..., (1, Ypi, X
′
i)W.(Yp,X′)′,i, vec((1, X
′
i)
′Y.X,i)′, (1, X ′i)
′W.X,i, vec(Y.X,i′Y.X,i−σ2Y˜ )′]′.
Recall that Q is finite (by A1(i)) and nonsingular. For a symmetric matrix C and a vector
D, let C1 denote the submatrix that removes the last
1
2p(p+ 1) row and column of C and
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let D1 be the subvector that removes the last
1
2p(p+ 1) row of D. Then
√
n(p˜i1 − pi∗1) = Qˆ−11
√
nL1 = (Qˆ
−1
1 −Q−11 )
√
nL1 +Q
−1
1
√
nL1.
Since (i) gives Qˆ−11 −Q−11 = op(1) and (ii) gives
√
nL1
d→N(0,Ξ1), we obtain that
√
n(p˜i1−
pi∗1) = Q
−1
1
√
nL1+op(1)
d→N(0,Σ∗1). Moreover, it follows from µˆ2(1,X′)′
p→ µ2(1,X′)′ ,
√
n(b˜Yj .X−
b∗Yj .X) = Op(1), and
1
n
∑n
i=1Yj .X,i(1, X
′
i)
′ = E[Yj .X(1, X ′)′] + op(1) = op(1) for j = 1, ..., p
that for any j, h = 1, ..., p
n−
1
2
∑n
i=1ˆYj .X,iˆYh.X,i
= n−
1
2
∑n
i=1(Yj .X,i − (1, X ′i)(b˜Yj .X − b∗Yj .X))(Yh.X,i − (1, X ′i)(b˜Yh.X − b∗Yh.X))
= n−
1
2
∑n
i=1Yj .X,iYh.X,i − [
1
n
∑n
i=1Yj .X,i(1, X
′
i)]
√
n(b˜Yh.X − b∗Yh.X)
− [ 1
n
∑n
i=1Yh.X,i(1, X
′
i)]
√
n(b˜Yj .X − b∗Yj .X) + (b˜Yh.X − b∗Yh.X)′µˆ2(1,X′)′
√
n(b˜Yj .X − b∗Yj .X)
= n−
1
2
∑n
i=1Yj .X,iYh.X,i + op(1).
Similarly, by (i), we have that
1
n
∑n
i=1ˆYj .X,iˆYh.X,i = E(Yj .XYh.X)+op(1) = σY˜j ,Y˜h+op(1) and
1
n
∑n
i=1ˆ
2
W.X,i = σ
2
W˜
+op(1).
Thus, since n−1/2
∑n
i=1 Yj .X,iYh.X,i is Op(1) by (ii), we have that for j, h = 1, ..., p
√
n
1
n
∑n
i=1ˆYj .X,iˆYh.X,i
1
n
∑n
i=1ˆ
2
W.X,i
= (σ2
W˜
)−1n−
1
2
∑n
i=1Yj .X,iYh.X,i + op(1).
Together with
√
n(p˜i1 − pi∗1) = Q−11
√
nL1 + op(1), we obtain by (i) and (ii) that
√
n(p˜i − pi∗) = Q−1√nL+ op(1) d→N(0,Σ∗)
and therefore that the subvector
√
n(pˆi − pi) d→N(0,Σ).
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Proof of Corollary B.1.1: The identification set J k,τ,c obtains from A1-A′6 and the
(V ar[(Y˜ , W˜ )′]) the moments given by (in)equalities (2.3,2.5,2.6,2.7), using the expressions
in Theorem 2.3.1. The sharpness proof in Corollary 2.3.2 implies that J k,τ,c is sharp.
Specifically, since G(r) = σ−2
W˜
σ2η˜∗ , we have that cjh ≤ rη˜∗j ,η˜∗h ≤ cjh.
To derive Rk,τ,c, for j, h = 1, ..., p and j < h, consider the restriction
cjh ≤ Γjh =
Gjh(ρ)
[Gjj(ρ)Ghh(ρ)]
1
2
=
σ−2
W˜
σY˜j ,Y˜h − bY˜j .W˜ 1ρbY˜h.W˜
(σ−2
W˜
σ2
Y˜j
− 1ρb2Y˜j .W˜ )
1
2 (σ−2
W˜
σ2
Y˜h
− 1ρb2Y˜h.W˜ )
1
2
≤ c¯jh.
If σ2
Y˜j
= 0 or σ2
Y˜h
= 0 then σ2ηj = 0 or σ
2
ηh
= 0 and cjh ≤ σηj ,ηh ≤ c¯jh is either incorrect
(if 0 6∈ [cjh, c¯jh]) or uninformative about ρ (if 0 ∈ [cjh, c¯jh]). Suppose that σ2Y˜j 6= 0 and
σ2
Y˜h
6= 0. Multiplying the numerator and denominator by 0 < ρσ2
W˜
σ−1
Y˜j
σ−1
Y˜h
gives
cjh ≤
ρrY˜j ,Y˜h − rW˜ ,Y˜jrW˜ ,Y˜h
(ρ−R2
W˜ .Y˜j
)
1
2 (ρ−R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)
1
2
≤ c¯jh.
The expression for Rcjh then follows from encoding the sign of rηj ,ηh via the function
Sjh(r) ≡ r × rY˜j ,Y˜h − rW˜ ,Y˜jrW˜ ,Y˜h
and the magnitude of rηj ,ηh (r
2
ηj ,ηh
≤ c2 or c2 ≤ r2ηj ,ηh) via the quadratic function
Mjh(r; c) ≡ (r × rY˜j ,Y˜h − rW˜ ,Y˜jrW˜ ,Y˜h)
2 − c2(r −R2
W˜ .Y˜j
)(r −R2
W˜ .Y˜h
).
By Corollary 2.3.2, we obtain that ρ ∈ Rk,τ,c = [R2
W˜ .Y˜
, 1]∩[ 11+κ , 1]∩pj=1[ 1τjR2W˜ .Y˜j , 1]
p
∩
j,h=1
j<h
Rcjh.
In addition, Rk,τ,c is sharp since every r ∈ Rk,τ,c corresponds to a point (r, d, b, g) ∈ J k,τ,c.
Specifically, if r ∈ Rk,τ,c then 11+κ ≤ r ≤ 1, 0  G(r), and R2Y˜j .U˜ ≤ τj for j = 1, ..., p by
Corollary 2.3.2. Further, from the sign and magnitude restrictions in Sjh(r) and Mjh(r; c),
we have that cjh ≤ Gjh(r)
[Gjj(r)Ghh(r)]
1
2
≤ c¯jh for every r ∈ Rk,τ,c ⊆ Rcjh and j, h = 1, ..., p with
j < h.
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Next, we examine the behavior of Sjh(r) and Mjh(r; c) when σ
2
Y˜j
σ2
Y˜h
6= 0. First, we have
that
0 ≤ Sjh(r)⇔

rW˜ ,Y˜j
rW˜ ,Y˜h
rY˜j ,Y˜h
≤ r when 0 < rY˜j ,Y˜h
rW˜ ,Y˜jrW˜ ,Y˜h ≤ 0 when rY˜j ,Y˜h = 0
r ≤ rW˜ ,Y˜j rW˜ ,Y˜hrY˜j ,Y˜h when rY˜j ,Y˜h < 0
.
Further, if R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
= 1 then
Mjh(r; c) = (1− c2)(r −R2W˜ .Y˜j )
2 ≥ 0.
Suppose instead that R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
6= 1. We obtain
Mjh(r; c) = r
2R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
+R2
W˜ .Y˜j
R2
W˜ .Y˜h
− 2r × rY˜j ,Y˜hrW˜ ,Y˜jrW˜ ,Y˜h
− c2r2 + c2r(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
+R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)− c2R2
W˜ .Y˜j
R2
W˜ .Y˜h
= r2(R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
− c2) + r[−2rY˜j ,Y˜hrW˜ ,Y˜jrW˜ ,Y˜h + c
2(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
+R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)] + (1− c2)R2
W˜ .Y˜j
R2
W˜ .Y˜h
= r2(R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
− c2) + r[R2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′
(1−R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
)− (1− c2)(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
+R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)]
+ (1− c2)R2
W˜ .Y˜j
R2
W˜ .Y˜h
,
where the last equality makes use of
R2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′
=
[
rW˜ ,Y˜j rW˜ ,Y˜h
] 1 rY˜j ,Y˜h
rY˜h,Y˜j 1

−1  rW˜ ,Y˜j
rW˜ ,Y˜h
 = R2W˜ ,Y˜j +R2W˜ ,Y˜h − 2rW˜ ,Y˜jrY˜j ,Y˜hrW˜ ,Y˜h
1−R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
.
If c2 = R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
then Mjh(·; c) is a linear function
Mjh(r; rY˜j ,Y˜h) = r[R
2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′
(1−R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
)− (1−R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
)(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
+R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)]
+ (1−R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
)R2
W˜ .Y˜j
R2
W˜ .Y˜h
= (1−R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
){r[R2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′
− (R2
W˜ .Y˜j
+R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)] +R2
W˜ .Y˜j
R2
W˜ .Y˜h
}
137
and
0 ≤Mjh(r; c)⇔
r ≤
−R2
W˜ .Y˜j
R2
W˜ .Y˜h
R2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)
′−(R2W˜ .Y˜j+R
2
W˜ .Y˜h
)
when c2 = R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
and R2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′
< R2
W˜ .Y˜j
+R2
W˜ .Y˜h
0 ≤ (1−R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
)R2
W˜ .Y˜j
R2
W˜ .Y˜h
when c2 = R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
and R2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′
= R2
W˜ .Y˜j
+R2
W˜ .Y˜h
−R2
W˜ .Y˜j
R2
W˜ .Y˜h
R2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)
′−(R2W˜ .Y˜j+R
2
W˜ .Y˜h
)
≤ r when c2 = R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
and R2
W˜ .Y˜j
+R2
W˜ .Y˜h
< R2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′
Otherwise, if c2 6= R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
, the discriminant of Mjh(·; c) is
∆jh(c) = [R
2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′
(1−R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
)− (1− c2)(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
+R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)]2 − 4(1− c2)(R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
− c2)R2
W˜ .Y˜j
R2
W˜ .Y˜h
= [R2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′
(1−R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
)− (1− c2)(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
+R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)]2
− (1− c2)4R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
R2
W˜ .Y˜j
R2
W˜ .Y˜h
+ 4c2(1− c2)R2
W˜ .Y˜j
R2
W˜ .Y˜h
= [R2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′
(1−R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
)− (1− c2)(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
+R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)]2
− (1− c2)[R2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′
(1−R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
)− (R2
W˜ .Y˜h
+R2
W˜ .Y˜j
)]2 + 4c2(1− c2)R2
W˜ .Y˜j
R2
W˜ .Y˜h
= c2R4
W˜ .(Y˜j .Y˜h)′
(1−R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
)2 − c2(1− c2)(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
+R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)2 + 4c2(1− c2)R2
W˜ .Y˜j
R2
W˜ .Y˜h
= c2{R4
W˜ .(Y˜j .Y˜h)′
(1−R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
)2 − (1− c2)[(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
+R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)2 − 4R2
W˜ .Y˜j
R2
W˜ .Y˜h
]}
= c2[R4
W˜ .(Y˜j .Y˜h)′
(1−R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
)2 − (1− c2)(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
−R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)2].
In particular, ∆jh(c) < 0 if and only if
0 < c2 < 1−
R4
W˜ .(Y˜j .Y˜h)′
(1−R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
)2
(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
−R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)2
.
Further, we have that 1−
R4
W˜ .(Y˜j .Y˜h)
′ (1−R2Y˜j .Y˜h )
2
(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
−R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)2
≤ R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
since if c2 = R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
then
∆jh(c) = [R
2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′
(1−R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
)− (1− c2)(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
+R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)]2 − 4(1− c2)(R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
− c2)R2
W˜ .Y˜j
R2
W˜ .Y˜h
= (1−R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
)2[R2
W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′
− (R2
W˜ .Y˜j
+R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)]2 ≥ 0
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and if R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
= 0 then
1−
R4
W˜ .(Y˜j .Y˜h)′
(1−R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
)2
(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
−R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)2
= 1−
(R2
W˜ ,Y˜j
+R2
W˜ ,Y˜h
)2
(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
−R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)2
≤ 0 = R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
.
It follows that if 0 < c2 < 1−
R4
W˜ .(Y˜j .Y˜h)
′ (1−R2Y˜j .Y˜h )
2
(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
−R2
W˜ .Y˜h
)2
then c2 < R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
and
0 ≤Mjh(r; c)⇔ −∞ < r <∞.
If c2 6= R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
and 0 ≤ ∆jh(c) then define
Fjh(c) ≡ −R2W˜ .(Y˜j ,Y˜h)′(1−R
2
Y˜j .Y˜h
) + (1− c2)(R2
W˜ .Y˜j
+R2
W˜ .Y˜h
),
so that Mjh(ρ; c) has the two roots
ρ−jh(c) ≡
Fjh(c)−∆jh(c) 12
2(R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
− c2) and ρ
+
jh(c) ≡
Fjh(c) + ∆jh(c)
1
2
2(R2
Y˜j .Y˜h
− c2) .
We then have that
0 ≤Mjh(r; c)⇔

r ∈ (−∞, ρ−jh(c)] ∪ [ρ+jh(c),∞) when c2 < R2Y˜j .Y˜h
r ∈ [ρ+jh(c), ρ−jh(c)] when R2Y˜j .Y˜h < c
2
.
Combining these results, yields the equivalence between 0 ≤Mjh(r; c) and the range of r.
The sharp bounds Dk,τ,c, Bk,τ,c, and Gk,τ,c follow from the mappings D(·), B(·), and G(·)
in Theorem 2.3.1.
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Figure 11: Evolution of Identification Region over Time
50% (dark) and 95% (light) confidence regions for βj1 (cash flow) for j = 1, 2, 3 (investment,
saving, and debt) from year 1970 to 2017, when X includes asset tangibility. We consider
the regions Bj1, Bc∗j1 , and Bκ,τ,cj1 where c∗ = 0, κ and τ are such that κˆ∗ = 0.5 and τˆ∗ =
(0.9, 0.9, 0.9)′, and c is such that (c12, c12) = (c23, c23) = (−1, 0) and (c13, c13) = (0, 1). The
shaded vertical bars indicate years in which the maintained assumptions are rejected.
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Table 16: Bounds on the Cash Flow Coefficients in the Investment, Saving, and Debt
Equations Using the Full Panel and Accounting for Asset Tangibility
Sκ,τj J κ,τ J κ,τ,c J κ,τ,c
∗
bY.(W,X′)′
Results without fixed effects for κ =∞ and τ = (1, 1, 1)′
β11 [-0.134 , 0.144] [-0.028 , 0.144] [0.130 , 0.144] - 0.143
(-0.142 , 0.145) (-0.033 , 0.145) (0.129 , 0.145) - (0.136 , 0.150)
β21 [-0.438 , 0.122] [-0.014 , 0.122] [0.111 , 0.122] - 0.121
(-0.456 , 0.124) (-0.019 , 0.124) (0.109 , 0.124) - (0.114 , 0.129)
β31 [-0.419 , 1.242] [-0.419 , -0.248] [-0.419 , -0.405] - -0.418
(-0.423 , 1.294) (-0.423 , -0.242) (-0.423 , -0.402) - (-0.436 , -0.400)
Results without fixed effects for κ∗ = 0.5 and τ∗ = (0.9, 0.9, 0.9)′
β11 [0.127 , 0.144] [0.127 , 0.144] [0.130 , 0.144] - 0.143
(0.125 , 0.145) (0.125 , 0.145) (0.129 , 0.145) - (0.136 , 0.150)
β21 [0.108 , 0.122] [0.108 , 0.122] [0.111 , 0.122] - 0.121
(0.106 , 0.124) (0.106 , 0.124) (0.109 , 0.124) - (0.114 , 0.129)
β31 [-0.419 , -0.401] [-0.419 , -0.401] [-0.419 , -0.405] - -0.418
(-0.423 , -0.398) (-0.423 , -0.398) (-0.423 , -0.402) - (-0.436 , -0.400)
Results with year and firm fixed effects for κ =∞ and τ = (1, 1, 1)′
β11 [-0.629 , 0.130] [-0.480 , 0.130] [-0.481 , 0.130] - 0.129
(-0.634 , 0.131) (-0.484 , 0.131) (-0.485 , 0.131) - (0.122 , 0.137)
β21 [-2.267 , 0.170] [-0.273 , 0.170] [-0.274 , 0.170] - 0.170
(-2.300 , 0.172) (-0.279 , 0.172) (-0.280 , 0.172) - (0.159 , 0.181)
β31 [-0.369 , 32.655] [-0.369 , -0.315] [-0.369 , -0.315] - -0.368
(-0.370 , 35.443) (-0.370 , -0.31) (-0.370 , -0.309) - (-0.383 , -0.353)
Results with year and firm fixed effects for κ∗ = 0.5 and τ∗ = (0.9, 0.9, 0.9)′
β11 [0.083 , 0.130] [0.083 , 0.130] [0.083 , 0.130] - 0.129
(0.083 , 0.131) (0.083 , 0.131) (0.083 , 0.131) - (0.122 , 0.137)
β21 [0.136 , 0.170] [0.136 , 0.170] [0.136 , 0.170] - 0.170
(0.135 , 0.172) (0.135 , 0.172) (0.135 , 0.172) - (0.159 , 0.181)
β31 [-0.369 , -0.364] [-0.369 , -0.364] [-0.369 , -0.364] - -0.368
(-0.370 , -0.362) (-0.370 , -0.362) (-0.370 , -0.362) - (-0.383 , -0.353)
The sample is an unbalanced panel of 161,959 firm-year observations. Y1, Y2, and Y3 denote Investment,
Saving, and Debt respectively and X = [Cash Flow,Firm Size,Asset Tangibility]. When year fixed effects
are included, X also includes year indicator variables. When firm fixed effects are included, the equations’
variables undergo a within transformation. c sets (c12, c12) = (c23, c23) = (−1, 0) and (c13, c13) = (0, 1)
whereas c∗ = 0. Robust standard errors for pi are clustered by firm. 50% and 95% confidence regions are in
brackets and parentheses respectively.
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